MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION
MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION MATHEMATICAL MODAL LOGIC: A VIEW OF ITS EVOLUTION
28 Robert GoldblattThis proposal became a major programme for Prior. He used formulas like p ∧¬P p ∧ ¬F p which can be true at only one point of the linear series of moments,or instants. If M(p ∧ ¬P p ∧ ¬F p) is true at some time, the variable p must itselfbe true at exactly one instant and may be identified with that instant. Then theformula L(p → α) expresses that “it is the case at p that α”, and so if p and qare both such instance-variables, L(p → P q) asserts that it is true at p that it hasbeen q, i.e. p is later than q, and q is earlier than p.Systems having variables identified with unique instants or worlds are developedmost fully in the book of [Prior and Fine, 1977, p. 37], where Prior gives anemphatic statement of his metaphysical propensity:. . . I find myself quite unable to take ‘instants’ seriously as individual entities;I cannot understand ‘instants’, and the earlier-than relation that is supposedto hold between them, except as logical constructions out of tensed facts.Tense logic is for me, if I may use the phrase, metaphysically fundamental,and not just an artificially torn-off fragment of the first-order theory of theearlier-than relation.4.5 KangerA semantics is given by Stig Kanger in [1957b] for a version of modal predicatelogic whose atomic formulas are propositional variables and expressions of theform (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ε y, where n ≥ 1 and the x i and y are individual variables orconstants. The language included a list of modal connectives M 1 , M 2 , . . . .A notion of a system is introduced as a pair (r, V ) where r is a frame andV a primary valuation. Here r is a certain kind of sequence of non-empty setswhose elements provide values of individual symbols of various types. V is abinary operation that assigns a truth value V (r, p), belonging to {0, 1}, to eachpropositional variable p and frame r, as well as interpreting individual symbolsand the symbol ε in each frame in a manner that need not concern us. Thena “secondary” truth valuation T (r, V, α) is inductively specified, allowing eachformula α to be defined to be true in system (r, V ) iff T (r, V, α) = 1. For thispurpose each modality M i is assumed to be associated with a class R i of quadruples(r ′ , V ′ , r, V ), and it is declared thatT (r, V, M i α) = 1 iffT (r ′ , V ′ , α) = 1 for each r ′ and V ′ such thatR i (r ′ , V ′ , r, V )(so M i is a “box” type of modality).Kanger states the following soundness results. The theorems of the Feys–vonWright system T are valid (i.e. true in all systems) iff R i (r, V, r, V ) always holds.S4 is validated iff R i (r, V, r, V ) always holds and so does the conditionR i (r, V, r ′ , V ′ ) and R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r, V ) implies R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r ′ , V ′ ).S5 is validated iff the S4 conditions hold along with
Mathematical Modal Logic: A View of its Evolution 29R i (r, V, r ′ , V ′ ) and R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r ′ , V ′ ) implies R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r, V ).Proofs of these assertions are not provided. (In fact it is readily seen that thegiven conditions on R i imply validity for the corresponding logics in each case,but the converses are dubious.) A result is proved that equates the existence ofan R i fulfilling the above definition of T (r, V, M i α) to the preservation of certaininference rules involving M i . Kanger says of this that[s]imilar results in the field of Boolean algebras with operators may be foundin [Jónsson and Tarski, 1951].Completeness theorems are not proved, or even stated, for this modal semantics.But there is a completeness proof for the non-modal fragment of the languagewhich has a remarkable aspect. Kanger wishes to have the symbol ε interpreted asthe genuine set membership relation, and he applies the (much-overused) adjectivenormal to a primary valuation V which does give this interpretation to ε in everyframe. Since his language allows atomic formulas like x ε x, normal systems musthave non-well-founded sets. He introduces a new set-theoretical principle to ensurethat enough such sets exist to give the completeness theorem with respect tonormal structures. 29Different definitions of R allow the modelling of different notions of necessity.Kanger [1957a, p. 35] defines set-theoretical necessity to be the modality given byrequiringR i (r ′ , V ′ , r, V ) iff V ′ is normal with respect to ε.This means that M i gets the reading “in all normal systems”. Analytic necessityis modelled by the R i havingR i (r ′ , V ′ , r, V ) iff V ′ = V ,and logical necessity arises when R i (r ′ , V ′ , r, V ) always holds. Thus “logicallynecessary” means “true in all systems”, which is reminiscent of the modelling ofthe S5 necessity connective by Carnap and Bayart (section 4.3).There is no doubt much scope for defining other modalities in this way, andKanger offers one other brief suggestion:We may, for instance, define ‘geometrical necessity’ in the way we definedset-theoretical necessity except that (roughly speaking) V ′ shall be normalalso with respect to the theoretical constants of geometry.The paper [Kanger, 1957a] addresses difficulties raised by Quine (in [1947] andother writings) about the possibility of satisfactorily interpreting quantificationalmodal logic. One such obstacle concerns the principle of substitutivity of equals,formalised by the schemax ≈ y → (α → α ′ )29 This principle is discussed further in [Aczel, 1988, pp. 28–31 and 108].
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- Page 24 and 25: 24 Robert Goldblatt“true” or
- Page 26 and 27: 26 Robert GoldblattPrior’s articl
- Page 30 and 31: 30 Robert Goldblattwhere α ′ is
- Page 32 and 33: 32 Robert Goldblattif α is atomic
- Page 34 and 35: 34 Robert GoldblattHintikka gives a
- Page 36 and 37: 36 Robert Goldblattbetween worlds a
- Page 38 and 39: 38 Robert Goldblattnormal (“queer
- Page 40 and 41: 40 Robert Goldblattinterpreting for
- Page 42 and 43: 42 Robert GoldblattDiodorean interp
- Page 44 and 45: 44 Robert Goldblattthat the formula
- Page 46 and 47: 46 Robert Goldblatt6.1 Incompletene
- Page 48 and 49: 48 Robert Goldblatttions: every nor
- Page 50 and 51: 50 Robert Goldblatttrue at some poi
- Page 52 and 53: 52 Robert Goldblattof the monadic s
- Page 54 and 55: 54 Robert Goldblattversion [van Ben
- Page 56 and 57: 56 Robert Goldblatt6.5 Duality and
- Page 58 and 59: 58 Robert Goldblattfrom a suitably
- Page 60 and 61: 60 Robert GoldblattAnother way to d
- Page 62 and 63: 62 Robert Goldblattwhether a variet
- Page 64 and 65: 64 Robert Goldblattatomic commands
- Page 66 and 67: 66 Robert Goldblattmodalities 〈 i
- Page 68 and 69: 68 Robert Goldblatt[Hennessy and Li
- Page 70 and 71: 70 Robert GoldblattThe logic CTL* w
- Page 72 and 73: 72 Robert GoldblattThe meaning of
- Page 74 and 75: 74 Robert Goldblattwhich shows that
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28 Robert GoldblattThis proposal became a major programme for Prior. He used formulas like p ∧¬P p ∧ ¬F p which can be true at only one point of the linear series of moments,or instants. If M(p ∧ ¬P p ∧ ¬F p) is true at some time, the variable p must itselfbe true at exactly one instant and may be identified with that instant. Then theformula L(p → α) expresses that “it is the case at p that α”, and so if p and qare both such instance-variables, L(p → P q) asserts that it is true at p that it hasbeen q, i.e. p is later than q, and q is earlier than p.Systems having variables identified with unique instants or worlds are developedmost fully in the book of [Prior and Fine, 1977, p. 37], where Prior gives anemphatic statement of his metaphysical propensity:. . . I find myself quite unable to take ‘instants’ seriously as individual entities;I cannot understand ‘instants’, and the earlier-than relation that is supposedto hold between them, except as logical constructions out of tensed facts.Tense logic is for me, if I may use the phrase, metaphysically fundamental,and not just an artificially torn-off fragment of the first-order theory of theearlier-than relation.4.5 KangerA semantics is given by Stig Kanger in [1957b] for a version of modal predicatelogic whose atomic formulas are propositional variables and expressions of theform (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ε y, where n ≥ 1 and the x i and y are individual variables orconstants. The language included a list of modal connectives M 1 , M 2 , . . . .A notion of a system is introduced as a pair (r, V ) where r is a frame andV a primary valuation. Here r is a certain kind of sequence of non-empty setswhose elements provide values of individual symbols of various types. V is abinary operation that assigns a truth value V (r, p), belonging to {0, 1}, to eachpropositional variable p and frame r, as well as interpreting individual symbolsand the symbol ε in each frame in a manner that need not concern us. Thena “secondary” truth valuation T (r, V, α) is inductively specified, allowing eachformula α to be defined to be true in system (r, V ) iff T (r, V, α) = 1. For thispurpose each modality M i is assumed to be associated with a class R i of quadruples(r ′ , V ′ , r, V ), and it is declared thatT (r, V, M i α) = 1 iffT (r ′ , V ′ , α) = 1 for each r ′ and V ′ such thatR i (r ′ , V ′ , r, V )(so M i is a “box” type of modality).Kanger states the following soundness results. The theorems of the Feys–vonWright system T are valid (i.e. true in all systems) iff R i (r, V, r, V ) always holds.S4 is validated iff R i (r, V, r, V ) always holds and so does the conditionR i (r, V, r ′ , V ′ ) and R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r, V ) implies R i (r ′′ , V ′′ , r ′ , V ′ ).S5 is validated iff the S4 conditions hold along with