Equilibrium prices <strong>and</strong> information 47In a <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> <strong>perspective</strong> profit incentives are not rewards toencourage the adoption by agents of certain courses of actionalready perceived <strong>and</strong> known, in at least a vague way, by thedesigner of the incentive system. Market profits are, as argued in theprevious chapter, incentives that encourage the discovery of‘opportunities that have until now been perceived by no one at all’(Kirzner 1985a:29).The conclusion, then, is that although there could be some roomfor another informational role of prices within Grossman <strong>and</strong>Stiglitz’s theoretical framework, their treatment of the ignorance tobe dispelled in terms of the economics of information is likely toproduce an undervaluation of the achievement of prices in this role.From such a <strong>perspective</strong>, prices would turn out to be a (probablyimperfect) mechanism for rewarding the production of <strong>knowledge</strong>, amechanism that could be replicated, or even surpassed, by someother alternative. From the <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> <strong>perspective</strong>, on the otherh<strong>and</strong>, the crucial problem is not merely one of efficiently deploying<strong>knowledge</strong> existing somewhere in the economy but also one ofprompting entrepreneurial discovery of previously unknown<strong>knowledge</strong>. And this is something for which there appears to be nogood substitute for <strong>market</strong> prices.To recapitulate, this chapter has hereto identified threeinformational roles of prices: (1) prices may inform the actions of anindividual (without informing him), (2) prices may be ‘read’ byindividuals to infer some information, <strong>and</strong>, lastly, (3) price disparitiesmay provide rewards for the ‘production’, or discovery, of new<strong>knowledge</strong>.<strong>Prices</strong> as ‘sufficient statistics’Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz interpret Hayek as saying that prices in a<strong>market</strong> economy serve as sufficient statistics, that <strong>knowledge</strong> of pricesis sufficient for agents to act so as to achieve an efficient economicallocation. 25 They are not alone in this interpretation. Already, in 1957,Koopmans (1957:22–3, n.), after citing Hayek’s 1945 article, pointedout thatthere is a striking similarity between the summarization of supply<strong>and</strong> preference data through prices <strong>and</strong> the notions of sufficient <strong>and</strong>efficient statistical estimation procedures, proposed by R.A.Fisher
48 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>as devices for the ‘reduction’ of data <strong>and</strong> widely adopted <strong>and</strong>further developed by statisticians. The basic idea there is to find aset of numbers which adequately summarizes a much moredetailed body of information for the purposes of a certain class ofdecisions. 26More recently, in an attempt to outline the <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> position,Loasby (1982:114–15) has described it as arguing, among otherthings, thata decentralized economy needs only to establish a set of prices.Each economic agent can then apply his own specific<strong>knowledge</strong> of resources <strong>and</strong> of technology <strong>and</strong> his ownparticular pattern of preferences to those prices: there is no needfor information about these matters to be communicated. Whatis more, as F. A.Hayek, for example, has emphasized, no oneneeds to know why the price of some particular commodity iswhatever it is. A particular material may rise in price because itssupply is becoming exhausted, because new uses have beenfound for it, or because existing uses are becoming morepopular. The cause does not matter: whatever that may be, theconsequence is that more effort should now be devoted to waysof increasing the supply, using it more effectively, or replacing itby some alternative. But in a pure <strong>market</strong> economy no one needsto be instructed to do any of these things. The increased priceprovides the only signal needed, <strong>and</strong> anyone who has the<strong>knowledge</strong>, or the particular pattern of preferences, tocontribute in any of these ways will do so. 27But, Loasby realizes, this interpretation leaves one questionunanswered: how are these prices to be arrived at? Agents in thisversion of Hayek’s story act as price takers. What is needed is a‘theory of price setting’, a theory which Loasby believes Kirznerprovides in his work on entrepreneurship (1982:115). Loasby sees thislack as a problem, in contrast to Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz, who do notseem worried about it, 28 because he is not concerned only withequilibrium states but also with the <strong>process</strong>es by which they might bearrived at.Loasby’s interpretation has been criticized by Garrison (1982).Garrison quotes from Hayek’s tin example to show that Hayek didnot envisage an economy in which nobody possessed the relevant
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ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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138 ReferencesKihlstrom, R.E. and M
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142 Referencesfrontiers of analytic
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144 IndexCercone, N. 79change: and
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150 IndexVeljanowski, C.G. 43voting