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Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

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to oust competitors, there was nothing wrong with what they haddone—in fact, it was simply a normal business decision.243 Theeconomic effect <strong>of</strong> Melway’s action and ultimate consumer welfare(from an economic sense) seemed to be in harmony. Melway’s wassuccessful in having their action vindicated.Judge Kirby’s dissent was geared toward guaranteeing andensuring diversity <strong>of</strong> suppliers and access to the informationalproduct. He explained:The respondent’s primary submission was that,properly analysed, Queensland Wire stands for only onerelevant legal proposition applicable to this case. Thiswas that “take advantage <strong>of</strong>” means no more than “use.”In determining whether a corporation has “take[n]advantage <strong>of</strong> “its market power for a proscribed purpose,the respondent argued that all that was necessary waspro<strong>of</strong> that, as a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, the corporation, havingsuch power, had refused supply for a proscribed purpose.Upon this view, it was unnecessary to pose hypotheticalquestions (sometimes difficult to resolve) as to whethersuch corporation could or would, acting rationally, haveengaged in the forbidden conduct if it were subject toeffective competition. My own opinion is that this iscorrect analysis <strong>of</strong> s 46(1) <strong>of</strong> the Act. I also consider thatit is what the decision in Queensland Wire stands for as abinding principle <strong>of</strong> law. There is nothing in thelanguage <strong>of</strong> the section itself that obliges theascertainment <strong>of</strong> an answer to a hypothetical question.If, as was held in Queensland Wire, “take advantage <strong>of</strong>”means no more than “use”, that presents a purely factualquestion to be answered. In short, if the supplier enjoys asubstantial degree <strong>of</strong> market power, the grant or refusal<strong>of</strong> supply is necessarily, as a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, takingadvantage <strong>of</strong> (sc “using”) such market power. It is doingso because the power to grant, or refuse, supply is part <strong>of</strong>243. Id. at para 67. The majority explained:But it does not follow that because a firm in fact enjoys freedom from competitiveconstraint, and in fact refuses to supply a particular person, there is a relevantconnection between the freedom and the refusal. Presence <strong>of</strong> competitive constraintmight be compatible with a similar refusal, especially if it is done to secure businessadvantages which would exist in a competitive environment.Id.

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