JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

13.07.2015 Views

Responsibility203reflection will take up for its own account the initial project of freedom or not take itup, whether it will be a purifying reflection refusing to “go along with” this project. Itis obvious that we are here in the presence of a free choice among alternatives of thetype that classical psychology has habituated us to consider. “Mitmachen oder nichtmitmachen” [to take or not to take part]. Except the two terms here do not exist beforethe decision. And as they take their source from the nonthetic consciousness thatfreedom has of itself, it is clear that accessory reflection is just the prolongation of thebad faith found nonthetically within the primitive project, whereas pure reflection isa break with this projection and the constitution of a freedom that takes itself as itsend. This is why, although it would be much more advantageous to live on the plane offreedom that takes itself for its end, most people have a difficulty. . . .Notes1 I am shifting to the personal pronoun here since Sartre is describing the for-itselfin concrete personal terms rather than as a metaphysical entity. Strictly speaking,of course, this is his position throughout, and the French “il” is indifferently “he”or “it.” Tr.2 J. Romains: Les hommes de bonne volonté; “Prélude à Verdun.”3 Sartre left for his second trip to the United States on 12 December 1945 (TheWritings of Jean-Paul Sartre, p. 13). He traveled across the Atlantic by Libertyship, a voyage that took eighteen days; hence this document, the second part ofwhich is dated 17 December, must have been written during that voyage.4 Jean Paulhan, Entretien sur des faits Divers (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp. 24–25.

11 Bad faithThe reality of our freedom is so unbearable that we refuse to face it. Insteadof realising our identities as free conscious subjects we pretend to ourselvesthat we are mechanistic, determined objects. Refusing to freely makeourselves what we are, we masquerade as fixed essences by the adoptionof hypocritical social roles and inert value systems. This denial of freedomis called by Sartre ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi). Almost a secularisation of theChristian Fall, bad faith is pervasive.It is depicted in merciless detail in Sartre’s fiction and in the chapter onbad faith from Being and Nothingness, partly reprinted below, which containsthe locus classicus: a café waiter whose exaggerated movements andaffected manner make it clear that he is playing at being a café waiter.Several kinds of bad faith are displayed by the waiter. He behavesmechanically as though he were a thing rather than a person. He is acting arole, playing a part. His relationship to himself is as false as that of an actorto his part in a play. His behaviour is a display before others, a set of routineswhich make him comfortable in his own eyes and in the eyes of others.In another of Sartre’s examples, the soldier at attention is in bad faithwhen he turns himself into a mechanical soldier-thing with a fixed unseeinggaze. A woman on a date with a certain man for the first time is presentedwith the moment of choice. The man takes her hand. For her to leave herhand in his is to choose a sexual direction for the relationship. To withdrawit is to reject this possibility. Instead of choosing, instead of exercising herreal choice, she refuses to face it, leaving her hand to rest, neither acceptingnor rejecting: a thing.Sartre’s philosophical literature is strewn with characters in bad faith:Goetz in The Devil and the Good Lord, Hugo in Dirty Hands, the bourgeoisie

Responsibility203reflection will take up for its own account the initial project of freedom or not take itup, whether it will be a purifying reflection refusing to “go along with” this project. Itis obvious that we are here in the presence of a free choice among alternatives of thetype that classical psychology has habituated us to consider. “Mitmachen oder nichtmitmachen” [to take or not to take part]. Except the two terms here do not exist beforethe decision. And as they take their source from the nonthetic consciousness thatfreedom has of itself, it is clear that accessory reflection is just the prolongation of thebad faith found nonthetically within the primitive project, whereas pure reflection isa break with this projection and the constitution of a freedom that takes itself as itsend. This is why, although it would be much more advantageous to live on the plane offreedom that takes itself for its end, most people have a difficulty. . . .Notes1 I am shifting to the personal pronoun here since <strong>Sartre</strong> is describing the for-itselfin concrete personal terms rather than as a metaphysical entity. Strictly speaking,of course, this is his position throughout, and the French “il” is indifferently “he”or “it.” Tr.2 J. Romains: Les hommes de bonne volonté; “Prélude à Verdun.”3 <strong>Sartre</strong> left for his second trip to the United States on 12 December 1945 (The<strong>Writing</strong>s of Jean-Paul <strong>Sartre</strong>, p. 13). He traveled across the Atlantic by Libertyship, a voyage that took eighteen days; hence this document, the second part ofwhich is dated 17 December, must have been written during that voyage.4 Jean Paulhan, Entretien sur des faits Divers (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), pp. 24–25.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!