Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
principles articulated in several international instruments. Forexample, a directive of the European Union deems aspresumptively unfair a term “irrevocably binding the consumer toterms with which he had no real opportunity of becomingacquainted before the conclusion of the contract.”71 Also deemedunfair are terms enabling the supplier to alter the terms of thecontract unilaterally without a valid reason specified in thecontract.72In addition, UCITA for the first expressly validates postpaymentdisclosure of terms—“pay now, terms later”73—underwhat is known as the “rolling contract” theory of contractformation. While it may not always be possible to disclose (ormake available) all applicable terms prior to the creation of abinding agreement (as in the case of a telephone purchase order),that is not the case with respect to online transactions whereinformation can be made readily accessible. Indeed, one can arguethat the Internet is the quintessential marketplace: a place wherethe notional or theoretical fully-informed party to a transactioncan be more closely approximated than in physical markets; anenvironment capable of providing the information that buyersneed to make informed shopping decisions.74 Rather thanrecognizing the ability of the media to resolve informationaldistribution issues, however, UCITA condones the delay ofdisclosure of terms until a consumer is committed to the deal, nomatter how important the terms.75 This is contrary to theapproach in the European Union, where prior disclosure of terms71. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on Unfair Terms of ConsumerContracts, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29, Annex 1(i).72. Id. at Annex 1(j).73. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code forElectronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 635,651 (1999).74. See id. at 652 (“Would it not be consistent . . . to draft legal rules that enhancethe market’s efficiency by providing more information to customers, correcting forinformation asymmetries that might otherwise exist and distort marketperformance?”); see also Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerceas an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1805 (2000) (arguing thatmarketing to consumers online and failing to make pre-transaction disclosuresamounts, like other bait and switch practices, to unfair and deceptive practices inviolation of the Federal Trade Commission Act and states’ little FTC acts).75. See Braucher, supra note 65. UCITA does, however, contain a “safe harbor” toencourage posting. UCITA § 211.
is mandated in certain instances.76 As stated in Guidelines of theOrganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development:“Businesses engaged in electronic commerce should providesufficient information about the terms, conditions and costsassociated with a transaction to enable consumers to make aninformed decision about whether to enter into the transaction.”77The easier it is to find or imply assent to the terms of acontract, the greater the pressure becomes to impose a method toprevent unfair or overreaching terms in the resultingagreements.78 The question of whether to enforce shrink-wrap orclick-wrap licenses is related to a second problem: whattechniques are there for policing unfair or overreaching termsincluded in the license by the licensor?79 To the extent that theseclick-wrap agreements are adhesion contracts, the user or licenseeeffectively has no choice but to accept the objectionable term orreject the entire transaction. To the extent the user has alreadypurchased a product and then finds additional terms (either undera rolling contract theory or because the licensor changes the termsafter the conclusion of the contract), the licensee may find itselfbound by terms it had no ability to negotiate.Repeated attempts in the Article 2 revision process to dealwith unfair terms in adhesion contracts were constantly objected76. Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers inRespect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. A basic purpose of the directive isconsumer protection through prior information, written confirmations, right ofwithdrawal, performance, payment by card, and prevention of inertia selling.77. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, ConsumerProtection in the Context of Electronic Commerce Guidelines, § III(C) (Dec. 9, 1999)[hereinafter OECD], available athttp://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-24-320-0,FF.html.78. The concept of contractual free choice and assent often sound good to thebusinessperson:However, contract law has a darker side as well. Cyberspace is not anegalitarian society with equal chances for every ‘netizen.’ In a world totallyruled by contract, weaker parties risk being subjugated and fundamentalfreedoms may be jeopardized. Freedom of contract may become contractualcoercion, especially when dominant undertakings abuse their market powerto impose contractual rules on powerless consumers, as if they were publicauthorities.P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract and the Code: What Will Remain of thePublic Domain, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 77, 79 (2000).79. See John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24Seton Hall Legis. J. 285 (2000) (surveying the policing approaches available tostandard form contracts and recommending a regulatory response).
- Page 154 and 155: Association (WIPO) will administer
- Page 156 and 157: the new environment.For example, th
- Page 158 and 159: implemented. As this section will h
- Page 160 and 161: ight. First sale is an important di
- Page 162 and 163: sign a hard copy contract containin
- Page 164 and 165: to digital property. As well, free
- Page 166 and 167: desirable to sellers and buyers ali
- Page 168 and 169: ural and remote areas, where access
- Page 170 and 171: as “high-speed telecommunications
- Page 172 and 173: decrease innovation.30 On the other
- Page 174 and 175: could be called a trespass, since a
- Page 176 and 177: inform what permissible access and
- Page 178 and 179: Universal Music Group uses software
- Page 180 and 181: Taking UCITA on the Road: WhatLesso
- Page 182 and 183: the debate has centered on whether
- Page 184 and 185: It is against this background that
- Page 186 and 187: similarities as well as differences
- Page 188 and 189: as well, such as the American Bar A
- Page 190 and 191: American Law Institute refused to p
- Page 192 and 193: enactment of the draft. This led to
- Page 194 and 195: such application.35 To the extent,
- Page 196 and 197: transactions involving goods other
- Page 198 and 199: quite controversial.49 As the histo
- Page 200 and 201: provisions of Article 2 (based in p
- Page 202 and 203: form license of information.63 Alth
- Page 206 and 207: to by industry groups, with the res
- Page 208 and 209: powers going well beyond the UNIDRO
- Page 210 and 211: Contracts deals with unfair terms i
- Page 212 and 213: worth a thousand words. Picture a d
- Page 214 and 215: types of provisions being sought by
- Page 216 and 217: law is a complex one.125 Although s
- Page 218 and 219: the intellectual property balance o
- Page 220 and 221: Other Substantive IssuesThere are,
- Page 222 and 223: law,153 and many of UCITA’s provi
- Page 224 and 225: nature of law-making both domestica
- Page 226 and 227: Transactions Act).
- Page 228 and 229: acts of copyright infringement.7 Un
- Page 230 and 231: these rights.I. ISP LIABILITY FOR T
- Page 232 and 233: Cubby, the court in Stratton Oakmon
- Page 234 and 235: liability for third-party content.5
- Page 236 and 237: network and removed the edition of
- Page 238 and 239: subscribers’ conversations.84 Fur
- Page 240 and 241: holder.92 Contributory liability ap
- Page 242 and 243: and Klemesrud on the counts of dire
- Page 244 and 245: eport, the White Paper on Intellect
- Page 246 and 247: imposed ISP liability both in insta
- Page 248 and 249: any infringing material either upon
- Page 250 and 251: provider liability, the European Co
- Page 252 and 253: of a defamatory statement.While saf
is mandated in certain instances.76 As stated in Guidelines <strong>of</strong> theOrganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development:“Businesses engaged in electronic commerce should providesufficient information about the terms, conditions and costsassociated with a transaction to enable consumers to make aninformed decision about whether to enter into the transaction.”77The easier it is to find or imply assent to the terms <strong>of</strong> acontract, the greater the pressure becomes to impose a method toprevent unfair or overreaching terms in the resultingagreements.78 The question <strong>of</strong> whether to enforce shrink-wrap orclick-wrap licenses is related to a second problem: whattechniques are there for policing unfair or overreaching termsincluded in the license by the licensor?79 To the extent that theseclick-wrap agreements are adhesion contracts, the user or licenseeeffectively has no choice but to accept the objectionable term orreject the entire transaction. To the extent the user has alreadypurchased a product and then finds additional terms (either undera rolling contract theory or because the licensor changes the termsafter the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the contract), the licensee may find itselfbound by terms it had no ability to negotiate.Repeated attempts in the Article 2 revision process to dealwith unfair terms in adhesion contracts were constantly objected76. Council Directive 97/7/EC <strong>of</strong> 20 May 1997 on the Protection <strong>of</strong> Consumers inRespect <strong>of</strong> Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19. A basic purpose <strong>of</strong> the directive isconsumer protection through prior information, written confirmations, right <strong>of</strong>withdrawal, performance, payment by card, and prevention <strong>of</strong> inertia selling.77. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, ConsumerProtection in the Context <strong>of</strong> Electronic Commerce Guidelines, § III(C) (Dec. 9, 1999)[hereinafter OECD], available athttp://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-0-nodirectorate-no-24-320-0,FF.html.78. The concept <strong>of</strong> contractual free choice and assent <strong>of</strong>ten sound good to thebusinessperson:However, contract law has a darker side as well. Cyberspace is not anegalitarian society with equal chances for every ‘netizen.’ In a world totallyruled by contract, weaker parties risk being subjugated and fundamentalfreedoms may be jeopardized. Freedom <strong>of</strong> contract may become contractualcoercion, especially when dominant undertakings abuse their market powerto impose contractual rules on powerless consumers, as if they were publicauthorities.P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract and the Code: What Will Remain <strong>of</strong> thePublic Domain, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 77, 79 (2000).79. See John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A <strong>No</strong>nfiction Approach, 24Seton Hall Legis. J. 285 (2000) (surveying the policing approaches available tostandard form contracts and recommending a regulatory response).