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TRUSTS OF LANDAND PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL:SECURING A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN LANDOliver Hilton

TRUSTS OF LAND1. In both life and death 1 disputes commonly arise regarding the beneficial interest inland. We are concerned here with a party claiming as against a sole proprietor abeneficial interest in land, or, in respect of co-ownership, disputes regarding theirrespective shares. In either case, the matter is resolved by reference to express orimplied (i.e. a constructive) trusts.The Express Trust2. Parties often record the beneficial interests in land in signed writing 2 pursuant toLaw Property Act 1925 s53(1)(b). Indeed, it is well settled that unless rescinded onthe grounds of fraud or mistake, or rectified, such written declarations of trust areconclusive as between the parties for all time, and the court will not consider parolevidence to contradict it 3 .3. It has been suggested however that a declaration of trust could be subject tovariation by subsequent agreement (perhaps even an informal agreement) orproprietary estoppel 4 .The Implied Trust4. In the absence of such a declaration, a common intention constructive trust willneed to be established.5. The law since Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset 5 has “moved on”, and the modernapproach of the Court is now governed by the opinion of Baroness Hale in Stackv Dowden.1 Contentious matters concerning co-ownership of land sometimes arise only on death. These are not dealtwith in this paper, but include: (1) whether a beneficial joint tenancy had been severed before death; (2)whether a severable half share should be ordered to retained by the deceased co-owner’s estate pursuant tos9 of the Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 or under s421A of the InsolvencyAct 1986; and (3) whether, upon the death of a tenant in common, the property ought to be sold.2 Commonly achieved by filling in the appropriate boxes on the TR1 form or by separate declaration oftrust.3 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777; Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886; Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam106; Huntingford v Hobbs [1993] 1 FLR 736; Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432.4 See Lewin on Trusts, 18 th Ed., Para 9-55; and Stack v Dowden at para [49]2

6. Baroness Hale explained that the task for the Court is“…to ascertain the parties’ sharedintentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in light of their whole course ofconduct in relation to it.” 6 For these purposes she endorsed the adoption of a “holisticapproach”, undertaking a survey of the whole course of dealing between the partiesand taking account of all conduct which throws light on the question what shareswere intended 7 .7. In divining that common intention, the majority of the House of Lords were ofthe view that, at least in the domestic context 8 , the resulting trust analysis does notoperation as a starting legal presumption. It was said: “Many more factors thanfinancial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties' true intentions” 9 , “although it may(in an updated form which takes account of all significant contributions, direct or indirect, in cashor in kind) happen to be reflected in the parties’ common intention.” 108. Instead, the starting point is the presumption that equity follows the law, asBaroness Hale explained 11 :“Just as the starting point where there is sole legal ownership is sole beneficial ownership,the starting point where there is joint legal ownership is joint beneficial ownership. Theonus is upon the person seeking to show that the beneficial ownership is different from thelegal ownership. So in sole ownership cases it is upon the non-owner to show that he hasany interest at all. In joint ownership cases, it is upon the joint owner who claims to haveother than a joint beneficial interest.”9. There are thus two hurdles to overcome: “first, was it intended that the parties shouldshare the beneficial interest in a property …; and second, if it was so intended, in whatproportions was it intended that they share the beneficial interest?” 125 [1991] 1 AC 1076 Para [60]7 Para [61]8 i.e. in respect of matrimonial or quasi-matrimonial property. However this phrase is not limited to claimsbetween co-habitees in a sexual relationship, but can extend to other domestic relationship, such as motherand son: Adekunle v Ritchie, unreported, 17th August 2007 (Leeds County Court, John Behrens QC)9 Baroness Hale at Para [69]; and see also her opinion in Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53 at Para [4].10 Lord Walker at Para [31], who described his authoritative opinion as an ‘extended footnote’ to that ofBaroness Hale. It was on this point that Lord Neuberger gave a dissenting opinion.11 at Para [56]12 As set out by Baroness Hale in the later case of Abbott v Abbott at Para [4].3

10. It is to be noted at the outset that:(1) The inquiry is to the common intention at the date of acquisition 13 ;(2) The common intention constructive trust is not ‘ambulatory’: see Jones vKernott 14 where it was held that the beneficial interest, accepted by theparties as being equal from acquisition to the date of their separation, couldnot, without an express agreement, change by reason of unequalcontributions over a passage of time (12 years in that case) after theseparation.The First Hurdle11. The primary question is: “was there a common intention that each should have a beneficialinterest in the property.” 1512. The case of joint legal tenancies is straightforward since equity follows the law. AsBaroness Hale observed in Stack v Dowden: “a conveyance into joint names is sufficient,at least in the vast majority of cases, to surmount the first hurdle.” 1613. The case of a sole proprietor is more complex.14. The better view seems to be that Lord Bridge’s test in Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset wasaddressed at the primary question 17 . That test tells us that a common intention thatA and B should both have a beneficial interest in property may arise:(1) by express agreement, arrangement or understanding however imperfectlyremembered and however imprecise their terms may have been, coupledwith detrimental reliance; or13 Para [62].14 [2010] EWCA Civ 57815 Oxley v Hiscock [2005] Fam 211 at 235, per Chadwick LJ, cited with approval by Baroness Hale in Stackv Dowden.16 Para [63].17 Oxley v Hiscock at 2354

(2) where there was no evidence of actual agreement, by inference from theconduct of the parties in relation to the property (as to both the commonintention, reliance and detriment), readily justified where B contributesdirectly to the purchase price, whether by cash contribution or itsequivalent, or by paying mortgage instalments 18 ;15. However, Lord Bridge’s doubt that anything less than a contribution to thepurchase price will do to infer a common intention was in itself doubted in Stackv Dowden, where Baroness Hale suggested that his “the observations, which werestrictly obita dicta, … have set [the first] hurdle rather too high in certain respects.” 19 . LordWalker also commented that the law had moved on 20 , a position more firmlyadopted by Baroness Hale in Abbott v Abbott, where she considered that:“The Court of Appeal appears to have attached undue significance to the dictum ofLord Bridge …, in particular as to what conduct is to be taken into account inquantifying an acknowledged beneficial interest. The law has indeed moved on since then.The parties' whole course of conduct in relation to the property must be taken intoaccount in determining their shared intentions as to its ownership.” 2116. The authors of the latest edition of Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property andthe Court in Holman v Howes 22 and Hapeshi v Allnatt 23 have all adopted thisbroader approach.17. This has not met universal support however, and a number of recent decisionshave cautioned against inferring a common intention from conduct alone,particularly of domestic duties, staying home to look after the children,contribution to rates and certain utility bills and purchase of some fittings andfixtures and domestic chattels 24 .18 In the earlier case of Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638 it had been said that contributions to the purchaseprice of the property will show evidence from which an intention can be inferred, as corroboration ofdirect evidence of intention, as evidence that the Claimant has acted to her detriment in reliance on theintention, and to quantify the size of her beneficial interest.19 Para [63]20 Para [26]21 Para [19].22 [2007] EWCA Civ 877. Although in that case the parties had agreed that the wife had a beneficial interest,so the question was one of quantification only, the second hurdle.23 [2010] EWHC 392 at para [18]24 See Morris v Morris [2008] EWCA Civ 257 per Sir Peter Gibson at para [23]; Thompson v Humphrey[2009] EWHC 3576 (Ch) per Warren J at Para [29]; and Jones v Kernott [2009] EWHC 1713 per5

18. It does seem clear now, however, that when Baroness Hale talked of imputing acommon intention, she meant no more than inferring/implying an intention,rather than enabling the Court to invent one: Jones v Kernott 25 .The Second Hurdle19. If the parties expressly agree their shares, that will normally be conclusive, and acourt will depart from it only if there is good cause to do so: see Hapeshi vAllnatt 26 .20. In the absence of such agreement, the Court must undertake a search for the resultwhich reflects what the parties must, in the light of their conduct, be taken to haveintended.21. In joint ownership cases Baroness Hale explained in Stack v Dowden: “the question… was not simply ‘what is the extent of the parties’ beneficial interest’ but ‘did the parties intendtheir beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests’” 27 She later said: “in jointnames cases [a full examination of the facts] is … unlikely to lead to a different result [from afinding of joint beneficial ownership] unless the facts are very unusual” 28 .22. In relation to the case of a sole proprietor, the extent of the parties’ beneficialinterest is to be answered “by inferences from their subsequent conduct” 29 . In so doing, theCourt will declare such interest as it “considers fair having regard to the whole course ofdealing between them in relation to the property…[including] the arrangements which they makefrom time to time in order to meet the outgoings (for example mortgage contributions, council taxand utilities, repairs, insurance and housekeeping) which have to be met if they are to live in theproperty as their home.” 30Strauss QC at Para [26(1)]. There was also some support from this at Para [39] of Wall LJ’s decision onappeal ([2010] EWCA Civ 578)25 Per Rimer LJ at Paras [76-77]26 Para [17]27 Para [66]28 Para [68]. See also Para [33] of Lord Walker’s opinion. It should be noted that the House of Lords inStack v Dowden did depart from the presumption on the basis, inter alia, of unequal contributions. Seealso Fowler v Barron [2008] 2 FLR 1 where the presumption was not rebutted.29 Oxley v Hiscock, Para [47].30 Oxley v Hiscock, Para [69]. These passages were approved by Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden, whocommented that “the approach to quantification in cases where the home is conveyed into joint names should certainly be nostricter than the approach to quantification in cases where it has been conveyed into the name of one only.” (Para [65]).6

23. This approach, however, it does not enable the court to produce the result whichthe court itself considers fair 31 . As Lloyd LJ put it recently in Holman v Howes:“The court's enquiry is, therefore, for what was intended between the parties, or if thatcannot be identified directly, what they must be taken from their conduct to have intended;it is not for that which the court considers fair… The task formulated and approved is,first, to survey the whole course of dealing between the parties, and second, to take accountof all conduct which throws light on the question of what shares were intended.” 3224. Such conduct and relevant factors are likely to include 33 :(1) any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upontheir intentions then;(2) the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names;(3) the reasons why (if it were the case) the survivor was authorised to give areceipt for the capital moneys;(4) the purpose for which the home was acquired;(5) the nature of the parties’ relationship;(6) whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility toprovide a home;(7) how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently;(8) how the parties arranged their finances (whether separately or together, or abit of both);(9) how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their otherhousehold expenses;31 Stack v Dowden at Para [61]32 Paras [30]-[31]33 Stack v Dowden, Para [69] per Baroness Hale.7

(10) the parties’ individual characters and personalities; and(11) the construction (or financing of the construction) of an extension orsubstantial improvements to the property (including significantcontributions of manual labour 34 ).34 See also Para [36] of Lord Walker’s opinion8

PROPRIETY ESTOPPEL1. Claims that a property owner is estopped from denying another’s interest 35 in hisproperty are particularly common in recent times.2. The principles of proprietary estoppel are said to be closely aligned to those ofcommon intention constructive trusts, particularly in cases based on a jointenterprise and/or positive agreement or assurance 36 concerning a present interestin land;3. Constructive trusts, however, are not applicable in the passive encouragementcases, where only proprietary estoppel will provide a remedy 37 . So too, aproprietary estoppel analysis, rather than constructive trust one, is required forclaims 38 against an estate based on an expectant future interest, encouraged by thedeceased before his death, in the deceased’s property.4. The modern approach to proprietary estoppel has been considered in two recentHouse of Lords case:(1) Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Limited 39 , which involving acommercial relationship is less relevant to domestic, post-deal claims 40 ; and(2) Thorner v Major 41 , a definitive judgment claims based on expectations offuture benefits in a deceased’s estate.Basic principles5. The doctrine “is based on three main elements, …: a representation or assurance made to theclaimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his(reasonable) reliance.” 4235 Or perhaps more accurately, that a property right has been or is to be affected or created36 Proprietary estoppel will often be necessary in post acquisition cases.37 Yaxley v Gotts [1999] EWCA Civ 1680.38 Usually by a disgruntled would be beneficiary.39 [2008] UKHL 55.40 That case concerned an oral assurance to sell a property comprising a number of flats for £12m pursuantto which, it was alleged, the promisee expended money on architects and other professionals in applyingfor planning permission before purchase.41 [2009] 1 WLR 776.9

6. The test is best summarised as follows::“If A, under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a certaininterest in land thereafter, on the faith of such expectation and with the knowledge of Band without objection from him, acts to his detriment in connection with such land, aCourt of Equity will compel B to give effect to such expectation.” 437. The doctrine, however, is not treated as subdivided into three watertightcompartments. Instead 44 :(1) Unconscionable conduct is the fundamental principle that equity isconcerned to prevent, and that principle permeates all the elements of thedoctrine;(2) The question for the court was whether the combined effect of what thelandowner had said and done, on the one hand, and the overall conduct ofthe promisee on the other, meant that the repudiation of an assurance wasunconscionable in all the circumstances;(3) For these purposes the Court would conduct a broad enquiry, looking atthe case in the round.8. The equity is an inchoate right only, giving the claimant the right to go to court toseek relief and only crystallising on the Court’s decision. The Court however has awide discretion as to satisfying the equity to avoid an unconscionable result havingregard to all of the circumstances.Representation9. The first requirement is that the owner of land induces, encourages or allows theClaimant to expect or believe that he has or will enjoy some right or benefit overthe owner’s property.42 Thorner v Major, per Lord Walker at Para [29]43 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd (Note) 43 per Oliver J at ppg 15244 Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 and Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159 per Walker LJ and Cook vThomas [2010] EWCA Civ 227 per Lloyd LJ.10

10. A representation may be made in a direct, express form by encouraging words orconduct or as a result of an agreement between the parties. These tend to be easierto prove.11. However “perhaps the classic example of proprietary estoppel is based on silence and inaction,rather than any statement or action” 45 . The representation may thus take the indirectform of encouraging the claimant in a pre-existing expectation or of acquiescenceby silence or inactivity and allowing the claimant to act to his detriment 46 . InLester v Woodgate 47 Pattern J considered in such a case “the landowner's passive anduncomplaining acquiescence in what is done may amount to an assurance that the other party willcontinue to enjoy rights over his land on which it would be reasonable for that party to rely.” 48 .Mere inaction is not sufficient, however. What is required is that “… the landownerbecomes aware of the work and knows that the other party is carrying it out in the belief that heowns the land in question or has rights over it but fails to object, [and in such a case] his silencewill be treated as a species of equitable fraud sufficient to found an estoppel.” 49 . In such cases itwas the duty of the landowner to investigate his title and prevent the works.However, no equity will usually arise where the claimant was working on thelandowners’ property knowing that he had no right to do so, or if there was amistaken belief, the landowner was not aware of it 50 .12. The representation it seems need not be strictly ‘clear and unambiguous’, but must be‘clear enough’ as reasonably conveyed to the promisee in the context of the case: seeThorner v Major where in the context of that case a sufficient representationarose by implication and inference from indirect, unclear, oblique remarks andconduct.13. It follows that provided the person at whom the representation is directedreasonably believed that the representation is true and intended to be acted uponby himself it is not necessary to prove that the promisor intended that his words orconduct would have that effect or was even subjectively aware that they did so 51 .45 Thorner v Major per Lord Neuberger in at Para [84].46 The unilateral mistake / standing back / passive encouragement type of case47 [2010] EWCA Civ 19948 Para [26]49 Para [29]50 Paras [30] & [33]51 Thorner v Major per Lord Hoffman Para [5].11

14. It is now well established that the promise need not be made irrevocably. Whileproprietary estoppel is based on promises which, made without consideration orregarding future dispositions under an estate, are inherently irrevocable (andsubject to a change of mind), “[w]hat later makes them binding, and therefore irrevocable, isthe promisee's detrimental reliance on them. Once that occurs, there is simply no question of thepromisor changing his or her mind." 52 .15. Again, however, it seems that context is everything. It may be that the promise inwas so unambiguous and had been made on numerous occasions at familygatherings, that it was thus “more than more than a mere statement of present (revocable)intention, and is tantamount to a promise.” 53 On the other hand the representationmight only be reasonably interpreted as conveying “no more than a statement of A'scurrent intention, which can be subject to change with the passage of time, with or without achange of circumstances.” 54 . It might even be a conditional promise (as in Ottey vGrundy 55 and Uglow v Uglow).16. Finally, the expectations of the claimant must, it now seems, focus on somespecific, identified piece of property, or some part of the property the extent ofwhich need not be identified, but which is objectively ascertainable: Thorner vMajor. A generalised promise of future support will therefore not be sufficient:Lissimore v Downing 56 . And it seems that a promise relating to the devolutionof a persons residuary estate, considered sufficient in Re Basham 57 , may not now besufficient: see Thorner v Major 58 and MacDonald v Frost 59 .52 Gillet v Holt at pg 227. See also Uglow v Uglow [2004] EWCA Civ 987 per Mummery LJ at Para [9].53 Gillet v Holt at pg 228.54 Thorner v Major per Lord Neuberger at Para [74].55 [2003] EWCA Civ 1176.56 [2003] 2 F.L.R. 308.57 [1986] 1 WLR 1498.58 per Lord Walker at Para [63].59 [2009] EWHC 2276 (HC).12

Reliance17. There is no need to show a mutual understanding or agreement that the Claimantwould incur the relevant expenditure or suffer the relevant detriment. Instead 60 :(1) There must be a sufficient link between the promises relied upon and theconduct which constitutes the detriment;(2) The promises relied upon do not have to be the sole inducement for theconduct: it is sufficient if they are an inducement;(3) Once it has been established that promises were made, and that there hasbeen conduct by the plaintiff of such a nature that inducement may beinferred then the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to establish thathe did not rely on the promises 61 .18. It is not necessary, however, for the Claimant to show that he would have acteddifferently if the promise had never been made but only if the representation hadbeen withdrawn: Ottey v Grundy.19. Subject to that, to the list may be added that the reliance must be reasonable in allthe circumstances: see Thorner v Major. However when evidence is available thatthe property owner intended the Claimant to rely on his promise as he did, thequestion of the reasonableness of the reliance is likely to be indisputable: Lester vWoodgate 62 .60 As set out by Balcombe LJ in Wayling v Jones (1993) 69 P & CR 170, approved by Robert Walker LJ inGillett v Holt.61 As to the last point, it was argued in Cook v Thomas [2010] EWCA Civ 227 Lloyd LJ explained that theburden point was only relevant in the absence of evidence. He held at Para [77] that in cases where therehad been a full investigation of the evidence there was no need for the presumption.62 Para [26].13

Detriment20. Although taken separately here, reliance and detriment are intertwined. In Henry vHenry 63 Sir Jonathan Parker said:“As to the relationship between reliance and detriment in the context of the doctrine ofproprietary estoppel, just as the inquiry as to reliance falls to be made in the context ofthe nature and quality of the particular assurances which are said to form the basis of theestoppel, so the inquiry as to detriment falls to be made in the context of the nature andquality of the particular conduct or course of conduct adopted by the claimant in relianceon those assurances. Thus, notwithstanding that reliance and detriment may, in theabstract, be regarded as different concepts, in applying the principles of proprietaryestoppel they are often intertwined.” 6421. Detriment was defined in Gillett v Holt as follows 65 :(1) Detriment is not a narrow or technical concept: it need not consist of theexpenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as itis something substantial;(2) The detriment which the promisee must be shown to have suffered falls tobe judged at the moment when the promisor proposes to go back on hisrepresentation. Whether the detriment is sufficiently substantial is to betested by whether it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the assuranceto be disregarded; and(3) Detriment is the detriment or harm which a claimant would suffer if thepromisor were not compelled to adhere to the representation in relianceupon which the claimant had altered his position. In other words, thepromisee’s change of position must be viewed in the light not only of hisposition before the unconscionable act (e.g. the assertion of the promisor’sown legal right, or the death of the promisor) takes place, but of the effectthereafter on his life if the Court does not intervene to alter the effect ofthe unconscionable conduct of the promisor.63 [2010] UKPC 3.64 Para [55]65 Ppg 232-23314

22. In Lissimore v Downing HHJ Norris QC, added 66 : “I must therefore look for conductwhich is in some sense detrimental or prejudicial, which goes beyond what might normally beexpected of the relationship between the parties and which suggests that it was induced by somesort of assurance, and which (judged at the time when the representor wishes to go back on theassurance) can be seen to be sufficiently substantial to render it unconscionable for him to dealfreely (and without any equitable restraint) with his property.”23. Examples of detriment have included:(1) Giving up work and moving to new location 67 ;(2) Foregoing other business opportunities and running a family business formany decades at a reduced wage 68 ;(3) Refusing inquiries from other employers and undertaking domestic tasksfor the promisor 69 ;(4) Providing general nursing care, tending garden and running errands 70 ;(5) Giving up a career (which would not in fact have been successful) in actingand modelling 71 ;(6) Giving up a better life elsewhere to look after and work on the promisor’sfarm 72 .24. The detriment must be more than de minimis, and will not include householdchores 73 .66 Para [21]67 Jones v Jones [1977] 1 WLR 43868 Newman v Blanton [2002] All ER (D) 107 (Jun)69 Gillett v Holt70 Jennings v Rice71 Ottey v Grundy72 Henry v Henry73 Century (UK) Ltd SA v Clibbery [2004] EWHC 1870 (Ch)15

25. In assessing detriment, unconscionability and in satisfying any equity, it isincumbent on the Court to weigh against any detriment countervailing benefits tothe Claimant: Fisher v Brooker 74 ; and Henry v Henry 75 . The Court’s boardenquiry approach together with detriment not being a narrow or technical conceptmeans that it is not strictly a matter of balancing gains and losses and the Courtdoes not generally adopt a rigid ‘balance sheet’ exercise 76 .Unconscionability26. Lord Walker said in Cobbe:Satisfying the equity“That argument raises the question whether "unconscionability" is a separate element inmaking out a case of estoppel, or whether to regard it as a separate element … Here it isbeing used (as in my opinion it should always be used) as an objective value judgment onbehaviour (regardless of the state of mind of the individual in question). As such it doesin my opinion play a very important part in the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in unifyingand confirming, as it were, the other elements. If the other elements appear to be presentbut the result does not shock the conscience of the court, the analysis needs to be looked atagain.” 7727. Once an estoppel has been established, the Court must go on to consider how tosatisfy the Claimant’s equity. It is perhaps at this stage that the flexibility of thedoctrine is at its most apparent.28. The Court’s approach can be summarised as follows 78 :(1) The court takes a principled approach, and does not exercise a completelyunfettered discretion according to the individual judge's notion of what isfair in any particular case;74 [2009] UKHL 41 per Lord Walker at Para [11]75 Para [59]76 Walton v Walton (unreported, 14 th April 1994); Gillett v Holt; Evans v HSBC Trust Company (UK)Ltd [2005] WTLR 128977 Para [92]78 See Jennings v Rice16

(2) The approach to be taken was to ascertain the maximum extent of theclaimant’s equity, and then to determine what was the minimum required tosatisfy it and do justice between the parties;(3) The most essential requirement is that there must be proportionalitybetween the expectation and the detriment;(4) It is a question of satisfying the equity rather than satisfying, or vindicating,the claimant's expectations. The equity arises not from the claimant'sexpectations alone, but from the combination of expectations, detrimentalreliance, and the unconscionableness of allowing the benefactor (or thedeceased benefactor's estate) to go back on the assurances as arising fromthe whole sequence of events.29. In certain cases however either expectation or detriment alone might be fulfilled:(1) The Court might vindicate an expectation:(a)(b)Where the representation was on the basis of mutual understandingor agreement in reasonably clear terms that the claimant would havean identifiable interest in an identifiable property (such as being thesole heir of a house), the case being indistinguishable from acommon intention constructive trust; orWhere there are difficulties or uncertainties in quantifying‘detriment’, for example where it consisted of the provision of careor services, or of pandering to the moods or caprices of an elderlyperson;(2) By contrast detriment may be the relevant yardstick:(a)(b)Where the Claimant’s expectations were uncertain, extravagant (i.e.they cannot fairly be derived from the assurances given), or out ofall proportion to the detriment suffered; orWhere the detriment can be quantified with reasonable precision,for example if it consists solely of expenditure on improvements to17

another person's house, and in some cases of that sort an equitablecharge for the expenditure may be sufficient to satisfy the equity 79 .30. In any case, “the remedy must be proportionate to the detriment suffered” 80 .OLIVER HILTON3 Stone Buildings020 7242 4937ohilton@3sb.law.co.uk8 November 201079 See Jennings v Rice at Paras [47], [50], & [51].80 Ottey v Grundy at Paras [57] & [62]; Fisher v Brooker [2009] at Para [11]18