JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

156Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsBy way of conclusion to this analysis, it seems to me that one can make thefollowing statements:First, the I is an existent. It has a concrete type of existence, undoubtedly differentfrom the existence of mathematical truths, of meanings, or of spatio-temporal beings,but no less real. The I gives itself as transcendent.Second, the I proffers itself to an intuition of a special kind which apprehends it,always inadequately, behind the reflected consciousness.Third, the I never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. In this case, thecomplex structure of consciousness is as follows: there is an unreflected act of reflection,without an I, which is directed on a reflected consciousness. The latter becomes theobject of the reflecting consciousness without ceasing to affirm its own object (a chair,a mathematical truth, etc.). At the same time, a new object appears which is theoccasion for an affirmation by reflective consciousness, and which is consequentlynot on the same level as the unreflected consciousness (because the latter consciousnessis an absolute which has no need of reflective consciousness in order to exist), nor onthe same level as the object of the reflected consciousness (chair, etc.). This transcendentobject of the reflective act is the I.Fourth, the transcendent I must fall before the stroke of phenomenological reduction.The Cogito affirms too much. The certain content of the pseudo-“Cogito” is not “Ihave consciousness of this chair,” but “There is consciousness of this chair.” Thiscontent is sufficient to constitute an infinite and absolute field of investigation forphenomenology.BEING AND NOTHINGNESSThe immediate structure of the for-itselfAny study of human reality must begin with the cogito. But the Cartesian “I think” isconceived in the instantaneous perspective of temporality. Can we find in the heart ofthe cogito a way of transcending this instantaneity? If human reality were limited tothe being of the “I think,” it would have only the truth of an instant. And it is indeedtrue that with Descartes the cogito is an instantaneous totality, since by itself it makesno claim on the future and since an act of continuous “creation” is necessary to makeit pass from one instant to another. But can we even conceive of the truth of aninstant? Does the cogito not in its own way engage both past and future? Heidegger isso persuaded that the “I think” of Husserl is a trap for larks, fascinating and ensnaring,that he has completely avoided any appeal to consciousness in his description of