Change, responsiveness <strong>and</strong> co-ordination 1094 Price-mediated transactions versus decentralized <strong>market</strong>hierarchies.5 Several comparisons between <strong>market</strong> <strong>and</strong> non-<strong>market</strong> hierarchies,both in their centralized <strong>and</strong> in their decentralized versions.Pairing (1) was, in most interpretations, the subject of the socialistcalculation debate. Pairings (3) <strong>and</strong> (4) are, within economics, thesubject of the analysis of organizations, a field pioneered by RonaldCoase’s classic article (1937). Although not much will be said aboutthem here, both the view of competition as a discovery procedure<strong>and</strong> some remarks made by Hayek regarding organizations, to bequoted below, provide hints of possible contributions of a <strong>market</strong><strong>process</strong>approach to this analysis.The task to be attempted by this section, however, is more limited.First, it will point out some important differences between non<strong>market</strong><strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong> (entrepreneurial) hierarchies—the pairs includedunder (5) —from a <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> <strong>perspective</strong>. Then it will try toshow why decentralized hierarchies could not be perfect substitutesfor the price system—the pair included in (2) —as solutions to theproblems of centralized planning. 16Non-<strong>market</strong>- <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>-designed organizationsIt is not always apparent in the writings of the bounded-rationalityauthors whether they see any significant theoretical differencesbetween non-<strong>market</strong>- <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>-designed organizations. In fact, theabsence of a clear-cut distinction between them suggests that thedifferences are not believed either to exist or to be very important.However, some differences can be pointed out that are important.The differences appear most clearly when comparing how, forexample, government, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> private individuals, onthe other, decide between carrying out an activity through ‘<strong>market</strong>s’(i.e. competition via a price mechanism) or through ‘hierarchies’ (ororganizations, or planning); <strong>and</strong>, if deciding to create a ‘hierarchy’,how they choose the type of organization to adopt, the specificpersonnel to be included, <strong>and</strong> so on.In government hierarchies, <strong>market</strong> competition is replaced bycentral direction, or planning. This, to a certain extent, is also true offirms. As Coase (1937:389) put it, ‘the distinguishing mark of thefirm is the supersession of the price mechanism’. 17 Planning, from anentrepreneurial <strong>perspective</strong>, has the disadvantage of not providing a
110 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>framework stimulating a discovery <strong>process</strong> the way a <strong>market</strong> systemdoes. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, there are a number of difficulties that canapparently be dealt with better by such a form of organization. Theavoidance of the duplication of effort <strong>and</strong> investment that may bepresent in competitive situations (Kirzner 1984a:417), problems ofco-ordination of decisions <strong>and</strong> activities, the reduction of transactioncosts, <strong>and</strong> other problems studied by the economic theory oforganizations, seem to sometimes make some forms of plannedorganization desirable. However, the choice of what arrangement toadopt is not made in the same way by profit-motivated privateindividuals <strong>and</strong> government planners. Knowledge regarding what thetrade-offs are between <strong>market</strong>s, with their scope forentrepreneurship, <strong>and</strong> organizations, with their own advantages,cannot be assumed to be ‘given’ to these decision-makers.As individuals are not assumed always to ‘know what it is theydo not know’, the choice between carrying out an activity withinan organization or leaving it in the <strong>market</strong> cannot be made interms of costs <strong>and</strong> benefits: knowing the latter would requireindividuals to know <strong>and</strong> evaluate what could or could not bediscovered if scope were left for entrepreneurship, a logicalimpossibility. In the <strong>market</strong> system, different combinations ofplanning <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>s can be tried out <strong>and</strong> are allowed to competeagainst each other. Although in a world in which equilibrium isnever achieved this will not lead to the revelation of the optimalextent of planning, it will at least lead to the ab<strong>and</strong>onment of theless successful forms of organization. Although more research isnecessary to make this last statement more precise, 18 nothingsimilar can be said of government planning. As Kirzner(1984a:417) has argued,if central planning is imposed on an otherwise free <strong>market</strong>, whetherin comprehensive terms or not, such planning will almost alwaysinvolve the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem, <strong>and</strong> to an extent not likely to bejustified by any advantages that centralization might otherwiseafford [emphasis in original].The <strong>knowledge</strong> requirements of creating an organization should notbe underestimated. Suppose there is an individual (a ‘planner’) whobelieves a certain task should be undertaken. This ‘planner’ has alsosomehow decided that it would be best to do so through a hierarchicalorganization. For this he must know which of the numerous
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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- Page 143 and 144: ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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