JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
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JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

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The self161being is failure because it is the foundation only of itself as nothingness. In truth thisfailure is its very being, but it has meaning only if the for-itself apprehends itself asfailure in the presence of the being which it has failed to be; that is, of the being whichwould be the foundation of its being and no longer merely the foundation of itsnothingness—or, to put it another way, which would be its foundation as coincidencewith itself. By nature the cogito refers to the lacking and to the lacked, for the cogitois haunted by being, as Descartes well realized.Such is the origin of transcendence. Human reality is its own surpassing towardwhat it lacks; it surpasses itself toward the particular being which it would be if it werewhat it is. Human reality is not something which exists first in order afterwards to lackthis or that; it exists first as lack and in immediate, synthetic connection with what itlacks. Thus the pure event by which human reality rises as a presence in the world isapprehended by itself as its own lack. In its coming into existence human realitygrasps itself as an incomplete being. It apprehends itself as being in so far as it is not,in the presence of the particular totality which it lacks and which it is in the form ofnot being it and which is what it is. Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward acoincidence with itself which is never given. If the cogito reaches toward being, it isbecause by its very thrust it surpasses itself toward being by qualifying itself in itsbeing as the being to which coincidence with self is lacking in order for it to be what itis. The cogito is indissolubly linked to being-in-itself, not as a thought to its object—which would make the in-itself relative—but as a lack to that which defines its lack. Inthis sense the second Cartesian proof is rigorous. Imperfect being surpasses itselftoward perfect being; the being which is the foundation only of its nothingness surpassesitself toward the being which is the foundation of its being. But the being towardwhich human reality surpasses itself is not a transcendent God; it is at the heart ofhuman reality; it is only human reality itself as totality.This totality is not the pure and simple contingent in-itself of the transcendent. Ifwhat consciousness apprehends as the being toward which it surpasses itself were thepure in-itself, it would coincide with the annihilation of consciousness. Butconsciousness does not surpass itself toward it annihilation; it does not want to loseitself in the in-itself of identity at the limit of its surpassing. It is for the for-itself assuch that the for-itself lays claim to being-in-itself.Thus this perpetually absent being which haunts the for-itself is itself fixed in thein-itself. It is the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself: it would be itsown foundation not as nothingness but as being and would preserve within it thenecessary translucency of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself ofbeing-in-itself. It would preserve in it that turning back upon the self which conditions

162Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsevery necessity and every foundation. But this return to the self would be withoutdistance; it would not be presence to itself, but identity with itself. In short, this beingwould be exactly the self which we have shown can exist only as a perpetuallyevanescent relation, but it would be this self as substantial being. Thus human realityarises as such in the presence of its own totality or self as a lack of that totality. Andthis totality can not be given by nature, since it combines in itself the incompatiblecharacteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself.Let no one reproach us with capriciously inventing a being of this kind; when by afurther movement of thought the being and absolute absence of this totality arehypostasized as transcendence beyond the world, it takes on the name of God. Is notGod a being who is what he is—in that he is all positivity and the foundation of theworld—and at the same time a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not—in that he is self-consciousness and the necessary foundation of himself? The being ofhuman reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totalitywhich it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itselfwithout losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappyconsciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.Notes1 Hegelian opposition belongs to this type of negation. But this opposition mustitself be based on an original internal negation; that is, on lack. For example, if thenon-essential becomes in its turn the essential, this is because it is experienced asa lack in the heart of the essential.2 Le manquant, “the lacking,” l’existant, “the existing”; le manqué, “the lacked.” Lemanque is “the lack.” At times when manqué is used as an adjective, I havetranslated it as “missing,” e.g., l’en-soi manqué, “the missing in-itself.” Tr.

162Jean-Paul <strong>Sartre</strong>: <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Writing</strong>severy necessity and every foundation. But this return to the self would be withoutdistance; it would not be presence to itself, but identity with itself. In short, this beingwould be exactly the self which we have shown can exist only as a perpetuallyevanescent relation, but it would be this self as substantial being. Thus human realityarises as such in the presence of its own totality or self as a lack of that totality. Andthis totality can not be given by nature, since it combines in itself the incompatiblecharacteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself.Let no one reproach us with capriciously inventing a being of this kind; when by afurther movement of thought the being and absolute absence of this totality arehypostasized as transcendence beyond the world, it takes on the name of God. Is notGod a being who is what he is—in that he is all positivity and the foundation of theworld—and at the same time a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not—in that he is self-consciousness and the necessary foundation of himself? The being ofhuman reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totalitywhich it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itselfwithout losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappyconsciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.Notes1 Hegelian opposition belongs to this type of negation. But this opposition mustitself be based on an original internal negation; that is, on lack. For example, if thenon-essential becomes in its turn the essential, this is because it is experienced asa lack in the heart of the essential.2 Le manquant, “the lacking,” l’existant, “the existing”; le manqué, “the lacked.” Lemanque is “the lack.” At times when manqué is used as an adjective, I havetranslated it as “missing,” e.g., l’en-soi manqué, “the missing in-itself.” Tr.

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