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JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

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The self149It does not follow from this argument alone that there is no transcendentalego, only that there are no consistent phenomenological grounds forpostulating one. Nevertheless, Sartre insists on subjectivity: that which isconscious is not what consciousness is consciousness of. The subject ofconsciousness, is not an object of that consciousness.Sartre thinks that the existence of the transcendental is inconsistent withthe unity of consciousness. There is a unity of consciousness, so there isno transcendental ego. He perhaps overestimates the role of thetranscendental ego in unifying consciousness in Husserl’s philosophy.Husserl thinks that acts of consciousness are parts of the sameconsciousness through the horizontal and vertical intentionalities of timeconsciousness. However, Husserl does think that some mental act’s beingmine is its source being a particular transcendental ego. Sartre suggestsinstead that it is the intentional object of acts of consciousness that accountsfor their unity. Consciousness unifies itself in the face of its objects and thatis as much unity as consciousness has. Neither thinker has resolved theultimate problem of what it is for acts of consciousness to be mine.Sartre also argues that the existence of the transcendental ego isinconsistent with the freedom of consciousness. Consciousness is free,so there is no transcendental ego. Consciousness is a free spontaneity orplay of nothingness. If conscious states were directed by a transcendentalego this spontaneity would be impossible.The Transcendence of the Ego shows that Husserl misread Kant’s theoryof the self in The Critique of Pure Reason and that Sartre understood Kantcorrectly. Kant, like Sartre, rejected the transcendental ego although mostcommentators, like Husserl, mistakenly ascribe it to Kant. In the Paralogismschapter of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant insists that there is nosubstantial, subjective, quasi-Cartesian self. Kant’s distinction betweenthe noumenal self and the phenomenal self is only the distinction betweenhow I am and how I appear to myself. The noumenal self is not an extraentity.The psychic subject according to Sartre, far from being the subjectivesource of consciousness, is itself a product of consciousness. It is in factthe result of consciousness being turned on consciousness in reflexiveconsciousness. The I is not a psychic subject but a psychic object: theintentional object of reflexive consciousness. In reflection I appear to myselfas an ego. Independently of reflection I am the me. In the world, as the me,

150Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsI am a psycho-physical totality, a flesh and blood thinking, feeling, moving,human being.Pre-reflexive consciousness is the ordinary awareness of objects in theexternal world that we exercise typically from morning to night. Reflexiveconsciousness is consciousness of consciousness: a new act ofconsciousness directed by consciousness onto itself. Reflexiveconsciousness is only intermittently exercised on pre-reflexiveconsciousness so the picture so far seems reasonably clear: There is prereflexiveconsciousness whenever we are conscious. From time to time weare self-conscious in that a new act of consciousness is directed ontoconsciousness by itself.Sartre complicates this picture by saying that every consciousness is aconsciousness of existing. Pre-reflexive consciousness is conscious ofitself and reflexive consciousness is conscious of itself. In addition to this,reflexive consciousness is an intermittent consciousness of pre-reflexiveconsciousness.Why does Sartre present us with this complicated and barely coherentpicture? He says, for example, consciousness is consciousness of itselfrather than consciousness is conscious of itself, meaning that it is identicalwith the awareness it has of itself. What is the subject and the object of thisawareness?Sartre’s motivation is Cartesian and anti-Freudian. As we shall see in thediscussions of bad faith and psychoanalysis (Chapters 11 and 13 below),Sartre thinks there is no unconscious. Indeed the idea of an unconsciousmental state is contradictory and so impossible. He agrees with Descartesthat if I am a mental state then I am aware of that mental state. Allconsciousness is therefore self-intimating or transparent. If that is sohowever, reflexive consciousness would seem to be redundant. Prereflexive,consciousness is already ‘a consciousness of itself’ so there is no need forreflection to inspect its states.There are important differences between the self-intimations ofprereflexive consciousness and the acts of reflexive consciousness. Notonly is reflexive consciousness presented with an ego and pre-reflexiveconsciousness not presented with an ego (except, sometimes, the ego ofanother). Reflexive consciousness consists in a set of mental acts extra toor in addition to those of pre-reflexive consciousness. Reflexiveconsciousnessalways only takes conscious states and the ego as its

150Jean-Paul <strong>Sartre</strong>: <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Writing</strong>sI am a psycho-physical totality, a flesh and blood thinking, feeling, moving,human being.Pre-reflexive consciousness is the ordinary awareness of objects in theexternal world that we exercise typically from morning to night. Reflexiveconsciousness is consciousness of consciousness: a new act ofconsciousness directed by consciousness onto itself. Reflexiveconsciousness is only intermittently exercised on pre-reflexiveconsciousness so the picture so far seems reasonably clear: There is prereflexiveconsciousness whenever we are conscious. From time to time weare self-conscious in that a new act of consciousness is directed ontoconsciousness by itself.<strong>Sartre</strong> complicates this picture by saying that every consciousness is aconsciousness of existing. Pre-reflexive consciousness is conscious ofitself and reflexive consciousness is conscious of itself. In addition to this,reflexive consciousness is an intermittent consciousness of pre-reflexiveconsciousness.Why does <strong>Sartre</strong> present us with this complicated and barely coherentpicture? He says, for example, consciousness is consciousness of itselfrather than consciousness is conscious of itself, meaning that it is identicalwith the awareness it has of itself. What is the subject and the object of thisawareness?<strong>Sartre</strong>’s motivation is Cartesian and anti-Freudian. As we shall see in thediscussions of bad faith and psychoanalysis (Chapters 11 and 13 below),<strong>Sartre</strong> thinks there is no unconscious. Indeed the idea of an unconsciousmental state is contradictory and so impossible. He agrees with Descartesthat if I am a mental state then I am aware of that mental state. Allconsciousness is therefore self-intimating or transparent. If that is sohowever, reflexive consciousness would seem to be redundant. Prereflexive,consciousness is already ‘a consciousness of itself’ so there is no need forreflection to inspect its states.There are important differences between the self-intimations ofprereflexive consciousness and the acts of reflexive consciousness. Notonly is reflexive consciousness presented with an ego and pre-reflexiveconsciousness not presented with an ego (except, sometimes, the ego ofanother). Reflexive consciousness consists in a set of mental acts extra toor in addition to those of pre-reflexive consciousness. Reflexiveconsciousnessalways only takes conscious states and the ego as its

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