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Prices and knowledge: A market-process perspective

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Change, responsiveness <strong>and</strong> co-ordination 972. Problems of comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control. Once the previous step issomehow solved, a large number of agents (farms, factories,consumers, <strong>and</strong> so on) have to be both informed about what theyshould do <strong>and</strong> somehow ‘motivated or coerced to do the right things’(Nelson <strong>and</strong> Winter 1982:358–9).Nelson argues that many economists believe that the <strong>market</strong> hasadvantages over central planning in h<strong>and</strong>ling both problems:Decentralized free enterprise operating in a <strong>market</strong> environmenthas been touted as superior to government ownership of firms <strong>and</strong>central planning on the grounds that the latter solution wouldinvolve vastly more information sending <strong>and</strong> would require thecomputation of much larger problems.They also believe thatfree enterprise is much more sensitive to dem<strong>and</strong>s, more stronglymotivated to cater to preferences of consumers, <strong>and</strong> more likely toproduce efficiently than is government bureaucracy.(Nelson <strong>and</strong> Winter 1982:359)Thus economists advocate the <strong>market</strong> because they holdan implicit theory of the role of organization in solving bigallocation problems, <strong>and</strong> some conjectures about the way in whichdifferent organizational structures perform.(ibid.)Nelson points out that a premise underlying these arguments,separating them from contemporary welfare economics, is the implicitor explicit presumption ‘that man’s data <strong>process</strong>ing capacity, hisability to underst<strong>and</strong> complex or novel situations, <strong>and</strong> his ability togain agreement are bounded,’ the presumption of ‘boundedrationality’ (Nelson 1981:95). Without this limitation, he argues, thedifficulties of collecting information for a central agency <strong>and</strong>computing a solution—the problem of information <strong>and</strong>computation—would simply disappear, <strong>and</strong> the problem of comm<strong>and</strong><strong>and</strong> control would be, at least, much easier to solve.(Nelson’s definition of bounded rationality tends to obscure thedistinction made in chapter 4 between the view of ignorance ofSimon <strong>and</strong> that of <strong>market</strong>-<strong>process</strong> economists. But, as he states, <strong>and</strong>

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