Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

y the later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of anyinconsistency between Sony and the new statute. Sonywas a suit for contributory infringement brought againstmanufacturers of videocassette recorders on the theorythat the manufacturers were contributing to infringinghome taping of copyrighted television broadcasts. TheSupreme Court held that the manufacturers were notliable in view of the substantial numbers of copyrightholders who either had authorized or did not object tosuch taping by viewers. But Sony has no applicationhere.When Sony was decided, the only question was whetherthe manufacturers could be held liable for infringementby those who purchased equipment from them incircumstances in which there were many noninfringinguses for their equipment. But that is not the questionnow before this Court. The question here is whether thepossibility of noninfringing fair use by someone who gainsaccess to a protected copyrighted work through acircumvention technology distributed by the defendantssaves the defendants from liability under Section 1201.But nothing in Section 1201 so suggests. By prohibitingthe provision of circumvention technology, the DMCAfundamentally altered the landscape. A given device orpiece of technology might have “a substantialnoninfringing use, and hence be immune from attackunder Sony’s construction of the Copyright Act—butnonetheless still be subject to suppression under Section1201.” Indeed, Congress explicitly noted that Section1201 does not incorporate Sony.. . . The fact that Congress elected to leave technologicallyunsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use ofencrypted copyrighted works without the technical meansof doing so is a matter for Congress unless Congress’decision contravenes the Constitution, a matter to whichthe Court turns below.297In summary, the DMCA provides an exception for297. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24.