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Prices and knowledge: A market-process perspective

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12 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>behavior of agents. Rather, the theory of the household <strong>and</strong> the firmmust be reformulated <strong>and</strong> extended where necessary to allowagents to perceive that the economy is not in equilibrium <strong>and</strong> to acton that perception. Without this, we cannot hope to provide atheory of what happens when arbitrage opportunities appear, forthe essence of the appearance of such opportunities is that agentssee <strong>and</strong> act on them.He points out thatAgents in the st<strong>and</strong>ard theory react to given prices <strong>and</strong> take noaccount either of the fact that prices may change or of the possibilitythat they may not be able to complete their own transactions. So longas the plans which agents make are compatible, this presents nodifficulty; in equilibrium the equilibrium assumptions of agents arefulfilled. If we are to deal with disequilibrium, however, this will notbe the case, <strong>and</strong> we must start at the level of individual agents.(1983:11)Related considerations lead Hey (1981:201) to state that ‘if one wantsto model genuine disequilibrium, then the optimising model ofindividual choice must be ab<strong>and</strong>oned’.Israel M.Kirzner (1973) has described the main problem with theeconomic agent of equilibrium theory, whom he terms the Robbinsian(for Lionel Robbins) maximizer. The neoclassical agent maximizeseither utility or profits (or some other magnitude in less frequentversions). The facts the agent uses for such a calculation (technologies,resource availabilities, prices, probabilities of occurrences of events,<strong>and</strong> so on) are presumed to be somehow given to him <strong>and</strong>, mostfrequently, also to be correct. How these facts were perceived, or whatthe agent would do if they were to turn out to be wrong, is beyond thescope of the maximizer. For example, the plans of a set of such agents,based on incorrect facts, would produce surpluses <strong>and</strong> shortages that,strictly speaking, could persist indefinitely: there is no indication ofhow, if at all, these agents’ perceptions would be modified under suchcircumstances. As T.W.Schultz (1975:829) puts it, ‘determiningprecisely what people do who are not in equilibrium is not one of thenotable achievements of economics’.Kirzner describes this characteristic by saying that the st<strong>and</strong>ardmaximizer operates within a given means-ends framework. Whenthere is disequilibrium ‘the Robbinsian framework suggests that the

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