MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION

MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION

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38 Robert Goldblattnormal (“queer”) worlds. 36 Notably absent is Kripke’s real world G ∈ K. Insteada formula α is said to be valid in S if in all models on S, α is true (i.e. assignedthe value ⊤) at all points of K.Associated with S is the modal algebra S + comprising the powerset Booleanalgebra P(K) with the additive operatorf(X) = {x ∈ K : x ∈ Q or ∃y ∈ X(xRy)}to interpret ✸. Note that f(∅) = Q, so f is a normal operator iff K has onlynormal members. Lemmon proved the result that a formula is valid in S iff itis satisfied in the algebra S + with just the element 1 (= K) designated. Thisfollows from the natural correspondence between models Φ on S and assignmentsto propositional variables in S + , under which a variable p is assigned the set{x : Φ(p, x) = ⊤} ∈ S + . The result itself is an elaboration of the construction in[Kripke, 1963a] of the matrix of propositions associated with any model structure.It remains true for S2-like systems if validity in S is confined to truth at normalworlds, and also all elements of S + that include K − Q are designated.Any finite modal algebra A = (B, f) is readily shown to be isomorphic to oneof the form S + , with S based on the set of atoms of B. Combining that observationwith McKinsey’s finite algebra constructions enabled Lemmon to deduce thecompleteness of a number of modal logics with respect to validity in their (finite)model structures. For an arbitrary A he gave a representation theorem, “due inessentials to Dana Scott”, that embeds A as a subalgebra of some S + . This wasdone by an extension of Stone’s representation of Boolean algebras, basing S onthe set K of all ultrafilters of B, with uRt iff {fx : x ∈ t} ⊆ u for all ultrafiltersu, t, while Q = {x ∈ K : f0 ∈ x}. Each x ∈ A is represented in S + by the set{u ∈ K : x ∈ u} of ultrafilters containing x, as in Stone’s theory.In the Lemmon Notes there is a model-theoretic analogue of this representationof modal algebras that has played a pivotal role ever since. Out of any normallogic Λ is constructed a modelM Λ = (K Λ , R Λ , Φ Λ )in which K Λ is the set of all maximally Λ-consistent sets of formulas, withuR Λ t iff {✸α : α ∈ t} ⊆ u iff {α : ✷α ∈ u} ⊆ t,and Φ Λ (p, u) = ⊤ iff p ∈ u. The key property of this construction is that anarbitrary formula α is true in M Λ at u iff α ∈ u. This implies that M Λ isa model of α, i.e. α is true at all points of M Λ , iff α is an Λ-theorem. ThusM Λ is a single characteristic model for Λ, now commonly called the canonicalΛ-model. Moreover, the properties of this model are intimately connected withthe proof-theory of Λ. For example, if (✷α → α) is an Λ-theorem for all α, then it36 At the time this work was done [Kripke, 1965b] had not appeared, but Lemmon had learnedabout non-normal worlds in conversation with Kripke.

Mathematical Modal Logic: A View of its Evolution 39follows directly from properties of maximally consistent sets that R Λ is reflexive.This gives a technique for proving that various logics are characterised by suitableconditions on models, a technique that is explored extensively in [Lemmon andScott, 1966].If Scott’s representation of modal algebras is applied to the Lindenbaum algebraof Λ, the result is a model structure isomorphic to (K Λ , R Λ ). The constructioncan also be viewed as an adaptation of the method of completeness proof introducedin [Henkin, 1949], and first used for modal logic in [Bayart, 1958] (seesection 4.3). There were others who independently applied this approach to therelational semantics for modal logic, including David Makinson [1966] and MaxCresswell [1967], their work being completed in 1965 in both cases. Makinson dealtwith propositional systems, while Cresswell’s appears to be the first Henkin-styleconstruction of relational models of quantificational modal logic. David Kaplanoutlined a proof of this kind in his review [1966] of [Kripke, 1963a], explaining thatthe idea of adapting Henkin’s technique to modal systems had been suggested tohim by Dana Scott.Another construction of lasting importance from the Lemmon Notes is a techniquefor proving the finite model property by forming quotients of the model M L .To calculate the truth-value of a formula α at points in M Λ we need only know thetruth-values of the finitely many subformulas of α. We can regard two members ofM Λ as equivalent if they assign the same truth-values to all subformulas of α. Ifthere are n such subformulas, then there will be at most 2 n resulting equivalenceclasses of elements of M Λ , even though M Λ itself is uncountably large. Identifyingequivalent elements allows M Λ to be collapsed to a finite quotient model whichwill falsify α if M Λ does. This process, which has become known as filtration, 37was first developed in a more set-theoretic way in [Lemmon, 1966b, p. 209] as analternative to McKinsey’s finite algebra construction. In its model-theoretic formit has proven important for completeness proofs as well as for proofs of the finitemodel property. Some eighteen modal logics were shown to be decidable by thismethod in [Lemmon and Scott, 1966].5.2 Bull’s Tense AlgebraA singular contribution from the 1960’s is the algebraic study by Robert Bull, astudent of Arthur Prior, 38 of logics characterised by linearly ordered structures.Prior had observed that the Diodorean temporal reading of ✷α as “α is and alwayswill be true” leads, on intuitive grounds, to a logic that includes S4 but not S5.In his 1956 John Locke Lectures at Oxford on Time and Modality (published as[Prior, 1957]) he attempted to give a mathematical precision to this reading by37 This term was first used in [Segerberg, 1968a], where “canonical model” was also introduced.38 Initially at Christchurch, New Zealand, and then at Manchester, England. Bull was one oftwo graduate students from New Zealand who studied with Prior at Manchester at the beginningof the 1960’s. The other was Max Cresswell, who later became the supervisor of the presentauthor.

38 Robert Goldblattnormal (“queer”) worlds. 36 Notably absent is Kripke’s real world G ∈ K. Insteada formula α is said to be valid in S if in all models on S, α is true (i.e. assignedthe value ⊤) at all points of K.Associated with S is the modal algebra S + comprising the powerset Booleanalgebra P(K) with the additive operatorf(X) = {x ∈ K : x ∈ Q or ∃y ∈ X(xRy)}to interpret ✸. Note that f(∅) = Q, so f is a normal operator iff K has onlynormal members. Lemmon proved the result that a formula is valid in S iff itis satisfied in the algebra S + with just the element 1 (= K) designated. Thisfollows from the natural correspondence between models Φ on S and assignmentsto propositional variables in S + , under which a variable p is assigned the set{x : Φ(p, x) = ⊤} ∈ S + . The result itself is an elaboration of the construction in[Kripke, 1963a] of the matrix of propositions associated with any model structure.It remains true for S2-like systems if validity in S is confined to truth at normalworlds, and also all elements of S + that include K − Q are designated.Any finite modal algebra A = (B, f) is readily shown to be isomorphic to oneof the form S + , with S based on the set of atoms of B. Combining that observationwith McKinsey’s finite algebra constructions enabled Lemmon to deduce thecompleteness of a number of modal logics with respect to validity in their (finite)model structures. For an arbitrary A he gave a representation theorem, “due inessentials to Dana Scott”, that embeds A as a subalgebra of some S + . This wasdone by an extension of Stone’s representation of Boolean algebras, basing S onthe set K of all ultrafilters of B, with uRt iff {fx : x ∈ t} ⊆ u for all ultrafiltersu, t, while Q = {x ∈ K : f0 ∈ x}. Each x ∈ A is represented in S + by the set{u ∈ K : x ∈ u} of ultrafilters containing x, as in Stone’s theory.In the Lemmon Notes there is a model-theoretic analogue of this representationof modal algebras that has played a pivotal role ever since. Out of any normallogic Λ is constructed a modelM Λ = (K Λ , R Λ , Φ Λ )in which K Λ is the set of all maximally Λ-consistent sets of formulas, withuR Λ t iff {✸α : α ∈ t} ⊆ u iff {α : ✷α ∈ u} ⊆ t,and Φ Λ (p, u) = ⊤ iff p ∈ u. The key property of this construction is that anarbitrary formula α is true in M Λ at u iff α ∈ u. This implies that M Λ isa model of α, i.e. α is true at all points of M Λ , iff α is an Λ-theorem. ThusM Λ is a single characteristic model for Λ, now commonly called the canonicalΛ-model. Moreover, the properties of this model are intimately connected withthe proof-theory of Λ. For example, if (✷α → α) is an Λ-theorem for all α, then it36 At the time this work was done [Kripke, 1965b] had not appeared, but Lemmon had learnedabout non-normal worlds in conversation with Kripke.

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