JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
Being115seen by itself. Originally then the cogito includes this nullifying characteristic ofexisting for a witness, although the witness for which consciousness exists is itself.Thus by the sole fact that my belief is apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief;that is, it is already no longer belief, it is troubled belief. Thus the ontological judgment“belief is consciousness (of) belief” can under no circumstances be taken as a statementof identity; the subject and the attribute are radically different though still within theindissoluble unity of one and the same being.Very well, someone will say, but at least we must say that consciousness (of) beliefis consciousness (of) belief. We rediscover identity and the in-itself on this level. Itwas only a matter of choosing the appropriate plane on which we should apprehendour object. But that is not true: to affirm that the consciousness (of) belief isconsciousness (of) belief is to dissociate consciousness from belief, to suppress theparenthesis, and to make belief an object for consciousness; it is to launch abruptly onto the plane of reflectivity. A consciousness (of) belief which would be onlyconsciousness (of) belief would in fact have to assume consciousness (of) itself asconsciousness (of) belief. Belief would become a pure transcending and noematicqualification of consciousness; consciousness would be free to determine itself as itpleased in the face of that belief. It would resemble that impassive regard which,according to Victor Cousin, consciousness casts on psychic phenomena in order toelucidate them one by one. But the analysis of methodical doubt which Husserlattempted has clearly shown the fact that only reflective consciousness can bedissociated from what is posited by the consciousness reflected-on. It is on thereflective level only that we can attempt an ep???, 1 a putting between parentheses,only there that we can refuse what Husserl calls the mitmachen. 2 The consciousness(of) belief, while irreparably altering belief, does not distinguish itself from belief; itexists in order to perform the act of faith. Thus we are obliged to admit that theconsciousness (of) belief is belief. At its origin we have apprehended this double gameof reference: consciousness (of) belief is belief and belief is consciousness (of) belief.On no account can we say that consciousness is consciousness or that belief is belief.Each of the terms refers to the other and passes into the other, and yet each term isdifferent from the other. We have seen that neither belief nor pleasure nor joy can existbefore being conscious; consciousness is the measure of their being; yet it is no lesstrue that belief, owing to the very fact that it can exist only as troubled, exists from thestart as escaping itself, as shattering the unity of all the concepts in which one canwish to inclose it.
116Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsThus consciousness (of) belief and belief are one and the same being, the characteristicof which is absolute immanence. But as soon as we wish to grasp this being, it slipsbetween our fingers, and we find ourselves faced with a pattern of duality, with a gameof reflections. For consciousness is a reflection (reflet), but qua reflection it is exactlythe one reflecting (réfléchissant), and if we attempt to grasp it as reflecting, it vanishesand we fall back on the reflection. This structure of the reflection—reflecting (refletreflétant)has disconcerted philosophers, who have wanted to explain it by an appealto infinity—either by positing it as an idea-ideae as Spinoza did, who calls it an ideaideae-ideae,etc., or by defining it in the manner of Hegel as a return upon itself, as theveritable infinite. But the introduction of infinity into consciousness, aside from thefact that it fixes the phenomenon and obscures it, is only an explicative theory expresslydesigned to reduce the being of consciousness to that of the in-itself. Yet if we acceptthe objective existence of the reflection—reflecting as it is given, we are obliged toconceive a mode of being different from that of the in-itself, not a unity which containsa duality, not a synthesis which surpasses and lifts the abstract moments of the thesisand of the antithesis, but a duality which is unity, a reflection (reflet) which is its ownreflecting (reflection). In fact if we seek to lay hold on the total phenomenon (i.e., theunity of this duality or consciousness (of) belief), we are referred immediately to oneof the terms, and this term in turn refers us to the unitary organization of immanence.But if on the contrary we wish to take our point of departure from duality as such andto posit consciousness and belief as a dyad, then we encounter the idea-ideae ofSpinoza and we miss the pre-reflective phenomenon which we wished to study. Thisis because pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion ofself which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness.Let us note first that the term in-itself, which we have borrowed from tradition todesignate the transcending being, is inaccurate. At the limit of coincidence with itself,in fact, the self vanishes to give place to identical being. The self can not be a propertyof being-in-itself. By nature it is a reflexive, as syntax sufficiently indicates—inparticular the logical rigor of Latin syntax with the strict distinctions imposed bygrammar between the uses of ejus and sui. The self refers, but it refers precisely to thesubject. It indicates a relation between the subject and himself, and this relation isprecisely a duality, but a particular duality since it requires particular verbal symbols.But on the other hand, the self does not designate being either as subject or as predicate.If indeed I consider the “se” in “il s’ennuie,” 3 for example, I establish that it opens upto allow the subject himself to appear behind it. It is not the subject, since the subjectwithout relation to himself would be condensed into the identity of the in-itself;
- Page 73 and 74: 64Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsI
- Page 75 and 76: 66Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsp
- Page 77 and 78: 68Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsi
- Page 79 and 80: 70Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsw
- Page 81 and 82: 72Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsd
- Page 83 and 84: 74Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsb
- Page 85 and 86: 76Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsp
- Page 87 and 88: 78Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsc
- Page 89 and 90: 80Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingss
- Page 91 and 92: 82Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingse
- Page 93 and 94: 84Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsi
- Page 95 and 96: 86Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsi
- Page 97 and 98: 88Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings2
- Page 99 and 100: 90Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsc
- Page 101 and 102: 92Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings(
- Page 103 and 104: 94Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingsc
- Page 105 and 106: 96Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writingst
- Page 107 and 108: 98Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsB
- Page 109 and 110: 100Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 111 and 112: 102Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 113 and 114: 104Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 115 and 116: 5 BeingThe question What is being?
- Page 117 and 118: 108Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 119 and 120: 110Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 121 and 122: 112Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 123: 114Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 127 and 128: 118Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 129 and 130: 120Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 131 and 132: 122Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 133 and 134: 124Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 135 and 136: 126Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 137 and 138: 128Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 139 and 140: 130Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 141 and 142: 132Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 143 and 144: 134Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 145 and 146: 136Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 147 and 148: 138Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 149 and 150: 140Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 151 and 152: 142Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 153 and 154: 144Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 155 and 156: 146Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 157 and 158: 7 The selfWhat is this subjective b
- Page 159 and 160: 150Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 161 and 162: 152Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 163 and 164: 154Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 165 and 166: 156Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 167 and 168: 158Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 169 and 170: 160Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 171 and 172: 162Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
- Page 173 and 174: 164Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings
Being115seen by itself. Originally then the cogito includes this nullifying characteristic ofexisting for a witness, although the witness for which consciousness exists is itself.Thus by the sole fact that my belief is apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief;that is, it is already no longer belief, it is troubled belief. Thus the ontological judgment“belief is consciousness (of) belief” can under no circumstances be taken as a statementof identity; the subject and the attribute are radically different though still within theindissoluble unity of one and the same being.Very well, someone will say, but at least we must say that consciousness (of) beliefis consciousness (of) belief. We rediscover identity and the in-itself on this level. Itwas only a matter of choosing the appropriate plane on which we should apprehendour object. But that is not true: to affirm that the consciousness (of) belief isconsciousness (of) belief is to dissociate consciousness from belief, to suppress theparenthesis, and to make belief an object for consciousness; it is to launch abruptly onto the plane of reflectivity. A consciousness (of) belief which would be onlyconsciousness (of) belief would in fact have to assume consciousness (of) itself asconsciousness (of) belief. Belief would become a pure transcending and noematicqualification of consciousness; consciousness would be free to determine itself as itpleased in the face of that belief. It would resemble that impassive regard which,according to Victor Cousin, consciousness casts on psychic phenomena in order toelucidate them one by one. But the analysis of methodical doubt which Husserlattempted has clearly shown the fact that only reflective consciousness can bedissociated from what is posited by the consciousness reflected-on. It is on thereflective level only that we can attempt an ep???, 1 a putting between parentheses,only there that we can refuse what Husserl calls the mitmachen. 2 The consciousness(of) belief, while irreparably altering belief, does not distinguish itself from belief; itexists in order to perform the act of faith. Thus we are obliged to admit that theconsciousness (of) belief is belief. At its origin we have apprehended this double gameof reference: consciousness (of) belief is belief and belief is consciousness (of) belief.On no account can we say that consciousness is consciousness or that belief is belief.Each of the terms refers to the other and passes into the other, and yet each term isdifferent from the other. We have seen that neither belief nor pleasure nor joy can existbefore being conscious; consciousness is the measure of their being; yet it is no lesstrue that belief, owing to the very fact that it can exist only as troubled, exists from thestart as escaping itself, as shattering the unity of all the concepts in which one canwish to inclose it.