The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction
The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction
could later bediscovered by lawenforcement. 41Predators also relyon “throw-away”free e-mailaccounts, “secure”e-mail accountssuch as hush mail,and countersurveillancemethods.Predators are alsoengaging in specificcounter-surveillanceactivities such asresearching cases inthe news and topicspresented by lawenforcement at lawenforcement onlyconferences. Tofurther shield theiridentities, offendersoccasionally willdeviate from thecommon use oftraditional creditcards and rely ondigital currenciesand prepaid creditcards to concealtransactions. Theuse of counterforensic tools suchas proxies andIdentification of a Child Pornography VictimIn January 2006, the FBI and NCMEC began conducting exhaustiveanalysis in an attempt to identify the child victim in a widely circulatedchild pornography series on the Internet. Images in this series began tosurface in 2005 and documented an increasing level of sexualmolestation to the minor victim as she aged over at least 4 years. Aprominent clue that produced the strongest lead for law enforcementauthorities was found in the background of one of the images. It was adecorative plate bearing a birth date and a girl’s name hung on a wall.This information was used to obtain a court order directing the SocialSecurity Administration in coordination with the Internal RevenueService to provide information on all filers in the tax year 2006 whoclaimed a dependent child matching the girl’s name from the wall orany variation of it.The information received resulted in the dissemination of action leadsto 29 field offices that directed them to compare the dependentchildren residing in their territory to sanitized images depicting thegirl. On March 18, 2009, the FBI sent an immediate lead to one of thefield divisions to follow up on two children residing within theirterritory who had pedigree information consistent with the girl in theimages. On March 25, 2009, the FBI received confirmation from thefield division that a child residing in its area was the child depicted inthe series. On March 30, 2009, the victim was interviewed, and sheidentified the subject and disclosed the activity that had taken place.The field division also obtained items of evidentiary value that werevisible in the explicit images. From the investigation, an immediatelead regarding the subject was disseminated to another field division.In turn, this second field division conducted surveillance on thesubject’s home. During surveillance, the subject was observed exitinghis residence. Agents were able to obtain written consent to search hishome, car, and shed. Jewelry visible in the explicit images was seizedfrom the shed during the consent search. The subject was arrested,confessed, and provided a signed sworn statement to FBI agents.onion routers 42 byonline predators to remain anonymous when accessing the Internet also has increased. Wheneffective methods of countering law enforcement efforts are developed, the information typicallyis shared among predators—including the suspected law enforcement officers screen name—often enabling even inexperienced offenders to operate undetected.41See Appendix A, Operation Achilles and Operation Joint Hammer. 42Standard routers are networking devices that forward traffic on the Internet onto an effective path for finding aparticular server; however, Onion Routers (anonymity networks) direct that Internet activity along complex circuitous routes in a network designed to completely obscure its origins.24
- Page 1: U.S. Department of Justice
- Page 5 and 6: 4. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFIC
- Page 7 and 8: V. CONCLUSION .....................
- Page 9 and 10: amount of information, including: (
- Page 12 and 13: assisting state, local, tribal and
- Page 14 and 15: goals that can provide some measura
- Page 16 and 17: State and federal investigators and
- Page 18 and 19: a. Available indicators suggest chi
- Page 20 and 21: These two applications (Fairplay, R
- Page 22 and 23: The Figure below shows the number o
- Page 24 and 25: For FY 2008, ICAC Task Forces repor
- Page 26 and 27: Some researchers suggest that viewi
- Page 28 and 29: interests in children and their des
- Page 32 and 33: Further, producers of child pornogr
- Page 34 and 35: multiple layers of security in an a
- Page 36 and 37: B. Online EnticementOnline offender
- Page 38 and 39: movies, and games that appeal to th
- Page 40 and 41: a criminal to prostitute a child (w
- Page 42 and 43: escued from prostitution, rarely re
- Page 44 and 45: significantly overall. 71 However,
- Page 46 and 47: • Some American Indians who speak
- Page 48 and 49: III.THE NATION’S APPROACH TO COMB
- Page 50 and 51: analysts have specific training req
- Page 52 and 53: Since 2006, the Child Abduction Rap
- Page 54 and 55: ecoveries has increased. In 2006, 1
- Page 56 and 57: in various domestic and internation
- Page 58 and 59: ii. Preventing Commercial Sexual Ex
- Page 60 and 61: c. National Institute of JusticeThe
- Page 62 and 63: Treatment Programs (SOTP-NR). Curre
- Page 64 and 65: implementing the Adam Walsh Act’s
- Page 66 and 67: • Since the program’s inception
- Page 68 and 69: Figure 1: Location of ICAC Task For
- Page 70 and 71: 3. Number of Trained Personnel at E
- Page 72 and 73: In addition, because of funds made
- Page 74 and 75: State Agency FY 2009FundingVirginia
- Page 76 and 77: State Agency FY2008#OKORPARISCSDTNT
- Page 78 and 79: State Agency FY 2008SubmittedNHNJNM
could later bediscovered by lawen<strong>for</strong>cement. 41Predators also relyon “throw-away”free e-mailaccounts, “secure”e-mail accountssuch as hush mail,<strong>and</strong> countersurveillancemethods.Predators are alsoengaging in specificcounter-surveillanceactivities such asresearching cases inthe news <strong>and</strong> topicspresented by lawen<strong>for</strong>cement at lawen<strong>for</strong>cement onlyconferences. Tofurther shield theiridentities, offendersoccasionally willdeviate from thecommon use oftraditional creditcards <strong>and</strong> rely ondigital currencies<strong>and</strong> prepaid creditcards to concealtransactions. <strong>The</strong>use of counter<strong>for</strong>ensic tools suchas proxies <strong>and</strong>Identification of a <strong>Child</strong> Pornography VictimIn January 2006, the FBI <strong>and</strong> NCMEC began conducting exhaustiveanalysis in an attempt to identify the child victim in a widely circulatedchild pornography series on the Internet. Images in this series began tosurface in 2005 <strong>and</strong> documented an increasing level of sexualmolestation to the minor victim as she aged over at least 4 years. Aprominent clue that produced the strongest lead <strong>for</strong> law en<strong>for</strong>cementauthorities was found in the background of one of the images. It was adecorative plate bearing a birth date <strong>and</strong> a girl’s name hung on a wall.This in<strong>for</strong>mation was used to obtain a court order directing the SocialSecurity Administration in coordination with the Internal RevenueService to provide in<strong>for</strong>mation on all filers in the tax year 2006 whoclaimed a dependent child matching the girl’s name from the wall orany variation of it.<strong>The</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation received resulted in the dissemination of action leadsto 29 field offices that directed them to compare the dependentchildren residing in their territory to sanitized images depicting thegirl. On March 18, 2009, the FBI sent an immediate lead to one of thefield divisions to follow up on two children residing within theirterritory who had pedigree in<strong>for</strong>mation consistent with the girl in theimages. On March 25, 2009, the FBI received confirmation from thefield division that a child residing in its area was the child depicted inthe series. On March 30, 2009, the victim was interviewed, <strong>and</strong> sheidentified the subject <strong>and</strong> disclosed the activity that had taken place.<strong>The</strong> field division also obtained items of evidentiary value that werevisible in the explicit images. From the investigation, an immediatelead regarding the subject was disseminated to another field division.In turn, this second field division conducted surveillance on thesubject’s home. During surveillance, the subject was observed exitinghis residence. Agents were able to obtain written consent to search hishome, car, <strong>and</strong> shed. Jewelry visible in the explicit images was seizedfrom the shed during the consent search. <strong>The</strong> subject was arrested,confessed, <strong>and</strong> provided a signed sworn statement to FBI agents.onion routers 42 byonline predators to remain anonymous when accessing the Internet also has increased. Wheneffective methods of countering law en<strong>for</strong>cement ef<strong>for</strong>ts are developed, the in<strong>for</strong>mation typicallyis shared among predators—including the suspected law en<strong>for</strong>cement officers screen name—often enabling even inexperienced offenders to operate undetected.41See Appendix A, Operation Achilles <strong>and</strong> Operation Joint Hammer. 42St<strong>and</strong>ard routers are networking devices that <strong>for</strong>ward traffic on the Internet onto an effective path <strong>for</strong> finding aparticular server; however, Onion Routers (anonymity networks) direct that Internet activity along complex circuitous routes in a network designed to completely obscure its origins.24