Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
information rights and legislated copyrights were fundamentallydifferent.359 He explained that contract is a mechanism forprivate ordering that applies only between the parties to thecontract whereas the Copyright Act is public legislation thatapplies to the world at large.360Some critics have said that non-negotiated mass marketlicences are much more like legislation than contract and shouldbe closely scrutinised in terms of preemption.361 Lemley suggeststhat the weight of the ProCD decision should not be overstated asit goes against the majority of judicial opinion on the issue.362 InAustralia, the courts have yet to explicitly determine the legalvalidity of shrink-wrap and click-wrap contracts. Such contractswill inevitably be challenged, as in the United States, on the basisthat they do not adequately disclose the terms of the contract priorto the entering of the agreement.363 The issue of the formation ofcontractual licences will continue to be important to thecomplexion and definition of digital property because knowingwhether a contract exists, and upon what terms, is intimatelyconnected to informational exploitation and user rights.D. Contractual Allocation of Domain NamesContract has been even more prominent in the area of domainname allocation. Allocation of the premium Internet commercialtrading domain “.com” is now performed through a contractualregime created under the auspices of the Internet Corporation for359. Id. at 1454.360. Id.361. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-LineLicenses, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Pre-emption: TheLaw and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999); MaureenA. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach,12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (1997); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, andPublic Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against ReverseEngineering, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 543 (1992).362. See Mark A. Lemley, Software and Internet Law 490-93 (2000).363. See Mark Sneddon, Legal Liability and E-Transactions 33-34 (2000), availableat http://www.noie.gov.au/publications/NOIE/NEAC/publication_utz1508.pdf (lastvisited Nov. 16, 2001); see generally Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., 2 Q.B. 163(1970) (holding in a case regarding contract printed on parking lot ticket that sinceplaintiff did not know of the exemption condition and the defendants had not donewhat was reasonably sufficient to bring it to his notice, it did not except them fromliability); Balmain New Ferry Co. v. Robertson (1906) 4 C.L.R. 379 (Austl.) (holdingthat notice posted above wharf entrance was sufficient to show implied agreement toterms).
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)364 requiringarbitration.365The recent string of personality cases concerningJuliaRoberts.com, Sting.com and Madonna.com are interestingexamples.366 Enterprising business people moved in early andregistered those domains. The famous stars behind the nameswanted them and sought to invoke the ICANN dispute resolutionpolicy, which involves compulsory arbitration. At the time ofregistration, the domain name registrants contractually bindthemselves, in the instance of a dispute, to enter arbitration andabide by the decision. If the registrant is found to have registeredand used the domain name in bad faith, vis-a-vis a trademark,they stand to lose that registration. Julia Roberts and Madonnawere successful in showing the necessary elements, including thatthey possessed a trademark, while Sting, due to the genericnature of the word and other difficulties, did not possess therequisite trademark.This system is in line for an overhaul as the legitimacy,consistency and accountability of the process is in question.367Nevertheless, let me make some observations. The ICANNsystem of resolving domain name disputes, which has dealt within excess of 3,000 cases since the beginning of the year 2000, hassought to protect informational value through contractuallyagreed principles. To date, the majority of the decisions havefavoured the traditional trademark holder and not the domainname speculator. Domain name speculation has been treated likea case of the theft of the investment value of the trademark.368The speculator has rarely been regarded as deserving of reward.Perhaps there should be arguments for value on both sides, but364. ICANN is available at http://www.icann.org.365. ICANN: Uniform Domain Names Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), art. 4, athttp://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).366. These decisions are available athttp://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/index.html.367. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANNto Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17 (2000) (arguing thatthe use of ICANN to regulate in the stead of an executive agency violates fundamentalvalues and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the use of governmentpower, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities).368. See Brian F. Fitzgerald & Emma Sheehan, Trademark Dilution and theCommodification of Information: Understanding the ‘Cultural Command’, 3 MacarthurL. Rev. 61 (1999) (Austl.).
- Page 100 and 101: scope of the Commerce Clause in the
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information rights and legislated copyrights were fundamentallydifferent.359 He explained that contract is a mechanism forprivate ordering that applies only between the parties to thecontract whereas the Copyright Act is public legislation thatapplies to the world at large.360Some critics have said that non-negotiated mass marketlicences are much more like legislation than contract and shouldbe closely scrutinised in terms <strong>of</strong> preemption.361 Lemley suggeststhat the weight <strong>of</strong> the ProCD decision should not be overstated asit goes against the majority <strong>of</strong> judicial opinion on the issue.362 InAustralia, the courts have yet to explicitly determine the legalvalidity <strong>of</strong> shrink-wrap and click-wrap contracts. Such contractswill inevitably be challenged, as in the United States, on the basisthat they do not adequately disclose the terms <strong>of</strong> the contract priorto the entering <strong>of</strong> the agreement.363 The issue <strong>of</strong> the formation <strong>of</strong>contractual licences will continue to be important to thecomplexion and definition <strong>of</strong> digital property because knowingwhether a contract exists, and upon what terms, is intimatelyconnected to informational exploitation and user rights.D. Contractual Allocation <strong>of</strong> Domain NamesContract has been even more prominent in the area <strong>of</strong> domainname allocation. Allocation <strong>of</strong> the premium Internet commercialtrading domain “.com” is now performed through a contractualregime created under the auspices <strong>of</strong> the Internet Corporation for359. Id. at 1454.360. Id.361. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption <strong>of</strong> Shrinkwrap and On-LineLicenses, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Pre-emption: The<strong>Law</strong> and Policy <strong>of</strong> Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1999); MaureenA. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach,12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (1997); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, andPublic Policy: Federal Preemption <strong>of</strong> S<strong>of</strong>tware License Prohibitions Against ReverseEngineering, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 543 (1992).362. See Mark A. Lemley, S<strong>of</strong>tware and Internet <strong>Law</strong> 490-93 (2000).363. See Mark Sneddon, Legal Liability and E-Transactions 33-34 (2000), availableat http://www.noie.gov.au/publications/NOIE/NEAC/publication_utz1508.pdf (lastvisited <strong>No</strong>v. 16, 2001); see generally Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., 2 Q.B. 163(1970) (holding in a case regarding contract printed on parking lot ticket that sinceplaintiff did not know <strong>of</strong> the exemption condition and the defendants had not donewhat was reasonably sufficient to bring it to his notice, it did not except them fromliability); Balmain New Ferry Co. v. Robertson (1906) 4 C.L.R. 379 (Austl.) (holdingthat notice posted above wharf entrance was sufficient to show implied agreement toterms).