Change, responsiveness <strong>and</strong> co-ordination 103accepted theory of disequilibrium adjustment can only be shared. Ofcourse, most <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> theorists believe they are already wellon the way towards such a theory. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, economistswho find only mathematically formalized arguments acceptable willprefer the interesting lines of research suggested by the already citedwork of Littlechild, Fisher, <strong>and</strong> Frydman, among others.Nelson <strong>and</strong> the <strong>knowledge</strong> problemNelson (1981:95) believes bounded rationality is the main problemany form of economic organization has to face. At the risk of someoversimplification, his view of the alternative systems can bepresented in the following manner: under a centralized regime, theplant managers, faced with new configurations of preferences,resources, <strong>and</strong>/or technologies, have to convey some informationto the central planner, the amount of which will be constrained bythe latter’s bounded rationality. The planner must then use thelimited information he has been able to receive to compute newcourses of action that, in turn, have to be conveyed back to theplants.Because of the planner’s limitations, the whole <strong>process</strong> will take asignificant amount of time, <strong>and</strong> his computed response will not be‘fine-tuned’ to the local conditions to which it refers. (Of course,Nelson is aware that by the time the plants receive their newinstructions the data will have changed again. This means the systemwill not manage to achieve equilibrium. However, this is notimportant because, in his view, neither organizational systemachieves equilibrium in a world of change, even though privateenterprise is faster than planning.) There is also the problem ofcontrol by the planner to ensure that the plant managers are bothsupplying him with the necessary information <strong>and</strong> complying withhis instructions (Nelson 1981:102).Private firms, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, faced with the same new‘facts’, do not have to convey the information anywhere <strong>and</strong> havemuch smaller computational problems to solve. Also, the profitincentive makes them self-controlling. However, from this pointof view, the decentralization of decision-making that producesthese advantages of private enterprise also gives rise to its mainlimitation, the inter- <strong>and</strong> intra-industry co-ordination problemsmentioned above.
104 <strong>Prices</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>knowledge</strong>As with Simon, the differences between Nelson <strong>and</strong> anentrepreneurial approach hinge to a large extent on the distinctionbetween the ignorance due exclusively to complexity (in the senseseen in chapter 4) <strong>and</strong> the ignorance that has to be overcome bydiscovery. This difference leads each approach to adopt a differentinterpretation of the working <strong>and</strong> the limitations of alternativeeconomic systems.The comparison of economic systemsNelson apparently assumes an arrangement in which firms (or plants)are not saturated by the facts of their local environment. Given thatthese units (firms or plants) perceive the new facts about their ownenvironment, the alternatives (traditional central planning having beendiscarded) are a Langian planned regime, with a ‘sluggish’, but fairlyco-ordinated, adjustment <strong>process</strong>, or private enterprise, producing anagile (‘light on its feet’) decentralized response with (potentiallyserious) co-ordination-of-response problems. This seems to suggestthat mixed systems that combine government planning <strong>and</strong> <strong>market</strong>forces could be preferable.The entrepreneurial approach, with its emphasis on the need fordiscovery of <strong>knowledge</strong>, perceives the alternatives differently. Theproblem with the Langian ‘trial-<strong>and</strong>-error’ solution is not that it isstill too complex (i.e. that it doesn’t simplify the task enough) for acentral planner in a world of change. Instead, it is that it provides asolution only by assuming away the <strong>knowledge</strong> problem. LikeSimon, Nelson seems to hold a theory of perception that assumes thatat least the plant managers are ‘hit in the face’ by new configurationsof their local data (or that they can easily ‘see’ them). The mainproblem is then to convey this information to the planner, solve thelarge computational problem, <strong>and</strong> send the results back to themanagers. But this assumes too much <strong>knowledge</strong> to be alreadysomehow given to the different individuals in the planned regime.Although mistaken courses of action may often be noticed byplant managers (through, say, shortages or surpluses of goods), thisdoes not imply that they will automatically perceive correctly whattheir circumstances are. As argued before, it is necessary thatindividuals discover, or ‘zero in’ on, the previously unknown<strong>knowledge</strong>. This does not happen automatically but requiressomething to attract their attention. Pecuniary profits do this in a
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ContentsAcknowledgmentsvii1 Introdu
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Chapter 1IntroductionIn recent deca
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Introduction 3to changes, and not a
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6 Prices and knowledgeOUTLINE OF TH
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Chapter 2A theory of the market pro
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10 Prices and knowledgeexistence of
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12 Prices and knowledgebehavior of
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14 Prices and knowledgedisequilibri
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16 Prices and knowledgeresources kn
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18 Prices and knowledgeproduce, bet
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20 Prices and knowledgeimportant in
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24 Prices and knowledgeSome writers
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38 Prices and knowledgeequilibrium.
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