‘Bounded rationality’ <strong>and</strong> the price system 89an army, it would refer to the mutual compatibility of the individualactions for the achievement of the superior’s ends. Were thisorganization to grow in the number of its members or in thediversity of its tasks, the planner might reach a point in which hewas overwhelmed by the complexity of achieving such coordination.Consequently, some individuals could receivecontradictory orders, others would perhaps realize that they couldnot comply with their orders because the prerequisite tasks had notbeen carried out, 42 some individuals would get in each other’s way,<strong>and</strong> so on. But as long as this is not the case, a large measure ofsuccessful co-ordination, one of the characteristics of an efficientarmy, will be possible.The notion of co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong> is somewhat subtler. Anexample provided by Kirzner may serve to illustrate it. Say that amutually beneficial exchange opportunity between individuals A <strong>and</strong>B exists, but is not exploited because they are not aware of it. In thisexample,by A’s not buying B’s apples, <strong>and</strong> by B’s not selling them to A, eachparty is, because of ignorance of the other’s ‘existence,’ acting as ifthe other did not in fact exist. A knows his own taste <strong>and</strong> assets; Bknows his. But because the bits of <strong>knowledge</strong> are not coordinated,the actions taken by A <strong>and</strong> B are uncoordinated.(Kirzner 1973:216; emphasis added)In this case, lack of co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong> is the cause of discoordinationof actions. How can this be solved? According to Kirzner,the rule is simple <strong>and</strong> obvious: coordination of information ensurescoordination of action. As soon as a single mind becomes aware ofthe situations <strong>and</strong> attitudes of two separate individuals betweenwhom exist the conditions for mutually beneficial exchange, so thathe perceives the opportunity so presented—as soon, that is, as thepreviously isolated pieces of information have become coordinatedin the mind of a single human being—we are assured of action tocoordinate the decisions, plans, <strong>and</strong> actions of the individualsconcerned.(ibid.: 219)In the example above, as soon as either A or B becomes aware of theother’s tastes, or as soon as a third individual becomes aware of A’s
90 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong><strong>and</strong> B’s tastes, there is co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong>; a bridge, so tospeak, has appeared between the previously isolated pieces ofinformation. (This bridge is due to entrepreneurship.) As soon as thisdisco-ordination is noticed, moves towards its elimination are assuredbecause doing so is profitable, <strong>and</strong> co-ordination of action follows.Thus, for example, in a <strong>market</strong>, there would finally be (were full coordinationto be achieved) no excess dem<strong>and</strong>s or supplies at the newprice. However, although co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong> may be asufficient condition for co-ordination of actions, it is not a necessaryone in the usual meaning of ‘co-ordination of actions’.To underst<strong>and</strong> how co-ordination of action does not implythere is also co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong>, the army example isagain useful. Say the comm<strong>and</strong>er is ordering certain strategicmanoeuvres, <strong>and</strong> there is among his soldiers one individual who,were he consulted, would prove to be a highly capable strategist.But the comm<strong>and</strong>er is unaware of his existence <strong>and</strong> therefore doesnot make use of his talents. There will not then be co-ordinationof <strong>knowledge</strong>. However, in the sense described initially, therecould still be (a visible) co-ordination of actions: the soldierscould act in a harmonious way towards the achievement of thecomm<strong>and</strong>er’s goal.There are thus two types of disco-ordination that could occur inthis example. (1) There could be disco-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong>because there remain isolated bits of information that have not yetbeen ‘bridged’ by a single mind: in this case, not making use of thesoldier’s talent for strategy. (2) There could be disco-ordinationonly of actions because, for example, the number of men <strong>and</strong>different tasks have become overwhelming for a singlecomm<strong>and</strong>er’s mind, given the present organization of this army.The first is an instance of ‘sheer’ ignorance, while the secondcorresponds to Simon’s type. This also serves as an additionalexample of how the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem is related to the number offacts to be known: in this case, the larger the number of soldiers themore likely the comm<strong>and</strong>er is not to notice the individuals’ abilitiesthat may be useful to him. 43Although this use of the term ‘co-ordination of actions’conforms to its habitual use, Kirzner’s example suggests that heprefers to confine its use exclusively to situations in which there isalso co-ordination of <strong>knowledge</strong>. Thus when, say, A trades with B,unaware that he could trade even more profitably with C, who isalso unaware of this opportunity, Kirzner would not describe this
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
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18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
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20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
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22 Prices and knowledgeauxiliary’
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24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
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26 Prices and knowledgeall practica
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30 Prices and knowledgeprices fully
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- Page 143 and 144: ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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140 ReferencesOsana, H. (1978) ‘O
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142 Referencesfrontiers of analytic
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144 IndexCercone, N. 79change: and
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146 Index61, 118; on costless infor
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148 Indexmisinformation 55, 57mista
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150 IndexVeljanowski, C.G. 43voting