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Prices and knowledge: A market-process perspective

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Equilibrium prices <strong>and</strong> information 43individuals in a Hayekian world could attempt to infer informationfrom prices if it were profitable for them to do so. Nevertheless, it isa different informational function. And to the extent that it is with theinference kind of activity that Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz are dealing theiranalysis becomes largely irrelevant with respect to Hayek’sargument.A question remains regarding whether or not the individuals ingeneral equilibrium need the information provided by prices assurrogates. Although the contrary is often argued, it has been saidthat in the competitive model ‘individuals do not have perfectinformation. Instead they have costless <strong>market</strong> information aboutexchange opportunities as conveyed by prices <strong>and</strong>, of course, it mustbe assumed that they know the equilibrium set of prices’ (Veljanovski1982:63–4; emphasis in original). 20 It is this type of considerationthat leads Coddington (1975:154, n.) to remark thatthe result that in equilibrium <strong>market</strong> prices are perfect-<strong>knowledge</strong>surrogates is something of a swindle or, at best, a piece ofconceptual conjuring. This is so because all the epistemic problemshave to be solved in reaching equilibrium (e.g. by the Walrasianauctioneer). The reason that <strong>market</strong> prices ‘reflect’ everything thattraders need to know about the <strong>market</strong>s is because—somehow—they have been rigged to do so.The last section of this chapter will argue that Hayek’s argument,here captured by an equilibrium approach, may also remain validfrom a <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> <strong>perspective</strong> that addresses Coddington’sconcern with disequilibrium. However, Coddington’s remarks donot alter the fact that there are two informational roles of equilibriumprices to be distinguished. Much of the literature has not only missedthe entrepreneurial, discovery role of disequilibrium prices but it isalso confusing the roles of prices as <strong>knowledge</strong> surrogates <strong>and</strong> assources of information. However, this is not a deficiency of all theresearch concerned with prices <strong>and</strong> information: other work,including that of Hurwicz mentioned above, deals more directlywith the role of prices as surrogates, although still to the exclusion ofall entrepreneurial aspects. At any rate, the distinction made hereshould be kept in mind in the discussion of Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’swritings that follows.

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