MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.
MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc. MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.
MIL,-STD-16?9ADEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEWashington, DC 20301—1Procedures for perfo~ing a Failure Mode, Effects, and CriticalityAnalysisMIL-STD-1629A1. This Military standard iS approved for use by all Departmentsand Agencies of the Department of Defense.2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions)and any per&inent data which may be of use in improving thiSdocument should be addressed to: Commanding Officer, EngineeringSpecifications and Standards Department (Code 93), Naval AirEngineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 08733, by using the selfaddressedstandardization Docume[lt Improvement Proposal (DDForm 1426) appearillg at the el~dof this documel~t or by let-ter.ii
MT7,-STW 1629AFOREWORDIThe~failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an essentialfunction in design,from concept through development. To be effective,the FMEcA must be iterative to correspond Wit}l ~he nature of the designprocess itself. The extent of effort and sophistication of approachused in the F~CA will be dependent upon the nature and requirements ofthe individual program. This makes it necessary to tailor the requirementsfor an FMECA to each individual program. Tailoring requires that,regardless of the degree of sophistication, the FMECA must contributemeaningfully to program decision. A properly performed F’MECA is invaluableto those who are responsible for making program decisions regarding thefeasibility and adequacy of a design approach.The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision makingprocess is dependent upon the effectiveness with which problem informationis communicated for early design attention. Probably the greatestcriticism of the ~~A has been its limited use in improving designs.The chief causes for this have been untimeliness and the isolated performanceof the F~CA without adequate inputs tO the design process. Timelinessis perhaps the most important factor in differentiating between effectiveand ineffective implementation of the FITECA. While the objective of anFMECA is to identify all modes of failul-e ~ithin a system design, itsfirst purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and criticalfailure possibilities so they can be eliminated or minimized throughdesign correction at tt~eearliest possible time. Therefore, the FMECAshould be initiated as soon as preliminary design information is availableat the higher system levels and extended to the lower levels as moreinformation becomes available on the items in question.Although the FMECA is an essential reliability task, it also providesinformation for other purposes. The use of the FMECA is called for inmaintainability, safety analysis, survivabili~y and vulnerability,logistics support analysis, n~ai~~tenarlceplan anaiysis, and for failuredetection and isolation subsystem desi~n. This coincident use musL be aconsideration in planning the F~CA effort LO prevent the proliferationOf requirements and t}leduplication of efforts within the same contractualprogram.a.iii— .. .——. --.—.—-——--—
- Page 1: MIL-STD-1629A24 NOVEMBER 1980SUPERS
- Page 5 and 6: ----MIL-STD-16Z9ACONTENTS(Continued
- Page 7 and 8: MI1.-STD-1629A1. SCOPEThis standard
- Page 9 and 10: MTL-STD-1 629A3. DEFINITIONS3.1 Ter
- Page 11 and 12: !’11 L-!;’J’l)- 1629A3. 1.17.
- Page 13 and 14: .MT1.-ST~-l629A4.3.5 Failure defini
- Page 15 and 16: MTT,-sTn-1629Afor each mission, mis
- Page 17 and 18: ?f?l.-STD-l629Ab. Des~ripGlon of de
- Page 19 and 20: MT1,-STD-1629A3.2 Functional approa
- Page 21 and 22: MI J,-STD-16?9Afunctional block dia
- Page 23 and 24: MI L-STD-1629A5.6.2 Next higher lev
- Page 25 and 26: Ml 1,-STD-1079Afurther amplified in
- Page 27 and 28: MIL-STD-1629A. --1III[IIIIIIIIIIIii
- Page 29 and 30: MIL-STD- 1629ATASK 102CRITICALITYAN
- Page 31 and 32: IMII.-ST1)-162(]Ashown in Figure 10
- Page 33 and 34: MIL-STD-1629Awhere:C* = Criticality
- Page 35 and 36: MI I.-sTI)-I629AINCREASINGCRITICALI
- Page 37 and 38: MIL-STD-1629A3*1 Failure predictabi
- Page 39 and 40: .--— .-—--— , --—— ——
- Page 41 and 42: MTL-STD- 1629A4\l Damage modes. All
- Page 43 and 44: NI 1.-[; 1’1)- 1(); ?!)Au0.-.mr-r
- Page 45 and 46: MI I,-ST1)-1629A3. Content. The FME
- Page 47 and 48: —..-A 1MIL-STD-1629AAPPENDIXA10.
- Page 49 and 50: MIL-STD-1629A50.1.3 Intended use. T
- Page 51 and 52: MIL-STD-1629AWhere:C= “ Criticali
<strong>MIL</strong>,-<strong>STD</strong>-16?9ADEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEWashington, DC 20301—1Procedures for perfo~ing a Failure Mode, Effects, <strong>and</strong> CriticalityAnalysis<strong>MIL</strong>-<strong>STD</strong>-<strong>1629</strong>A1. This Military st<strong>and</strong>ard iS approved for use by all Departments<strong>and</strong> Agencies of the Department of Defense.2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions)<strong>and</strong> any per&inent data which may be of use in improving thiSdocument should be addressed to: Comm<strong>and</strong>ing Officer, EngineeringSpecifications <strong>and</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ards Department (Code 93), Naval AirEngineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 08733, by using the selfaddressedst<strong>and</strong>ardization Docume[lt Improvement Proposal (DDForm 1426) appearillg at the el~dof this documel~t or by let-ter.ii
Change language