Change, responsiveness <strong>and</strong> co-ordination 107creating a constantly renewed need for the discovery of what the newcircumstances are. For Nelson, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, as also for Simon,change seems to be important mainly because it requires anexcessively large amount of information to be continuously movedaround <strong>and</strong> <strong>process</strong>ed by a central planner. From such a point ofview, in the absence of change the differences between the economicsystems might not be significant. It is therefore not surprising that forNelson it is Hayek’s supposedly stronger emphasis on change ratherthan Mises’s argument that is most damaging to the Langianproposal.Nelson’s ‘co-ordination problems’In pointing out the co-ordination problems that, in his view, a<strong>market</strong> economy is likely to suffer Nelson appears, perhapssurprisingly, to have a rather ‘static’ view of firms under privateenterprise <strong>and</strong> to neglect the wide variety of alternatives (such asdifferent types of organizations, vertical or horizontal integration,contracts, <strong>and</strong> so on) that are available <strong>and</strong> are, in fact, used in a<strong>market</strong> economy for the solution of these co-ordination problems.This has led to his approach being labelled ‘organizationally static’(Pelikan 1985). 13However, the possible occurrence of such co-ordination problemscannot be denied. Although profit opportunities stimulateentrepreneurial alertness, not all of them will be discovered. Also,some courses of action will be pursued because they are mistakenlybelieved to be profitable. In other words, there will be entrepreneurialmistakes in spite of the strong incentives to avoid them provided byprofits <strong>and</strong> losses. Nelson’s ‘co-ordination problems’ are examples ofsuch mistakes—mistakes that could probably have been avoided bythe parties concerned had they been aware of them. But theselimitations of the <strong>market</strong> should not be compared with those of ahypothetical centralized system whose only liability is its‘sluggishness’. Instead, they must be compared with the limitationsof a system in which, because of its lack of any discovery procedure,widespread ignorance of the correct courses of action—<strong>and</strong>, thus,mistakes—will be the rule.Even if only limited government intervention in the <strong>market</strong> isbeing advocated, there is no clear reason why the intervener shouldbe assumed to know which <strong>market</strong> situations could benefit from his
108 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>deliberate co-ordination, what type of co-ordination would be best,<strong>and</strong> so on. Of course, were one to start by assuming that the plannerhas superior <strong>knowledge</strong> of <strong>market</strong> conditions <strong>and</strong> opportunities, itcould follow that his intervention is desirable. But this assumption ishighly objectionable from an entrepreneurial <strong>perspective</strong>, <strong>and</strong> noplanning proposal has yet explained satisfactorily how it could bejustified.An entrepreneurial view of organizationsPrivate enterprise, in Nelson’s view, has the advantage of makingthe problems of the transmission of information <strong>and</strong> of thecomputation of solutions much more manageable for individualswith bounded rationality. In fact, the advantages Nelson attributesto private enterprise are mostly due to its being highlydecentralized. This leads to the question of why the same, or evenbetter, results could not be achieved by decentralizing a planningsystem. An answer to this question requires a prior clarification ofterminology <strong>and</strong> an outline of an entrepreneurial view oforganizations.Many economists, not only Nelson or Simon, use terms such as‘<strong>market</strong>’ <strong>and</strong> ‘hierarchy’ frequently to encompass different things.Therefore, in discussions of the relative merits of ‘<strong>market</strong>s versushierarchies’, several interpretations of the terms ‘<strong>market</strong>s’ <strong>and</strong>‘hierarchies’ are possible. 14 First, when talking about ‘<strong>market</strong>s’ thereference may be to price-mediated transactions only or also to<strong>market</strong>-generated hierarchies (such as firms). (Market-<strong>process</strong>economists generally use the term in this latter sense.) Second, anallusion to ‘hierarchies’ may refer to <strong>market</strong> or to non-<strong>market</strong>hierarchies. 15 Finally, ‘hierarchies’ could be seen as encompassing arange of organizations from highly centralized to decentralized. Withthese distinctions in mind, the following pairs of comparisons couldbe meant by ‘<strong>market</strong>s versus hierarchies’:1 Price-mediated transactions versus highly centralized non-<strong>market</strong>hierarchies.2 Price-mediated transactions versus decentralized non-<strong>market</strong>hierarchies.3 Price-mediated transactions versus highly centralized <strong>market</strong>hierarchies.
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Prices and knowledge
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
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18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
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20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
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22 Prices and knowledgeauxiliary’
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24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
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26 Prices and knowledgeall practica
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30 Prices and knowledgeprices fully
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32 Prices and knowledgeoptimal allo
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38 Prices and knowledgeequilibrium.
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- Page 143 and 144: ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
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- Page 151 and 152: 142 Referencesfrontiers of analytic
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