Change, responsiveness <strong>and</strong> co-ordination 105<strong>market</strong> economy. No equivalent mechanism is apparent in Lange’smodel.The model proposed by Lange assumes away the <strong>knowledge</strong>problem in yet another way. Although Lange <strong>and</strong>—implicitly—Nelson seem to believe that the only unknowns to find out are theappropriate prices <strong>and</strong> quantities of goods, much more <strong>knowledge</strong>must also somehow be acquired before even attempting to carry outLange’s scheme. For example, the planner must know the list of thegoods to be priced <strong>and</strong> produced (some should not be produced at all,some have never been produced before, some should be modified),the list of resources to be priced, the economic results of previousprice structures, the patterns of consumer dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> resourcesupply in the period ahead, <strong>and</strong> so on.The managers, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, should at least know aboutsources of resource supply, technological possibilities (many ofwhich had never been known to be available), <strong>and</strong> ‘the need for <strong>and</strong>possibility of any number of changes (innovative or otherwise) whichchanged patterns of tastes, for example, might make worthwhile’(Kirzner 1985a:32). All these things have to be discovered, <strong>and</strong>neither the Lange proposal nor Nelson’s version of it provides anysuggestion of how this will happen under central planning.The main feature of the <strong>market</strong> system is not that it is ‘light on itsfeet’ because it is a decentralized system. It is primarily that prices,through the creation of profit opportunities, spur entrepreneurialdiscovery of much previously unknown <strong>knowledge</strong>. It is not so muchthat the <strong>market</strong> is quick to respond to perceived change but, rather,that it is better able to lead to the discovery of changed circumstances<strong>and</strong> of the most appropriate responses to them.To summarize, for Nelson the extreme alternatives are either aslow, cumbersome planned system or a ‘responsive’ but not fully coordinatedprivate enterprise system. Neither system solves in a fullysatisfactory way the problems posed by bounded rationality. From anentrepreneurial <strong>perspective</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the superiority of the<strong>market</strong> system over central planning in h<strong>and</strong>ling the <strong>knowledge</strong>problem is unambiguous. (This, of course, does not constitute acomplete case for the <strong>market</strong>. The conclusion is only that the <strong>market</strong>is unambiguously better than planning as a discovery procedure.)Furthermore, a full underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the <strong>knowledge</strong> problemfaced by any economic system renders a comparison in Nelson’sterms rather irrelevant: it doesn’t make much sense to compare the‘responsiveness’ of two systems to perceived changes once it is
106 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>realized that one of them has no mechanism to stimulate suchperception.The <strong>knowledge</strong> problem <strong>and</strong> changeTo underst<strong>and</strong> the effect of change on the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem it isuseful to imagine a situation without it. The <strong>knowledge</strong> required by aLange-type system would still have to be discovered in an imaginaryunchanging world. If a centralized planning system has no discoveryprocedure comparable to that of the <strong>market</strong> it will be much less able todiscover <strong>and</strong> exploit the most desirable alternatives—i.e. reach anequilibrium—even if the data were to remain unchanged. 11This casts some doubt on the appropriateness of assuming that theeconomic systems are in equilibrium when comparing them underhypothetical conditions of no change. Nelson makes such anassumption explicitly when saying that with unchanging conditionsboth the ‘information <strong>and</strong> computation’ <strong>and</strong> the ‘comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>control’ problems could be solved once <strong>and</strong> for all, with few if anysignificant differences remaining between central planning <strong>and</strong>private enterprise. 12 This assumption could, presumably, be justifiedif there were reason to believe that any system could reach the‘optimum’ if given enough time. Additional time may be of use understatic conditions if what has to be overcome is complexity in Simon’s<strong>and</strong> Nelson’s sense—particularly if change is believed to be one ofthe main sources of this complexity. However, additional time wouldnot make much of a difference to a planned regime if its problem wasits lack of entrepreneurial incentives <strong>and</strong>, thus, of a discoveryprocedure. The planned regime could, presumably, persistindefinitely in a state in which many desirable alternatives remainedunnoticed. It can be argued that ‘under static conditions every personwould soon find out…everything in his situation <strong>and</strong> surroundingswhich affected his conduct’ (Knight 1921:79) only if there are profitincentives to stimulate entrepreneurial discovery.Although it is easy to agree with Nelson’s statements regardingthe irrelevance of st<strong>and</strong>ard welfare economics to the debate regardingeconomic systems, his interpretation of the content of argumentssuch as Hayek’s cannot be accepted uncritically. Not only ignorancedue to the complexity caused, or increased, by change, but also‘sheer’ ignorance, has to be overcome by any economic system.Change only complicates the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem even more,
- Page 2:
Prices and knowledge
- Page 6:
ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
- Page 10 and 11:
Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
- Page 12:
Introduction 3to changes, and not a
- Page 15 and 16:
6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
- Page 17 and 18:
Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
- Page 19 and 20:
10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
- Page 21 and 22:
12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
- Page 23 and 24:
14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
- Page 25 and 26:
16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
- Page 27 and 28:
18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
- Page 29 and 30:
20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
- Page 31 and 32:
22 Prices and knowledgeauxiliary’
- Page 33 and 34:
24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
- Page 35 and 36:
26 Prices and knowledgeall practica
- Page 37 and 38:
28 Prices and knowledgemarket parti
- Page 39 and 40:
30 Prices and knowledgeprices fully
- Page 41 and 42:
32 Prices and knowledgeoptimal allo
- Page 43 and 44:
34 Prices and knowledgeAn example.
- Page 45 and 46:
36 Prices and knowledgeIn this case
- Page 47 and 48:
38 Prices and knowledgeequilibrium.
- Page 49 and 50:
40 Prices and knowledgethose return
- Page 51 and 52:
42 Prices and knowledgeprices in th
- Page 53 and 54:
44 Prices and knowledgeThe informat
- Page 55 and 56:
46 Prices and knowledgeinformationa
- Page 57 and 58:
48 Prices and knowledgeas devices f
- Page 59 and 60:
50 Prices and knowledgeIt is probab
- Page 61 and 62:
52 Prices and knowledgetrue that in
- Page 63 and 64: 54 Prices and knowledgeknowledge st
- Page 65 and 66: 56 Prices and knowledgereached in r
- Page 67 and 68: 58 Prices and knowledgecorrespond t
- Page 69 and 70: 60 Prices and knowledgetake it away
- Page 71 and 72: 62 Prices and knowledgecritics of t
- Page 73 and 74: 64 Prices and knowledgeto work out
- Page 75 and 76: 66 Prices and knowledgebehavior in
- Page 77 and 78: 68 Prices and knowledgerich’ worl
- Page 79 and 80: 70 Prices and knowledgeThus the sim
- Page 81 and 82: 72 Prices and knowledgeSimon calls
- Page 83 and 84: 74 Prices and knowledgebelieves tha
- Page 85 and 86: 76 Prices and knowledgeIf what is u
- Page 87 and 88: 78 Prices and knowledgeoccurring wi
- Page 89 and 90: 80 Prices and knowledgecomputationa
- Page 91 and 92: 82 Prices and knowledgemaximizing a
- Page 93 and 94: 84 Prices and knowledgeframework de
- Page 95 and 96: 86 Prices and knowledgeAgain Mises
- Page 97 and 98: 88 Prices and knowledgepoint that
- Page 99 and 100: 90 Prices and knowledgeand B’s ta
- Page 101 and 102: 92 Prices and knowledgecoordination
- Page 103 and 104: 94 Prices and knowledgeFinally, the
- Page 105 and 106: 96 Prices and knowledgeBefore prese
- Page 107 and 108: 98 Prices and knowledgeas will be s
- Page 109 and 110: 100 Prices and knowledgeapples in l
- Page 111 and 112: 102 Prices and knowledgeThe identif
- Page 113: 104 Prices and knowledgeAs with Sim
- Page 117 and 118: 108 Prices and knowledgedeliberate
- Page 119 and 120: 110 Prices and knowledgeframework s
- Page 121 and 122: 112 Prices and knowledgeMarkets and
- Page 123 and 124: 114 Prices and knowledgeassigned an
- Page 125 and 126: 116 Prices and knowledgemain virtue
- Page 127 and 128: 118 Prices and knowledgechapter 3 t
- Page 129 and 130: 120 Prices and knowledgenoticed, wo
- Page 131 and 132: 122 Prices and knowledgeAs a by-pro
- Page 133 and 134: 124 Notesmoney, the behavior of arb
- Page 135 and 136: 126 Notes14 It is not clear why the
- Page 137 and 138: 128 Notes39 See also Hahn (1984a:11
- Page 139 and 140: 130 Notestheories of cognition held
- Page 141 and 142: 132 Notes3 Economists, Nelson and W
- Page 143 and 144: ReferencesAkerlof, G.A. (1970) ‘T
- Page 145 and 146: 136 ReferencesGilad, B. (1981) ‘A
- Page 147 and 148: 138 ReferencesKihlstrom, R.E. and M
- Page 149 and 150: 140 ReferencesOsana, H. (1978) ‘O
- Page 151 and 152: 142 Referencesfrontiers of analytic
- Page 153 and 154: 144 IndexCercone, N. 79change: and
- Page 155 and 156: 146 Index61, 118; on costless infor
- Page 157 and 158: 148 Indexmisinformation 55, 57mista
- Page 159: 150 IndexVeljanowski, C.G. 43voting