Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
that a monopolist should not seek to grow or maintain183 amonopoly through anti-competitive conduct. Section 46 of theAustralian Trade Practices Act says that someone possessingsubstantial market power should not take advantage of thatpower to lessen competition, while in Europe an entity should notabuse a dominant position in the market.184Understanding the scope and function of these laws dependson understanding their purpose. There are at least two reasonsfor adopting competition laws:185to facilitate diversity of economic actors in the marketplace—suggesting a number of small or medium playersrather than monopolies and;to ensure economic efficiency leading to an optimisationof consumer welfare—suggesting a market place thatprovides the best economic outcomes for consumersThe first rationale promotes diversity while the second promoteseconomic efficiency, in terms of economic welfare.Many subscribe to the view that the Sherman Act was enactedto protect the existence of small or medium size businesses in theface of monopolies.186 However, under the influence of theChicago School of Law and Economics, antitrust law is nowadaysmore frequently conceptualized in terms of the economic efficiencyof market practices with consumer welfare as an economic issueshall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall bepunished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any otherperson, $ 350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by bothsaid punishments, in the discretion of the court.Id.183. In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Courtexplained that “[t]he offense of monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act has twoelements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) thewillful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth ordevelopment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historicaccident.” 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.563, 570-71 (1966)).184. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.).185. See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty and Stability in Antitrust Law,16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 741-64 (2001) (discussing “some of antitrust’s purposes”).186. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy 47-76 (2d ed. 1999) (arguingthis view is supported by more recent amendments to the Sherman Act and publicchoice theory of the role of interest groups in the legislative process); George J. Stigler,The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. of Legal Stud. 1, 1-8 (1985).
eing the ultimate criterion.187 The economic efficiency approachat points seems to ignore political and social aspects of themarket.188 In Australia, section 2 of the Trade Practices Actprovides: “The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare ofAustralians through the promotion of competition and fair tradingand provision for consumer protection.”189David McGowan has recently written190 about the competingrationales of U.S. antitrust law in light of the Microsoft191decision. He ponders whether the decision is really aboutguaranteeing the existence of smaller firms and competition in themarket place or whether it is about total economic efficiencyanalysed through producer and consumer equations and evidencedin optimal costs and pricing.192 He argues that Judge Jackson inthe Microsoft case seemed to want to invoke both notions.193 Hequestions whether “innovation,” as invoked in antitrust reasoning,is a pursuit of many small players in the market or the pursuit ofbest possible outcomes in terms of economic welfare.194So what is it that we really want from antitrust law—diversity or optimal consumer welfare? The two are notnecessarily congruent. If we choose diversity as the touchstone,the exploitation of intellectual property rights will be defined inthis light and we may see courts more willing to facilitate abroader range of access to informational products than we wouldunder an economic efficiency approach. And if we marry a culturaltheory of intellectual property law with a cultural theory ofantitrust law, we are almost certain to see differently constructeddigital property rights than if economic theory were the187. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis ofAntitrust Principles and Their Application, 8-11, 51-57, 94-137 (2d ed. 2000) (calling fora multi-dimensional approach, yet arguing for the primary importance of consumerwelfare over rivalry of small business—although economic theory is said to be limited);Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 15-134 (1978).188. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F. 2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir.1945); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); seealso Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 187, at 97-115; Bork, supra note 187, at 50-56;Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1076 (1979).189. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46.190. See McGowan, supra note 185.191. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).192. See McGowan, supra note 185, at 766-76.193. Id.194. Id.
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that a monopolist should not seek to grow or maintain183 amonopoly through anti-competitive conduct. Section 46 <strong>of</strong> theAustralian Trade Practices Act says that someone possessingsubstantial market power should not take advantage <strong>of</strong> thatpower to lessen competition, while in Europe an entity should notabuse a dominant position in the market.184Understanding the scope and function <strong>of</strong> these laws dependson understanding their purpose. There are at least two reasonsfor adopting competition laws:185to facilitate diversity <strong>of</strong> economic actors in the marketplace—suggesting a number <strong>of</strong> small or medium playersrather than monopolies and;to ensure economic efficiency leading to an optimisation<strong>of</strong> consumer welfare—suggesting a market place thatprovides the best economic outcomes for consumersThe first rationale promotes diversity while the second promoteseconomic efficiency, in terms <strong>of</strong> economic welfare.Many subscribe to the view that the Sherman Act was enactedto protect the existence <strong>of</strong> small or medium size businesses in theface <strong>of</strong> monopolies.186 However, under the influence <strong>of</strong> theChicago <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and Economics, antitrust law is nowadaysmore frequently conceptualized in terms <strong>of</strong> the economic efficiency<strong>of</strong> market practices with consumer welfare as an economic issueshall be deemed guilty <strong>of</strong> a felony, and, on conviction there<strong>of</strong>, shall bepunished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any otherperson, $ 350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by bothsaid punishments, in the discretion <strong>of</strong> the court.Id.183. In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Supreme Courtexplained that “[t]he <strong>of</strong>fense <strong>of</strong> monopoly under §2 <strong>of</strong> the Sherman Act has twoelements: (1) the possession <strong>of</strong> monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) thewillful acquisition or maintenance <strong>of</strong> that power as distinguished from growth ordevelopment as a consequence <strong>of</strong> a superior product, business acumen, or historicaccident.” 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.563, 570-71 (1966)).184. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.).185. See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty and Stability in Antitrust <strong>Law</strong>,16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 741-64 (2001) (discussing “some <strong>of</strong> antitrust’s purposes”).186. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy 47-76 (2d ed. 1999) (arguingthis view is supported by more recent amendments to the Sherman Act and publicchoice theory <strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong> interest groups in the legislative process); George J. Stigler,The Origin <strong>of</strong> the Sherman Act, 14 J. <strong>of</strong> Legal Stud. 1, 1-8 (1985).