Notes 12527 Unlike in Demsetz’s framework, these mistakes <strong>and</strong> inefficiencies are due to‘sheer’ ignorance.28 Buchanan (1985:15–16) may be referring to this (although he mayreally have a more Schumpeterian framework in mind) when hedescribes as the ‘diachronic efficiencies of the <strong>market</strong>’ that‘competition in nonideal <strong>market</strong>s generates incentives for behaviorthat tends toward the more perfect satisfaction of the conditions of theideal <strong>market</strong>…’.3 Equilibrium prices <strong>and</strong> information1 Also: ‘the merit of perfect competition is that it would cause prices totransmit information reliably…’ (Scitovsky 1954:150); ‘a fundamental resultof competitive analysis is that <strong>market</strong> prices contain all of the informationrequired for consistent <strong>and</strong> efficient decision-making by firms <strong>and</strong>individuals’ (Kihlstrom <strong>and</strong> Mirman 1975:357).2 Grossman (1976, 1978); Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz (1976, 1980); Grossman(1981). Many of these essays have been reprinted in Grossman (1989). Avery similar approach to Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’s appears in Green (1973,1977).3 See Fama (1970).4 For a recent summary of Grossman’s work in this area, see Kreps (1988).5 The two quoted passages reflect frequently encountered interpretations ofHayek’s argument. See, for example, Sowell (1980:38, 75, 79, 80); Arrow(1974:158); Frydman (1982); Hahn (1984b: esp. 128); Hirshleifer <strong>and</strong> Riley(1979:1412); McAfee <strong>and</strong> McMillan (1987:699–700, 732–3); Schotter(1985:39–40, 41–2); Kohler (1982:28 ff.), <strong>and</strong> Dolan (1983:62).6 See, for example, Hurwicz (1960, 1972, 1973, 1977, 1984). Also see Almon(1963); Calsamiglia (1977); Davis <strong>and</strong> Whinston (1966); Marschak (1959,1972); Mount <strong>and</strong> Reiter (1974); Osana (1978); Reiter (1977). For arelatively recent survey <strong>and</strong> more bibliography, see Groves <strong>and</strong> Ledyard(1987).7 Most of this literature uses the term ‘information’ in the measurable sensemeant in ‘information theory’. It is in this context that Arrow (1974:159)complains about the lack of ‘a more definitive measure of information <strong>and</strong> itscosts, in terms of which it would be possible to assert the superiority of theprice system over a centralized alternative’.8 For critical comments on this point, see Lavoie (1986).9 In fact, Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz (1976:248) seem to believe that Hayek is alsosaying so.10 See Streit (1984) for some criticisms of this argument.11 The classic article on ‘breakdown’ <strong>and</strong> ‘thinness’ of <strong>market</strong>s is Akerlof(1970).12 Some problems with this example will be pointed out below.13 Implicitly, Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz must assume this ‘invisible h<strong>and</strong>’ to be ableto obtain the information costlessly. Otherwise, it would only becomeoptimally informed.
126 Notes14 It is not clear why the shoe seller does not count the complementaryinformation among the benefits of his activity. If he did, the informationexternality problem would lead him to find a lower level of sales profitable,he would acquire less <strong>knowledge</strong>, <strong>and</strong> there would still be an efficiencyproblem from a st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>perspective</strong>.In another article, Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz mention briefly the case ofcostless information <strong>and</strong> claim that, in the model they are considering, anequilibrium set of prices exists, but at ‘zero trade’. Because of the absence oftrade, Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz (1976:251, n.) point out, ‘there is no obviousmechanism for sustaining this particular set of prices, <strong>and</strong> this is a seriouslimitation’.15 This type of problem is highlighted by Hirshleifer (1971).16 For a refusal to regard entrepreneurship, a concept that includes the activityof arbitrage, as a costly resource, see Kirzner (1985a:24–5).17 Contrary to this, arbitrage has generally been considered, at least implicitly,to be a disequilibrium activity invoked to ensure the establishment ofequilibrium conditions. As Varian (1987:56) puts it: ‘It is generally felt thatpart of the definition of equilibrium in a perfect <strong>market</strong> is that noopportunities for pure arbitrage exist.’ Similarly, Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz(1980:393) point out that the ‘conventional’ position is that ‘when <strong>market</strong>sare not arbitraged, there are profits to be made, <strong>and</strong> so equilibrium must entailperfect arbitrage: the profits accrue in the <strong>process</strong> of responding to someunspecified disequilibrium’. In other words, equilibrium is in the traditionalview the result of arbitrage activity, <strong>and</strong> not an environment in which it takesplace.18 For a similar idea, see Schultz (1975). Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz have aninteresting justification for their procedure: they argue that ‘the limitationof our analysis to stationary stochastic <strong>process</strong>es is not a serious limitation;economic theory is concerned with identifying, describing, <strong>and</strong> explainingregularities in economic <strong>process</strong>es. Economic theory attempts to identifywithin a particular event those characteristics which it has in common withother events which have occurred. It is these regularities that are describedby the stationary stochastic <strong>process</strong>’ (1976:247, n.).19 Stiglitz (1987) is a survey of the literature dealing with such cases.20 Veljanovski also quotes D.Laidler as saying, ‘general equilibrium theory isconcerned [with] a situation of highly imperfect <strong>knowledge</strong>. There is noother way to justify the key role played by prices in that analysis’(1982:64).21 The competitive activity of other traders ‘determines not only theinformational quality of prices but also the speed at which changes inbeliefs <strong>and</strong> underlying information are disseminated’ (Streit 1984:394).22 The large number of economists who have interpreted Hayek’s argument inequilibrium terms may not be a mere product of coincidence: it appearsHayek himself was unaware in 1945 of the theoretical framework he wasusing (see Kirzner 1984b:203).23 The attempt here is to spell out implications of Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’sapproach which they themselves have not worked out. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, thework of Leonid Hurwicz already cited is an example of the line of argumentdescribed in the text.
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