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Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

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principle in the digital/crypto world is conservative and dated.However, I am yet to be convinced that I am a dinosaur, or thatthe demise <strong>of</strong> fair use is a good thing.How do we ensure the code world and its digital property willespouse public values <strong>of</strong> user and access? The answer to thisquestion requires us to determine the source and location <strong>of</strong>values inherent to digital property and their continued relevanceand enforceability.VI. THE VALUES DEFINING DIGITAL PROPERTY: DIGITALCONSTITUTIONALISMAs we have seen to this point, digital property takes definitionfrom legislation, contract and technology. The Constitution, as afoundational document bringing fairness to the exercise <strong>of</strong> power,acts as an overlay. However, U.S. constitutional law and itsfundamental values, such as free speech and equality, are onlyoperative where there is evidence <strong>of</strong> state action: legislative,administrative or judicial.379 Therefore, U.S. constitutional lawwill have limited application in the privatised world <strong>of</strong> code, whereprivate technology corporations build self-executing digitalarchitecture embedded/coded with corporate, not public values.The doctrine <strong>of</strong> state action, which perpetuates the public/privatedivide, is a crucial issue to understand. Some suggest its enduringnature in U.S. constitutional law comes from the notion <strong>of</strong> laissezfaire—the idea that people like to think their private actions areregulated by little more than the market.380 Whatever itsrationale, the notion <strong>of</strong> state action means that, in many cases,values inherent in public constitutionalism will have limitedimpact in the digital world. This challenges us to conceptualise anotion <strong>of</strong> digital constitutionalism wherein public values are379. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334U.S. 1 (1948); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional <strong>Law</strong> 1711 (2d ed. 1988); seealso Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1975) (holding that picketers did not have a FirstAmendment right to enter the shopping center for the purpose <strong>of</strong> advertising theirstrike against their employer); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that a shopping center whichserves as a community business block was the functional equivalent <strong>of</strong> a business blockfor First Amendment purposes); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the PrivateSphere (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994).380. Paul S. Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value<strong>of</strong> Applying Constitutional <strong>No</strong>rms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1263,1288 (2000).

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