JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing JeanPaul_Sartre_JeanPaul_Sartre_Basic_Writing
Being111them serve. In a word, man is active and the means which he employs are calledpassive. These concepts, put absolutely, lose all meaning. In particular, being is notactive; in order for there to be an end and means, there must be being. For an evenstronger reason it can not be passive, for in order to be passive, it must be. The selfconsistencyof being is beyond the active as it is beyond the passive.Being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation. Affirmation is alwaysaffirmation of something; that is, the act of affirming is distinguished from the thingaffirmed. But if we suppose an affirmation in which the affirmed comes to fulfill theaffirming and is confused with it, this affirmation can not be affirmed—owing to toomuch of plenitude and the immediate inherence of the noema in the noesis. It is therethat we find being-if we are to define it more clearly-in connection with consciousness.It is the noema in the noesis; that is, the inherence in itself without the least distance.From this point of view, we should not call it “immanence,” for immanence in spite ofall connection with self is still that very slight withdrawal which can be realized—away from the self. But being is not a connection with itself. It is itself. It is animmanence which can not realize itself, an affirmation which can not affirm itself, anactivity which can not act, because it is glued to itself. Everything happens as if, inorder to free the affirmation of self from the heart of being, there is necessary adecompression of being. Let us not, however, think that being is merely oneundifferentiated self-affirmation; the undifferentiation of the in-itself is beyond aninfinity of self-affirmations, inasmuch as there is an infinity of modes of self-affirming.We may summarize these first conclusions by saying that being is in itself.But if being is in itself, this means that it does not refer to itself as self-consciousnessdoes. It is this self. It is itself so completely that the perpetual reflection whichconstitutes the self is dissolved in an identity. That is why being is at bottom beyondthe self, and our first formula can be only an approximation due to the requirements oflanguage. In fact being is opaque to itself precisely because it is filled with itself. Thiscan be better expressed by saying that being is what it is. This statement is in appearancestrictly analytical. Actually it is far from being reduced to that principle of identitywhich is the unconditioned principle of all analytical judgments. First the formuladesignates a particular region of being, that of being in-itself. We shall see that the beingof for-itself is defined, on the contrary, as being what it is not and not being what it is.The question here then is of a regional principle and is as such synthetical. Furthermoreit is necessary to oppose this formula—being in-itself is what it is—to that whichdesignates the being of consciousness. The latter in fact, as we shall see, has to be whatit is.
112Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic WritingsThis instructs us as to the special meaning which must be given to the “is” in thephrase, being is what it is. From the moment that beings exist who have to be whatthey are, the fact of being what they are is no longer a purely axiomatic characteristic;it is a contingent principle of being in-itself. In this sense, the principle of identity, theprinciple of analytical judgments, is also a regional synthetical principle of being. Itdesignates the opacity of being-in-itself. This opacity has nothing to do with ourposition in relation to the in-itself; it is not that we are obliged to apprehend it and toobserve it because we are “without.” Being-in-itself has no within which is opposed toa without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of itself. The initselfhas nothing secret; it is solid (massif). In a sense we can designate it as asynthesis. But it is the most indissoluble of all: the synthesis of itself with itself.The result is evidently that being is isolated in its being and that it does not enterinto any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything whichpermits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it isnot—all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due tothis fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is. This means that by itself it can not evenbe what it is not; we have seen indeed that it can encompass no negation. It is fullpositivity. It knows no otherness; it never posits itself as other-than-another-being. Itcan support no connection with the other. It is itself indefinitely and it exhausts itselfin being. From this point of view we shall see later that it is not subject to temporality.It is, and when it gives way, one can not even say that it no longer is. Or, at least, aconsciousness can be conscious of it as no longer being, precisely because consciousnessis temporal. But being itself does not exist as a lack there where it was; the fullpositivity of being is re-formed on its giving way. It was and at present other beingsare: that is all.Finally—this will be our third characteristic—being-in-itself is. This means thatbeing can neither be derived from the possible nor reduced to the necessary. Necessityconcerns the connection between ideal propositions but not that of existents. Anexisting phenomenon can never be derived from another existent qua existent. This iswhat we shall call the contingency of being-in-itself. But neither can being-in-itself bederived from a possibility. The possible is a structure of the for-itself; that is, it belongsto the other region of being. Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It is.This is what consciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that beingis superfluous (de trop)— that is, that consciousness absolutely can not derive beingfrom anything, either from another being, or from a possibility, or from a necessarylaw. Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being,being-in-itself is de trop for eternity.
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112Jean-Paul <strong>Sartre</strong>: <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Writing</strong>sThis instructs us as to the special meaning which must be given to the “is” in thephrase, being is what it is. From the moment that beings exist who have to be whatthey are, the fact of being what they are is no longer a purely axiomatic characteristic;it is a contingent principle of being in-itself. In this sense, the principle of identity, theprinciple of analytical judgments, is also a regional synthetical principle of being. Itdesignates the opacity of being-in-itself. This opacity has nothing to do with ourposition in relation to the in-itself; it is not that we are obliged to apprehend it and toobserve it because we are “without.” Being-in-itself has no within which is opposed toa without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of itself. The initselfhas nothing secret; it is solid (massif). In a sense we can designate it as asynthesis. But it is the most indissoluble of all: the synthesis of itself with itself.The result is evidently that being is isolated in its being and that it does not enterinto any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything whichpermits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it isnot—all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due tothis fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is. This means that by itself it can not evenbe what it is not; we have seen indeed that it can encompass no negation. It is fullpositivity. It knows no otherness; it never posits itself as other-than-another-being. Itcan support no connection with the other. It is itself indefinitely and it exhausts itselfin being. From this point of view we shall see later that it is not subject to temporality.It is, and when it gives way, one can not even say that it no longer is. Or, at least, aconsciousness can be conscious of it as no longer being, precisely because consciousnessis temporal. But being itself does not exist as a lack there where it was; the fullpositivity of being is re-formed on its giving way. It was and at present other beingsare: that is all.Finally—this will be our third characteristic—being-in-itself is. This means thatbeing can neither be derived from the possible nor reduced to the necessary. Necessityconcerns the connection between ideal propositions but not that of existents. Anexisting phenomenon can never be derived from another existent qua existent. This iswhat we shall call the contingency of being-in-itself. But neither can being-in-itself bederived from a possibility. The possible is a structure of the for-itself; that is, it belongsto the other region of being. Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It is.This is what consciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that beingis superfluous (de trop)— that is, that consciousness absolutely can not derive beingfrom anything, either from another being, or from a possibility, or from a necessarylaw. Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with another being,being-in-itself is de trop for eternity.