Equilibrium prices <strong>and</strong> information 43individuals in a Hayekian world could attempt to infer informationfrom prices if it were profitable for them to do so. Nevertheless, it isa different informational function. And to the extent that it is with theinference kind of activity that Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz are dealing theiranalysis becomes largely irrelevant with respect to Hayek’sargument.A question remains regarding whether or not the individuals ingeneral equilibrium need the information provided by prices assurrogates. Although the contrary is often argued, it has been saidthat in the competitive model ‘individuals do not have perfectinformation. Instead they have costless <strong>market</strong> information aboutexchange opportunities as conveyed by prices <strong>and</strong>, of course, it mustbe assumed that they know the equilibrium set of prices’ (Veljanovski1982:63–4; emphasis in original). 20 It is this type of considerationthat leads Coddington (1975:154, n.) to remark thatthe result that in equilibrium <strong>market</strong> prices are perfect-<strong>knowledge</strong>surrogates is something of a swindle or, at best, a piece ofconceptual conjuring. This is so because all the epistemic problemshave to be solved in reaching equilibrium (e.g. by the Walrasianauctioneer). The reason that <strong>market</strong> prices ‘reflect’ everything thattraders need to know about the <strong>market</strong>s is because—somehow—they have been rigged to do so.The last section of this chapter will argue that Hayek’s argument,here captured by an equilibrium approach, may also remain validfrom a <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> <strong>perspective</strong> that addresses Coddington’sconcern with disequilibrium. However, Coddington’s remarks donot alter the fact that there are two informational roles of equilibriumprices to be distinguished. Much of the literature has not only missedthe entrepreneurial, discovery role of disequilibrium prices but it isalso confusing the roles of prices as <strong>knowledge</strong> surrogates <strong>and</strong> assources of information. However, this is not a deficiency of all theresearch concerned with prices <strong>and</strong> information: other work,including that of Hurwicz mentioned above, deals more directlywith the role of prices as surrogates, although still to the exclusion ofall entrepreneurial aspects. At any rate, the distinction made hereshould be kept in mind in the discussion of Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’swritings that follows.
44 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>The informational role of disequilibrium pricesGrossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’s argument is that prices cannot be perfecttransmitters of information because they cannot be fully arbitraged ifthey are to provide a reward for the (equilibrium) activity ofobtaining information, such as arbitrage. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, whenviewing <strong>market</strong>s in disequilibrium terms, it is true that prices cannotbe taken ‘literally’, as price-takers are supposed to take them,because out of equilibrium they provide wrong information aboutrelative scarcities. Although for Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz this meansthat prices will not be informationally efficient, which in a sense istrue, Kirzner argues that disequilibrium prices perform a moreimportant informational role.Market prices, which are imperfect <strong>knowledge</strong> surrogates if takenas equilibrium prices, provide rewards for those agents who noticeunexploited opportunities. In fact, ‘it is the very inadequacies thatcloud the manner in which these price-summaries express existing<strong>knowledge</strong>, that create the <strong>market</strong> incentives for their modification’(Kirzner 1984b:202). The profits resulting from exploiting pricedisparities spark the entrepreneurial discovery of new, previouslyunthought of <strong>knowledge</strong>. The claim is not that price-taking agents,by deciding on the basis of known prices, act as if they know morethan they actually do, but rather that profits lead them to find outabout better available courses of action. As Kirzner (1984b:205) putsit, ‘the social function served by <strong>market</strong> prices is captured far moresignificantly by the concept of discovery, than by that ofcommunication’. (Perhaps it would help to stress that it is reallyprofits, rather than prices directly, that perform this informationalrole.)This informational role is crucial because, as will be arguedlater on, the extent to which prices may reflect information, bothas surrogates <strong>and</strong> in the Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz sense, will be aresult of the disequilibrium rivalrous bids <strong>and</strong> offers ofentrepreneurs. 21It is well known that most economists have neglected thedisequilibrium informational role of prices. What is moreinteresting is that even a particularly sympathetic reader of Hayeksuch as Thomas Sowell, in his book Knowledge <strong>and</strong> Decisions,described by Kirzner (1984b:202) as ‘the most extensive <strong>and</strong> widerangingdevelopment of the implications of the Hayekian insights’,has been almost exclusively concerned with the role of equilibrium
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ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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