Chapter 6ConclusionsTHE ARGUMENT RESUMEDHayek’s 1945 essay gave rise to a much broader underst<strong>and</strong>ing ofprices by economists. <strong>Prices</strong> are generally seen nowadays not only asincentives for individuals to make decisions consistent with thescarcity of resources, but also as performing some informational role.Both the economics of information <strong>and</strong> the bounded-rationalityapproaches have been interested in this role of prices <strong>and</strong> haveac<strong>knowledge</strong>d Hayek’s influence. Economists working in these areashave analysed critically, in more or less detail, his arguments (<strong>and</strong>sometimes Mises’s).This book argues that some implications to be derived fromHayek’s approach to prices have gone unperceived. While theeconomics of information <strong>and</strong> bounded-rationality theory haveyielded interesting insights into some possible informational roles ofprices, they have missed an important one. The previous chapterstried to remedy this failing by examining representative work donefrom these <strong>perspective</strong>s <strong>and</strong> contrasting it with a third approach toproblems of <strong>knowledge</strong> in an economy. This third approach, adevelopment of the work of Mises, Hayek, Kirzner, <strong>and</strong> othermodern Austrians, highlights the disequilibrium role of prices.Economists have mistakenly tended to think that whatever insightsthe Austrians have to offer in this respect have already been absorbedinto their theories. This book tries to show that such is not the case.The three approaches to the informational role of prices can bedescribed in summary fashion:1. One approach taken by a large part of the literature is to analysethe informational role of prices within an equilibrium framework.This approach has been concerned mostly with what were shown in
118 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>chapter 3 to be two different informational roles that prices mayperform. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, prices may serve as <strong>knowledge</strong> surrogatesin the sense that individuals optimizing with respect to them act as ifthey knew more than they actually do. <strong>Prices</strong> thus serve to reduce theamount of information people need to have for them to makedecisions that are correct from the st<strong>and</strong>point of the economy as awhole. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, prices may serve as sources from whichindividuals may try to infer <strong>knowledge</strong> about the traded good.Much work has tried to determine whether prices perform theseroles effectively, that is, whether they are informationally efficient.Grossman <strong>and</strong> Stiglitz’s conclusion, like that of other economists, isthat, in most realistic situations, prices are not informationallyefficient, because of different types of externalities. (This, of course,raised the issue of what a relevant st<strong>and</strong>ard of efficiency ought to be,an issue previously brought up by Harold Demsetz.)2. Also interested in the informational role of prices, <strong>and</strong> of<strong>market</strong>s in general, are theorists adopting a bounded-rationalityframework. Their main dissatisfaction with the equilibriumapproach, as chapter 4 showed, is in its use of optimizing individualsfacing costly information as a framework for the analysis ofinformational problems. Bounded-rationality theory emphasizes thatthe cognitive limitations of individuals are more serious, <strong>and</strong> thatthese limitations make optimizing behaviour impossible. However, atthis stage of its development, the bounded-rationality analysis of theinformational role of prices, at least as found in Simon’s writings,does not differ significantly from that of equilibrium theory. <strong>Prices</strong>appear in Simon’s work as useful summaries (<strong>knowledge</strong> surrogates)that allow individuals to make reasonably good decisions in spite oftheir bounded rationality.Chapter 4 also tried to show that bounded-rationality theory,though it has pointed correctly at weaknesses of the omniscient,optimizing agent of equilibrium theorizing, still tends tounderestimate the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem by emphasizing only certainlimitations of human beings as information <strong>process</strong>ors. Thisunderestimation is related to Simon’s adoption of a special notionof complexity <strong>and</strong> a theory of cognition that, as was shown, arehighly questionable <strong>and</strong> have received serious criticism. Thelimitations of the bounded-rationality approach as it now st<strong>and</strong>sshould be noticed, particularly because it is often perceived as theonly alternative to the economics of information for the analysis ofinformational issues.
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
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18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
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20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
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22 Prices and knowledgeauxiliary’
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24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
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26 Prices and knowledgeall practica
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30 Prices and knowledgeprices fully
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38 Prices and knowledgeequilibrium.
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- Page 139 and 140: 130 Notestheories of cognition held
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- Page 143 and 144: ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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