MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc. MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.
M?L-sT~-1629A40.2 Data item descriptions (DID). The following listed DIDsprovide a source of possible data item description and format requirementsfor required data.SOURCE DATA REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE DID✟●Task 105 Failure Mode, Effects and DI-R-7086Criticality Analysis (FMECA) PlanGeneral Failure Mode, Effects and D1-R-7085Requirements Criticality Analysis (FMECA) ReportSection 4-5and Task 10150• APPLICATION CRITERIA50.1 General considerations. This standard has been structuredLO facilitate the tailoring of ~CA requiraents based upon individualprogram needs. Program variables such as system complexity, funding,and schedule influence the level of detail and timing of the FMECA andmust be considered when tailoring the requirements. All programs do notrequire the same level of detail and all programs should not wait untilfull scale development to implement the F?fECA requirements.50.1.1 Level of detail. The level of detail applies to thelevel of indenture at which failures are posLulaLed. Tile FMECA can beaccomplished at various levels of indenture from system to part leveldepending upon the information available and the needs of the program.The lower the indenture level, the higher the level of detail since morefailure modes will be considered. Th; choice of the level of indenturemust be compatible with the program COSt and schedule constraints andthe system reliability requirements. A less detailed analysis which isavailable in time to contribute to system reliability is more valuablethan a more detailed analysis which is late and makes changes costly andunfeasible. In general, the FMECA should not be performed below tl~elevel necessary to identify critical items or to the level required bythe LSA candidate list, whichever is lower. The depth and detail of theFMECA effort must be defined in appropriate contractual and programdocumentation..-50.1.2U!!@l” The objective of the l%ECA is to support thedecision making process. If the analysis fails to provide usable informationat or before e project decision pc~iI;:, LIlen it h:l.s made no c(~ntribu: ionand is untimely. The time-phasing of the F?IECA effort is important andshould be identified in the FMECA plan to assure that analysis resultswill be available to support the project decision points during systemdevelopment. Since program cost and scl]edulktconstraints require thatavailable resources be used wllcre they arc most CDSt etfective, theearliest possible availability of FMECA results is important. so ll~at theimpact on cost and schedule can be minimized.
MIL-STD-1629A50.1.3 Intended use. The FMECA is potentially one of the mostbeneficial and productive tasks in a well structured reliability program.Since individual failure modes are listed in an orderly, organizedfashion and evaluated, the FMECA serves to verify design integrity,identify and quantify sources of undesirable failure modes, and documentthe reliability risks. FKECA results can be used to provide the rationalefor changes in operating procedures for ameliorating the effects or fordetecting the incipience of the undesirable failure modes. Although theFMECA is an essential reliability task, it supplements and supportsother engineering tasks through identification of areas in which effortshould be concentrated. The FMECA results are not only used to providedesign guidance, but they are used advantageously in and for maintenanceplanning analysis, logistics support analysis, survivability and vulnerabilityassessments, safety and hazards analyses, and for fault detection andisolation design. This coincident use of the FMECA must be consideredin FMECA planning and every endeavor made to prevent duplication ofeffort by the program elements which utilize FMECA results.50.2 FMEA (task 101~. The FMEA is an essential design evaluationprocedure which should not be limited to the phase traditionally thoughtof as the design phase. The ini~ial FMEA should be done early in theconceptual phase when design criteria, mission requirements, and conceptualdesigns are being developed to evaluate t]ledesign approach and tocompare the benefits of competing design configurations. The FMEA willprovide quick visibility of the more obvious failure modes and identifypotential single failure points, some of which can bc eliminated withminimal design effort. As the mission and design definitions becomemore refined, the FMEA can be expanded to successively more detailedlevels. When changes are made in system design to remove or reduce theimpact of the identified failure modes, the FMEA must be repeated forthe redesigned portions to ensure that all predictable failure modes inthe new design are considered.50.3 CA (task 102). The CA is a procedure for associatingfailure probabilities with each failure mode. Since the CA supplementsthe FMEA and is dependent upon information developed in that analysis,it should not be imposed without imposition of the FMEA. The CA isprobably most valuable for maintenance and logistics support orientedanalyses since failure modes which have a high probability of occurrence(high criticality numbers) require investigation to identify changeswhich will reduce the potential impact on rhe maintenance and logisticsupport requireme~l~s for the system. Since the criticality numbers arcestablished based upon subjective judgments, they sk)uld only be used asindicators of relative priorities.*44-‘3
- Page 1 and 2: MIL-STD-1629A24 NOVEMBER 1980SUPERS
- Page 3 and 4: MT7,-STW 1629AFOREWORDIThe~failure
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- Page 7 and 8: MI1.-STD-1629A1. SCOPEThis standard
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M?L-sT~-<strong>1629</strong>A40.2 Data item descriptions (DID). The following listed DIDsprovide a source of possible data item description <strong>and</strong> format requirementsfor required data.SOURCE DATA REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE DID✟●Task 105 Failure Mode, Effects <strong>and</strong> DI-R-7086Criticality Analysis (FMECA) PlanGeneral Failure Mode, Effects <strong>and</strong> D1-R-7085Requirements Criticality Analysis (FMECA) ReportSection 4-5<strong>and</strong> Task 10150• APPLICATION CRITERIA50.1 General considerations. This st<strong>and</strong>ard has been structuredLO facilitate the tailoring of ~CA requiraents based upon individualprogram needs. Program variables such as system complexity, funding,<strong>and</strong> schedule influence the level of detail <strong>and</strong> timing of the FMECA <strong>and</strong>must be considered when tailoring the requirements. All programs do notrequire the same level of detail <strong>and</strong> all programs should not wait untilfull scale development to implement the F?fECA requirements.50.1.1 Level of detail. The level of detail applies to thelevel of indenture at which failures are posLulaLed. Tile FMECA can beaccomplished at various levels of indenture from system to part leveldepending upon the information available <strong>and</strong> the needs of the program.The lower the indenture level, the higher the level of detail since morefailure modes will be considered. Th; choice of the level of indenturemust be compatible with the program COSt <strong>and</strong> schedule constraints <strong>and</strong>the system reliability requirements. A less detailed analysis which isavailable in time to contribute to system reliability is more valuablethan a more detailed analysis which is late <strong>and</strong> makes changes costly <strong>and</strong>unfeasible. In general, the FMECA should not be performed below tl~elevel necessary to identify critical items or to the level required bythe LSA c<strong>and</strong>idate list, whichever is lower. The depth <strong>and</strong> detail of theFMECA effort must be defined in appropriate contractual <strong>and</strong> programdocumentation..-50.1.2U!!@l” The objective of the l%ECA is to support thedecision making process. If the analysis fails to provide usable informationat or before e project decision pc~iI;:, LIlen it h:l.s made no c(~ntribu: ion<strong>and</strong> is untimely. The time-phasing of the F?IECA effort is important <strong>and</strong>should be identified in the FMECA plan to assure that analysis resultswill be available to support the project decision points during systemdevelopment. Since program cost <strong>and</strong> scl]edulktconstraints require thatavailable resources be used wllcre they arc most CDSt etfective, theearliest possible availability of FMECA results is important. so ll~at theimpact on cost <strong>and</strong> schedule can be minimized.
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