Indexaggregation of information 30, 32–7,37–8allocation of resources 31, 47; <strong>and</strong>arbitrage 37; <strong>and</strong> computers 74,77; effects of change on 98; <strong>and</strong><strong>knowledge</strong> 15–16; <strong>market</strong> orgovernment 54, 73; optimized31–2, 74, 77, 98; problems of 97,98, 99; <strong>and</strong> profit opportunities 28Ando, A. 63, 64‘approximation’, concept of 69arbitrage: <strong>and</strong> allocation of resources37; in equilibrium 38, 44;opportunities 12, 17, 56, 91Arrow, K.J. 53Artificial Intelligence 78–9, 121aspiration levels 70–2‘auctioneer’, <strong>market</strong> concept of 39,43Austrian school of economists 2, 6, 7,64–5; <strong>and</strong> disequilibrium prices55; <strong>and</strong> entrepreneurship concept49–50; <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong> problem83–8; <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> concept14–28; <strong>and</strong> price mechanism49–50bargaining 73barter 121Bartley, W.W. 16, 46–7Baumol, W.J. 20, 68Bayesian economics 13bounded rationality 1–3, 5–7, 64–70,117, 118; <strong>and</strong> central planning 97,112, 120; <strong>and</strong> change 98;cognitive limitations of 115; <strong>and</strong>computers 67, 68, 81, 86;consequences of 68–70; <strong>and</strong>economic organization 103,108–115; <strong>and</strong> informationtransmission 108; <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong><strong>process</strong>concept 80–3, 84;Nelson’s concept of 97; <strong>and</strong> pricesystem 63–94; Simon’s concept of64–70; <strong>and</strong> simplification<strong>process</strong>es 68–76br<strong>and</strong> names 121‘bridging’ information 89–90, 91bureaucracies,decentralized 112–15central planning: <strong>and</strong> boundedrationality 97, 112, 120; orcompetition 7, 36–7, 109–11,114; <strong>and</strong> complexity 83–8, 97;<strong>and</strong> computers 81; <strong>and</strong> control99–100, 103; <strong>and</strong> coordination75, 88–9; <strong>and</strong> data 85; <strong>and</strong>decentralization 116, 120; <strong>and</strong>discovery procedure 46, 106–7,111; <strong>and</strong> externalities 81; <strong>and</strong>ignorance 46; imposition of110–11; <strong>and</strong> incentives 46, 111;<strong>knowledge</strong> problem in 15, 83–6,105, 107; <strong>and</strong> profitopportunities 82–3; response tochange in100–2, 103, 104–5centralization: of decision-making 54;of resource allocation 73
144 IndexCercone, N. 79change: <strong>and</strong> central planning 100–2;<strong>and</strong> complexity 67, 106–7; coordinationof response to 101–2;entrepreneurial discovery of 105;<strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong> problem 7, 106–7;response to 72–3, 98, 100–2, 105;time aspects of 106–7; unexpected13, 95, 100–1; <strong>and</strong> updating data103choice: <strong>and</strong> omniscience 64; <strong>and</strong>satisficing 70–1Coase, R.H. 109–10, 111Coddington, A. 43, 55cognition theory 4, 78–9, 118, 121comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control 97, 99–100,113–14; of informationtransmission 103competition: <strong>and</strong> central planningcompared 7, 36–7, 109–11, 114;concept of 65; as co-ordinating<strong>process</strong> 22; as discovery procedure16–17, 83, 87, 95, 109; imperfect67; rivalrous 5, 44, 50, 65, 114,119complexity 4, 66–70, 99, 113; <strong>and</strong>central planning 83–8, 97; <strong>and</strong>change 106–7; <strong>and</strong> governmentintervention 81; <strong>and</strong> ignorance104, 115; <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong> problem76–80; <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong>concept 83–8; <strong>and</strong> money 121–2;<strong>and</strong> price mechanism 72, 80–2;Simon’s theory of 118;simplification of 68–76, 116; <strong>and</strong>time 99–100computers 86; <strong>and</strong> allocativeoptimization 74, 77; <strong>and</strong> boundedrationality 67, 68, 81contracts 107, 121co-ordination: of actions 88–9, 90–1;by entrepreneurs 58–9, 90, 91,114; <strong>and</strong> central planning 75,88–9; <strong>and</strong> decentralizeddecision-making 24, 103; <strong>and</strong>disequilibrium 82, 83, 88; <strong>and</strong>equilibrium 9–10, 11; of<strong>knowledge</strong> 88, 89–90, 91–2; <strong>and</strong><strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> concept 7, 73, 75,114, 122; meaning of 88–92; <strong>and</strong>Nelson 107–8; <strong>and</strong> Paretooptimality 11; <strong>and</strong> response tochange 101–2costless information 35–6, 43, 53costly information 29, 32–3, 34,38–9, 53–4, 118Dasgupta, P. 41–2data: acquisition <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>ling 96;<strong>and</strong> central planning 85; changing98, 103; in disequilibrium 2, 3,15; in equilibrium 20; reduction of48decentralization: of bureaucracies <strong>and</strong><strong>market</strong>s 112–15; of centrallyplanned organizations 116, 120;<strong>and</strong> co-ordination problems 24,103; of decision-making 103, 112;versus centralization 36decision-making 2, 110;centralized 54;decentralized 103, 112dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> supply: <strong>and</strong> effects ofchange 98; <strong>knowledge</strong> of 105Demsetz, H.: <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards ofefficiency 54, 58, 118; <strong>and</strong> welfareeconomics 25–7, 53discovery procedure 6, 23, 45,115–16; in centrally plannedsystems 54, 106–7; competitionas 16–17, 95, 109; indecentralized hierarchies 113;<strong>and</strong> ignorance 23, 104; <strong>and</strong><strong>market</strong> system 105–6; see alsoentrepreneurial discoverydisequilibration 122disequilibrium: co-ordination in 82,83, 88; <strong>and</strong> equilibrium 37–40;modelling 11–12; order in 58,73–4, 119, 122disequilibrium analysis 2, 10–14, 27,102–3; by Austrian school 14–28;<strong>and</strong> Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz 39–40;<strong>and</strong> Hahn 10–11; <strong>and</strong>mathematical formalism 5, 22;<strong>and</strong> normative economics 24–8;<strong>and</strong> Simon 65; in theory of<strong>market</strong>s 11–14
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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