JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

Others225Concrete relations with others[. . .] since the original bond with the Other first arises in connection with the relationbetween my body and the Other’s body, it seemed clear to us that the knowledge ofthe nature of the body was indispensable to any study of the particular relations ofmy being with that of the Other. These particular relations, in fact, on both sidespresuppose facticity; that is, our existence as body in the midst of the world. Not thatthe body is the instrument and the cause of my relations with others. But the bodyconstitutes their meaning and marks their limits. It is as body-in-situation that Iapprehend the Other’s transcendence-transcended, and it is as body-in-situation thatI experience myself in my alienation for the Other’s benefit. Now we can examinethese concrete relations since we are cognizant of what the body is. They are notsimple specifications of the fundamental relation. Although each one of them includeswithin it the original relation with the Other as its essential structure and its foundation,they are entirely new modes of being on the part of the for-itself. In fact they representthe various attitudes of the for-itself in a world where there are Others. Therefore eachrelation in its own way presents the bilateral relation: for-itself-for-others, in-itself. Ifthen we succeed in making explicit the structures of our most primitive relations withthe Other-in-the-world, we shall have completed our task. At the beginning of thiswork, we asked, “What are the relations of the for-itself with the in-itself?” We havelearned now that our task is more complex. There is a relation of the for-itself with thein-itself in the presence of the Other. When we have described this concrete fact, weshall be in a position to form conclusions concerning the fundamental relations of thethree modes of being, and we shall perhaps be able to attempt a metaphysical theoryof being in general.The for-itself as the nihilation of the in-itself temporalizes itself as a flight toward.Actually it surpasses its facticity (i.e., to be either given or past or body) toward thein-itself which it would be if it were able to be its own foundation. This may betranslated into terms already psychological—and hence inaccurate although perhapsclearer—by saying that the for-itself attempts to escape its factual existence (i.e., itsbeing there, as an in-itself for which it is in no way the foundation) and that this flighttakes place toward an impossible future always pursued where the for-itself would bean in-itself-for-itself—i.e., an in-itself which would be to itself its own foundation.Thus the for-itself is both a flight and a pursuit; it flees the in-itself and at the sametime pursues it. The for-itself is a pursued-pursuing. But in order to lessen the dangerof a psychological interpretation of the preceding remarks, let us note that the foritselfis not first in order to attempt later to attain being; in short we must not conceive