JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

Psychoanalysis249the conscious fact and the desire it expresses, since the conscious fact is symbolical ofthe expressed complex. And for the psychoanalyst this symbolic character is obviouslynot external to the fact itself, but is constitutive of it. Upon this point we are in fullagreement with him. That the symbolization is constitutive of the symbolicconsciousness can be in no doubt whatever to anyone who believes in the absolutevalue of the Cartesian cogito. But this needs to be rightly understood: if symbolizationis constitutive it is legitimate to see an immanent bond of comprehension between thesymbolization and the symbol. Only, we must agree upon this, that consciousnessconstitutes itself by symbolization. In that case there is nothing behind it, and therelation between symbol, symbolized and symbolization is an intra-structural bond ofconsciousness. But if we go on to say that the consciousness is symbolizing under thecausal compulsion of a transcendent fact—which is the repressed desire—we arefalling back upon the theory previously indicated, which treats the relation of thesignified to the signifying as a causal relation. The profound contradiction in allpsychoanalysis is that it presents at the same time a bond of causality and a bond ofunderstanding between the phenomena that it studies. These two types of relationshipare incompatible. The theorist of psychoanalysis also establishes transcendent relationsof rigid causality between the facts under observation (a pincushion in a dream alwayssignifies a woman’s breasts, entry into a carriage signifies the sexual act), whilst thepractitioner assures himself of success by studying mainly the facts of consciousunderstanding; that is, by flexible research into the intra-conscious relation betweensymbolization and symbol.For our part, we do not reject the findings of psychoanalysis when they areobtained by the understanding. We limit ourselves to the denial that there is any valueor intelligibility in its underlying theory of psychic causality. And moreover we affirmthat, in so far as the psychoanalyst is making use of understanding to interpretconsciousness, it would be better to recognize frankly that whatever is going on inconsciousness can receive its explanation nowhere but from consciousness itself. Andhere we are brought back to our own point of departure: a theory of consciousnesswhich attributes meaningful character to the emotive facts must look for that meaningin the consciousness itself. In other words, it is the consciousness which makes itselfconscious, moved by the inner need for an inner signification.And indeed, the advocates of psychoanalysis are at the same time raising a difficultyof principle. If consciousness organizes emotion as a special type of response adaptedto an external situation, how does it manage to have no consciousness of this adaptation?And it must be granted that their theory renders a perfect account of this discrepancy