Index 145disequilibrium <strong>market</strong> failures 26,101disequilibrium prices 2–4; <strong>and</strong>Austrian school 55; <strong>and</strong>complexity 80–2; <strong>and</strong>entrepreneurial discovery 43–7,82–3; feedback mechanism of 3,58; Hayek on 87; informationalrole of 29–30, 44–7, 55–60, 118,119–20; as <strong>knowledge</strong> surrogates41, 121; as misinformationsurrogates 55, 57; <strong>and</strong> priceaccepting 57, 60; <strong>and</strong> pricetaking 55–7; <strong>and</strong> profitopportunities55–6, 58–60, 105, 119; assignals 48, 121; see also pricesdispersed information 30–1, 82Dreyfus, H.L. 79economic systems: <strong>and</strong> centralplanning 36–7; compared 36–7,104–6; decentralized 105;evaluation of 7, 36, 52–5;incentives in 19–20; <strong>and</strong><strong>knowledge</strong> problem 7, 105–6;mixed 104; <strong>and</strong> Pareto optimality52–5economics of information 38, 117,119, 121; <strong>and</strong> ignorance 22–4, 29economics, mathematical approach to5, 18, 22, 40, 102–3economy: household 84; regulation of96; socialist 85–8entrepreneurial discovery 4, 5; ofchange 105; <strong>and</strong> disequilibriumprices 43–7, 82–3, 119–20; <strong>and</strong>ignorance 38, 76–8; incentives for47; <strong>and</strong> inflation 122; <strong>and</strong><strong>knowledge</strong> 104, 105, 119; <strong>and</strong>profit opportunities 27, 47;research on 121entrepreneurs: <strong>and</strong> Austrian school49–50; co-ordinating role of 58–9,90, 91, 114; defined 17–18;Kirzner defines 17–18; <strong>and</strong><strong>market</strong>s 114; mistakes of 12, 21,27, 91, 107, 122entrepreneurship 2, 5; <strong>and</strong>equilibrium 22; in <strong>market</strong>economy 83, 86–8; Misesdescribes 18; <strong>and</strong> organizations108–15; <strong>and</strong> profits 17–20; <strong>and</strong>role of money 121–2equilibration 51–2, 122equilibrium: arbitrage in 38; <strong>and</strong>change 98; <strong>and</strong> co-ordination9–10, 11; defining 8–10; <strong>and</strong>disequilibrium 37–40; Hahn’sconcept of sloppy 9; as‘imaginary construction’ 21–2;modelling38–9; as negative description 21;prices 40–3, 117–18; <strong>and</strong> profitopportunities 9–10; role of 20–2;<strong>and</strong> stability analysis 102experimentation 110externalities: <strong>and</strong> central planning81; <strong>and</strong> hierarchies 75; <strong>and</strong>information 38–9; <strong>and</strong> perfectcompetition 55; <strong>and</strong> price systemparadoxes 33Fama, E. 30feedback mechanism of prices 3, 58‘filters’ 69–70firms 72–3, 76, 108Fisher, F.M. 8, 11–12, 24, 102, 103Fisher, R.A. 48foresight 28free entry 114‘free lunch’ fallacy 26, 53free-riding, <strong>and</strong> information 33Fundamental Welfare Theorem 42Frydman, R. 103Garrison, R. 48–9, 52, 58Gordon, D.F. 13government hierarchies 109–11;decentralized 112government intervention 26, 81,107–8government planning 96; <strong>and</strong>discovery procedure 54; <strong>and</strong><strong>knowledge</strong> problem 110–11‘grass-is-greener’ fallacy 26, 53Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz 2, 6, 29–50,
146 Index61, 118; on costless information35–6; <strong>and</strong> disequilibriumanalysis 39–40; on ‘diverse’information 30; <strong>and</strong>informational efficiency ofprices 2, 6, 31–7, 118; <strong>and</strong>‘noisy’ prices 33–5, 36–7; <strong>and</strong>normative st<strong>and</strong>ard 36, 52–5;<strong>and</strong> price inferred <strong>knowledge</strong>40–3; <strong>and</strong> prices as ‘sufficientstatistics’ 47–52Grossman, S.J. 2, 30, 32–6, 39–42,54, 61; see also Grossman <strong>and</strong>StiglitzHahn, F.: <strong>and</strong> disequilibrium 10–11;<strong>and</strong> sloppy equilibrium concept 9,102Hayek, F.A. 1, 6, 7, 117; <strong>and</strong>centralized control 113–14; <strong>and</strong>complexity 81, 86–7, 112; <strong>and</strong>equilibrium prices <strong>and</strong>information 29–31, 32–7, 38–55;<strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong> problem 15–16,25; on the <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong>concept 9–10, 14–17, 20–2, 24–5, 73–4; <strong>and</strong> response to change99–100, 101, 106–7; see alsoLange-Lerner-Taylor-HayekdebateHellwig, M.F. 39‘heroic abstractions’ 69Hey, J.D. 12, 13hierarchies 4; defined 108; <strong>and</strong>externalities 75; government109–11; <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>s 72–6, 96;Simon’s view of 72, 75–6; versus<strong>market</strong>s 108–15, 120Hirshleifer, J. 53Hurwicz, L. 30–1, 43Hynes, A. 13ignorance 4, 83; <strong>and</strong> centralplanning 46–7; <strong>and</strong> complexity77, 104, 115; deliberate 23; <strong>and</strong>economics of information 22–4;<strong>and</strong> entrepreneurial discovery38,76–8, 104; optimal 9, 23; <strong>and</strong>profit opportunities 17; radical 4,5, 119; sheer 23–4, 27, 38, 84,90, 107, 115, 121; Simon’sconcept of 76–8, 84, 90‘imaginary construction’, equilibriumas 21–2imperfect competition 67imperfect information 53–5incentives 119, 120; profits as 19–20,47, 55, 100, 111, 114; role ofmoney as 121inflation, <strong>and</strong> entrepreneurialdiscovery 122information: bridging 89–90, 91;collection of 32–3; costless 35–6,43, 53; costly 23–4, 26, 29, 32–3,34, 38–9, 53–4, 118; costs 24, 72,101; dispersed 30–1, 82;externalities 38–9; <strong>and</strong>government planning 54;imperfect 53–5; irrelevant 68,78–9; <strong>and</strong> prices 16, 29–62, 80–3,116–20; prices as aggregated 30,32–7, 37–8; prices as summariesof 80, 81–3, 116, 120; as publicgood 53; <strong>and</strong> role ofdisequilibrium prices 29–30,44–7, 55–60, 118, 119–20;transmission of 30, 35, 37–8, 108;unquestioned 56–8; see also<strong>knowledge</strong>information <strong>process</strong>ing: in centrallyplanned systems 107; electronic67; human 66–7, 68, 79, 86, 96–7,118; <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>s 73–4‘information rich’ world 67–8,115–16initiative, concept of 65innovation 98, 100, 114; <strong>and</strong>aspiration levels 71institutions, comparative st<strong>and</strong>ards25–7, 54–5integration, horizontal <strong>and</strong> vertical107investment 53, 65, 110‘invisible h<strong>and</strong>’ 11, 30, 35Kirzner, I.M.: on co-ordination
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
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20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
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22 Prices and knowledgeauxiliary’
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24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
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26 Prices and knowledgeall practica
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28 Prices and knowledgemarket parti
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30 Prices and knowledgeprices fully
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32 Prices and knowledgeoptimal allo
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38 Prices and knowledgeequilibrium.
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