JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing

130Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsBut if we are to consider total being as constituted by the synthetic organization ofthe in-itself and of the for-itself, are we not going to encounter again the difficultywhich we wished to avoid? And as for that hiatus which we revealed in the concept ofbeing, are we not going to meet it at present in the existent itself? What definitionindeed are we to give to an existent which as in-itself would be what it is and as foritselfwould be what it is not?If we wish to resolve these difficulties, we must take into account what is requiredof an existent if it is to be considered as a totality: it is necessary that the diversity ofits structures be held within a unitary synthesis in such a way that each of themconsidered apart is only an abstraction. And certainly consciousness considered apartis only an abstraction; but the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be; the“passion” of the for-itself only causes there to be in-itself. The phenomenon of initselfis an abstraction without consciousness but its being is not an abstraction.If we wish to conceive of a synthetic organization such that the for-itself is inseparablefrom the in-itself and conversely such that the in-itself is indissolubly bound to thefor-itself, we must conceive of this synthesis in such a way that the in-itself wouldreceive its existence from the nihilation which caused there to be consciousness of it.What does this mean if not that the indissoluble totality of in-itself and for-itself isconceivable only in the form of a being which is its own “self-use”? It is this being andno other which could be valid absolutely as that o??? of which we spoke earlier. Andif we can raise the question of the being of the for-itself articulated in the in-itself, it isbecause we define ourselves a priori by means of a pre-ontological comprehension ofthe ens causa sui. Of course this ens causa sui is impossible, and the concept of it, aswe have seen, includes a contradiction. Nevertheless the fact remains that since weraise the question of the being of the o??? by adopting the point of view of the enscausa sui, it is from this point of view that we must set about examining the credentialsof this o???. Has it not appeared due to the mere fact of the upsurge of the for-itself,and is not the for-itself originally a project of being its own self-use? Thus we begin tograsp the nature of total reality. Total being, the concept of which would not be cleftby an hiatus and which would nevertheless not exclude the nihilating-nihilated being ofthe for-itself, that being whose existence would be a unitary synthesis of the in-itselfand of consciousness—this ideal being would be the in-itself founded by the for-itselfand identical with the for-itself which founds it—i.e., the ens causa sui. But preciselybecause we adopt the point of view of this ideal being in order to judge the real beingwhich we call o???, we must establish that the real is an abortive effort to attain to thedignity of the self-cause. Everything happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-