JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

12 OthersThe distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, although mutuallyexclusive, is not collectively exhaustive. There exists a third manner of beingcalled ‘being-for-others’ (l’être-pour-autrui). Being-for-others is exhibited byexactly the same beings whose being is being-for-itself: human beings. Inbeing-for-others I am in a state that entails the existence of someone else.Under the heading of ‘Being-for-others’ Sartre attempts a refutation ofsolipsism, offers a phenomenology of the body, and a rather pessimisticontology of human relations. I say something about each of these in turn.Solipsism is the doctrine that only my mind exists. Putative refutations ofsolipsism usually either maintain, inductively, that other people have mindsbecause they look and behave like me and I have a mind, or, it is argued thatthe formulation of solipsism as a theory presupposes its falsity. For example,Hegel argues in The Phenomenology of Spirit that one consciousnessbeing a self-consciousness depends upon an encounter with anotherconsciousness. Solipsism presupposes self-consciousness, so solipsismpresupposes at least one other consciousness and so is false. Wittgensteinin Philosophical Investigations (1953) argues that solipsism presupposesa logically private language for its formulation. A logically private language isimpossible because any language presupposes a public language. A publiclanguage presupposes other language users, therefore solipsism may beformulated just on condition it is false.Sartre takes neither of these routes. His refutation is based upon humanemotion, paradigmatically, shame. Sartre invites us to imagine that listeningthrough a door and looking through a keyhole I suddenly hear footstepsbehind me. I am under the gaze of the other. I feel shame. Shame howeveris shame before another. In this situation it is not a psychological option forme to sincerely doubt that other people exist or have minds.