JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
Bad faith205of Bouville in Nausea and Kean in the play of that name. In the biographiesBaudelaire and Saint Genet: Comedian and Martyr the self-justifyingbourgeois hypocrisy of the nineteenth-century poet is contrasted with therecognition of freedom by the thieving and streetfighting proletarianhomosexual playwright from Brest. Genet’s disreputable and criminalbehaviour is eulogised by Sartre as a model of good faith – the real exerciseof freedom. Baudelaire’s law abiding conformity is condemned as the denialof freedom – bad faith. Sartre’s distinction between the moral and the immoralcuts across socially acceptable legal and ethical mores. The moral is thefree and authentic; the immoral is the conformist, the obsequious, theinauthentic.Sartre says bad faith is a lie to oneself. This raises the philosophicalparadox of self-deception because I know I am free but I hide my freedomfrom myself. In some sense, I both know and do not know I am free. How isthis possible?Sartre rejects one solution straight away: the psychoanalytical idea thatthere exists both a conscious and an unconscious mind. The Freudianallows that we know something unconsciously but remain ignorant of it anddeny it consciously, and so dissolves the paradox of self-deception. Sartrecan not possibly follow this route because it is a central tenet of his theory ofconsciousness that no unconscious exists. Sartre’s phenomenology impliesthat every mental state is necessarily a conscious state.Sartre’s solution is as follows. The respect in which I know I am free isdifferent from the respect in which I do not know I am free. I know that I amfree in that I have the capacity to make choices. However, I mask this capacityfrom myself by the adoption of everyday roles, by conforming to the fixedimage others have of me, by pretending to be a mechanism or a thing. I amfully possessed of the propositional knowledge of my own capacity to actfreely but behave rigidly to prevent the realisation of that capacity. I pretend Iam not free.In bad faith I am in relation to myself as the actor is to Hamlet. We are allactors. An actor knows he is an actor but in so far as he performs he is nothis real self. In bad faith I know I am free but adopt a role which masks myfreedom. Bad faith is a representation for others and for myself. Paradoxically,human reality is what it is not (its authentic self-defining project) and is notwhat it is (its hypocritical social role).Sartre distinguishes between two kinds of people in bad faith. One kindhe calls ‘cowards’ (‘les lâches’). They hide from their freedom in a facade of
206Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingssolemnity or with deterministic excuses. Those who deny not only their ownfreedom but that of others Sartre calls ‘swine’ (‘les salauds’). In Nausea, forexample, Roquentin concludes his tour of the portraits of the bourgeoisofficials in the city museum with the comment ‘you bastards’ (‘salauds’).They felt they had the natural or God-given right to exist, to occupy their sociallocation of wealth and privilege and suppress the freedom of others. Thedenial of freedom is immoral because it is inauthentic and hypocritical.Freedom brings with it a heavy and terrible responsibility described in thelast chapter. Bad faith is also therefore an evasion of responsibility.BEING AND NOTHINGNESSBad faithI. Bad faith and falsehoodThe human being is not only the being by whom négatités are disclosed in the world;he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself. In ourIntroduction we defined consciousness as “a being such that in its being, its being is inquestion in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.” But now that we haveexamined the meaning of “the question,” we can at present also write the formula thus:“Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness ofits being.” In a prohibition or a veto, for example, the human being denies a futuretranscendence. But this negation is not explicative. My consciousness is not restrictedto envisioning a négatité. It constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of apossibility which another human reality projects as its possibility. For that reason itmust arise in the world as a Not; it is as a Not that the slave first apprehends themaster, or that the prisoner who is trying to escape sees the guard who is watchinghim. There are even men (e.g., caretakers, overseers, gaolers) whose social reality isuniquely that of the Not, who will live and die, having forever been only a Not uponthe earth. Others so as to make the Not a part of their very subjectivity, establish theirhuman personality as a perpetual negation. This is the meaning and function of whatScheler calls “the man of resentment”—in reality, the Not. But there exist more subtlebehaviors, the description of which will lead us further into the inwardness ofconsciousness. Irony is one of these. In irony a man annihilates what he posits withinone and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to be believed; he affirms todeny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive object but it has no being other than its
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Bad faith205of Bouville in Nausea and Kean in the play of that name. In the biographiesBaudelaire and Saint Genet: Comedian and Martyr the self-justifyingbourgeois hypocrisy of the nineteenth-century poet is contrasted with therecognition of freedom by the thieving and streetfighting proletarianhomosexual playwright from Brest. Genet’s disreputable and criminalbehaviour is eulogised by <strong>Sartre</strong> as a model of good faith – the real exerciseof freedom. Baudelaire’s law abiding conformity is condemned as the denialof freedom – bad faith. <strong>Sartre</strong>’s distinction between the moral and the immoralcuts across socially acceptable legal and ethical mores. The moral is thefree and authentic; the immoral is the conformist, the obsequious, theinauthentic.<strong>Sartre</strong> says bad faith is a lie to oneself. This raises the philosophicalparadox of self-deception because I know I am free but I hide my freedomfrom myself. In some sense, I both know and do not know I am free. How isthis possible?<strong>Sartre</strong> rejects one solution straight away: the psychoanalytical idea thatthere exists both a conscious and an unconscious mind. The Freudianallows that we know something unconsciously but remain ignorant of it anddeny it consciously, and so dissolves the paradox of self-deception. <strong>Sartre</strong>can not possibly follow this route because it is a central tenet of his theory ofconsciousness that no unconscious exists. <strong>Sartre</strong>’s phenomenology impliesthat every mental state is necessarily a conscious state.<strong>Sartre</strong>’s solution is as follows. The respect in which I know I am free isdifferent from the respect in which I do not know I am free. I know that I amfree in that I have the capacity to make choices. However, I mask this capacityfrom myself by the adoption of everyday roles, by conforming to the fixedimage others have of me, by pretending to be a mechanism or a thing. I amfully possessed of the propositional knowledge of my own capacity to actfreely but behave rigidly to prevent the realisation of that capacity. I pretend Iam not free.In bad faith I am in relation to myself as the actor is to Hamlet. We are allactors. An actor knows he is an actor but in so far as he performs he is nothis real self. In bad faith I know I am free but adopt a role which masks myfreedom. Bad faith is a representation for others and for myself. Paradoxically,human reality is what it is not (its authentic self-defining project) and is notwhat it is (its hypocritical social role).<strong>Sartre</strong> distinguishes between two kinds of people in bad faith. One kindhe calls ‘cowards’ (‘les lâches’). They hide from their freedom in a facade of