JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

154Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsinherent in a reflective act. We would then find ourselves, on the one hand, with anabsolutely certain act which permits the presence of the I in the reflected consciousnessto be affirmed, and, on the other hand, with a questionable memory which wouldpurport to show the absence of the I from the unreflected consciousness. It wouldseem that we have no right to oppose the latter to the former. But I must point out thatthe memory of the unreflected consciousness is not opposed to the data of thereflective consciousness. No one would deny for a moment that the I appears in areflected consciousness. It is simply a question of opposing a reflective memory ofmy reading (“I was reading”), which is itself of a questionable nature, to a nonreflectivememory. The validity of a present reflection, in fact, does not reach beyondthe consciousness presently apprehended. And reflective memory, to which we areobliged to have recourse in order to reinstate elapsed consciousnesses, besides itsquestionable character owing to its nature as memory, remains suspect since, in theopinion of Husserl himself, reflection modifies the spontaneous consciousness. Since,in consequence, all the non-reflective memories of unreflected consciousness show mea consciousness without a me, and since, on the other hand, theoretical considerationsconcerning consciousness which are based on intuition of essence have constrained usto recognize that the I cannot be a part of the internal structure of Erlebnisse, we musttherefore conclude: there is no I on the unreflected level. When I run after a streetcar,when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I.There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positionalconsciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects;it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousnesses; it is they which presentthemselves with values, with attractive and repellent qualities— but me, I havedisappeared; I have annihilated myself. There is no place for me on this level. And thisis not a matter of chance, due to a momentary lapse of attention, but happens becauseof the very structure of consciousness.This is what a description of the Cogito will make even more obvious to us. Canone say, indeed, that the reflective act apprehends the I and the thinking consciousnessto the same degree and in the same way? Husserl insists on the fact that the certitudeof the reflective act comes from apprehending consciousness without facets, withoutprofiles, completely (without Abschattungen). This is evidently so. On the contrary,the spatio-temporal object always manifests itself through an infinity of aspects andis, at bottom, only the ideal unity of this infinity. As for meanings, or eternal truths,they affirm their transcendence in that the moment they appear they are given asindependent of time, whereas the consciousness which apprehends them is, on thecontrary, individuated through and through in duration. Now we ask: when a reflective