‘Bounded rationality’ <strong>and</strong> the price system 69agents build simplified models (‘heroic abstractions’) to deal with thesituations in which they find themselves. This makes Simon(1956:278) adopt the familiar distinction between subjective <strong>and</strong>objective rationality: he defines the former as ‘behavior that isrational, given the perceptual <strong>and</strong> evaluational premises of thesubject’, <strong>and</strong> the latter as referring to ‘the rationality of theperceptions themselves (i.e. whether or not the situation as perceivedis the “real” situation).’ Although individual behaviour may besubjectively rational, he argues, the complexity of the world imposesa need for simplification that makes it very unlikely that it will beobjectively rational. 16An agent can be said to be optimizing with respect to hissimplified model, but ‘such behavior is not even approximatelyoptimal with respect to the real world’ (Simon 1957:199). This lackof optimality can apparently occur in two respects: (1) the actor willnot be able to encompass the whole set of relevant variables, <strong>and</strong> (2)given the limited amount of information that he can h<strong>and</strong>le, there isno assurance that he will take into account the most profitableportion of reality (as a neoclassical agent who had to allocate hislimited attention optimally would). 17 To emphasize further that he isnot talking about optimal simplifications by individuals, Simonobjects to their being described as ‘approximations’ or the agents’perceptive mechanisms as ‘filters’:The term ‘approximation’ implies that the subjective world of thedecision-maker resembles the external environment closely, but lacks,perhaps, some fineness of detail. In actual fact the perceived world isfantastically different from the ‘real’ world. The differences involveboth omissions <strong>and</strong> distortions, <strong>and</strong> arise in both perception <strong>and</strong>inference. The sins of omission in perception are more important thanthe sins of commission. The decision-maker’s model of the worldencompasses only a minute fraction of all the relevant characteristics ofthe real environment, <strong>and</strong> his inferences extract only a minute fractionof all the information that is present even in his model.Regarding the term ‘filter’, the type of filtering that actually occurs isan active <strong>process</strong> involving attention to a very small part of thewhole <strong>and</strong> exclusion, from the outset, of almost all that is not withinthe scope of attention.(Simon 1959:306–7; emphasis added)
70 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>Thus the simplification is not—<strong>and</strong> cannot be—done, as is assumed inan optimizing approach, after evaluating all the potentially availableinformation, however vaguely the latter might be supposed to beknown.SOME SIMPLIFYING DEVICESTwo of the devices Simon identifies that reduce the complexity ofdecision problems, making them manageable for individuals, will beconsidered here: (1) at the individual level, the procedure Simon hasnamed ‘satisficing’ (arguably his most renowned contribution toeconomics) <strong>and</strong> (2), at the social level, ‘the combined use of <strong>market</strong>s<strong>and</strong> administrative hierarchies.’ The idea of ‘satisficing’, not crucialfor present purposes, will be briefly described to help underst<strong>and</strong>bounded rationality.Satisficing <strong>and</strong> aspiration levels‘Satisficing’ simplifies the agents’ choice problem by having themlook for an alternative that is satisfactory, or good enough, rather thanbest, or optimal. 18 Instead of having the individual scan through all theavailable alternatives, satisficing requires him only to search until hefinds one that, in Simon’s words, meets his ‘aspiration level’.As an example of how this procedure is supposed to operate,Simon (1978a:468) provides the following:If needles are distributed r<strong>and</strong>omly in a haystack of size, H, with anaverage density of distribution, d, then to find the sharpest needle inthe stack, we have to search the entire stack, <strong>and</strong> the search timewill vary with H. Search time will be linear with size, which doesnot seem too bad until we remember that the haystack of life isessentially infinite.If we are satisfied with any needle, however (after all, they are allsharp enough to sew with), then the amount of search to find one willvary with d—that is, will be independent of the size of the stack.According to Simon, man will satisfice at two decision stages:1. When deciding whether to search for alternatives. The agentwill not search for alternatives as long as his present one meets his
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
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ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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138 ReferencesKihlstrom, R.E. and M
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140 ReferencesOsana, H. (1978) ‘O
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142 Referencesfrontiers of analytic
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144 IndexCercone, N. 79change: and
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146 Index61, 118; on costless infor
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148 Indexmisinformation 55, 57mista
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150 IndexVeljanowski, C.G. 43voting