MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.

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MIL-STD-1629Aa.b.C9d.Category I - Catastrophic - A failure which maycause death or weapon system loss (i.e., aircraft,tank, missile, ship, etc.)Category II - Critical - A failure which may causesevere injury, major property damage, or majorsystem damage which will result in mission loss.Category III - Marginal - A failure which may causeminor injury, minor property damage, or minor systemdamage which will result in delay or loss of availabilityor mission degradation.Category IV - Minor - A failure not serious enoughto cause injury, property damage$ or system damage,but which will result in unscheduled maintenance orrepair.-’14.5 FMECA Report. The results of the FMEA and other relatedanalyses shall be documented in a report that identifies the level ofanalysis, summarizes the results, documents the data sources and techniquesused in performing the analysis, and includes the system definitionnarrative, resultant analysis data, and worksheets. The worksheetsshall be organized to first display the highest indenture level ofanalysis and then proceed down through decreasing indenture levels ofthe system. The ground rules, analysis assumptions, and block diagramsshall be included, as applicable, for each indenture level analyzed.Interim reports shall be available at each design review to providecomparisons of alternative designs and to highlight the Category I andCategory II failure modes, the potential single failure points, and theproposed design corrections. The final report shall reflect the finaldesign and provide identification of the Category I and Category IIfailure modes and the single failure points which could not be eliminatedfrom che design.4.5.1 Sunmary. The report shall contain a summary which providesthe contractor’s conclusions and recommendations based upon the analysis.Contractor interpretation and comments concerning the analysis and theinitiated or recommended actions for the elimination or reduction offailure risks shall be included. A design evaluation summary of majorproblems detected during the analysis sh:)llbe provided in the finalreport. A list of items omitted from the F?U?A shall be included withrationale for each item’s exclusion.4.5.2 Reliability critical item lists. Reliability criticalitem lists extracted from the FMEA shall be included in the summary.The information provided for each item listed s}lall include t})e f~)llowing:a. Item identification and FMEA cross-reference.—
?f?l.-STD-l629Ab. Des~ripGlon of design features which minimize theoccurrence of failure for the listed item.c. Description of tests accomplished that verify designfeathres and tests planned at hardware acceptance orduri~g operations and maintenance that would detectthe failure mode occurrence.d. Description of planned inspections to ensure hardwareis being built to design requirements, and inspectionsplanned du’ing down-time or turnaround or duringTmaintenance that could detect the failure mode orevidence of conditions that could cause the failuremod e.e. A statement relating to the history of this particulardesign or a similar design.f. Description of the method(s) by which the occurrenceof the failure mode is detected by the operator, andwhether a failure of a redundant or alternativeoperating mode, when available, can be detected.4.5.2.1 Category I and Category II failure mode list. A list ofall Category I (catastrophic) and Category II (critical) failure modesshall be provided. The information described above shall be providedfor each Category 1’and Category 11 failure mode listed such that it ispossible to identify directly the FMEA entry and its related drawingsand schematics.4.5.2.2 Single failure points list. A separate list of allsingle failure points shall be provided. The information describedabove shall be provided in the summary for each single failure pointlisted such that it is possible to identify directly the FMEA entry andits related drawings and schematics. The criticality classification foreach single failure point shall be included in the listing.
Page 1 and 2: MIL-STD-1629A24 NOVEMBER 1980SUPERS
Page 3 and 4: MT7,-STW 1629AFOREWORDIThe~failure
Page 5 and 6: ----MIL-STD-16Z9ACONTENTS(Continued
Page 7 and 8: MI1.-STD-1629A1. SCOPEThis standard
Page 9 and 10: MTL-STD-1 629A3. DEFINITIONS3.1 Ter
Page 11 and 12: !’11 L-!;’J’l)- 1629A3. 1.17.
Page 13 and 14: .MT1.-ST~-l629A4.3.5 Failure defini
Page 15: MTT,-sTn-1629Afor each mission, mis
Page 19 and 20: MT1,-STD-1629A3.2 Functional approa
Page 21 and 22: MI J,-STD-16?9Afunctional block dia
Page 23 and 24: MI L-STD-1629A5.6.2 Next higher lev
Page 25 and 26: Ml 1,-STD-1079Afurther amplified in
Page 27 and 28: MIL-STD-1629A. --1III[IIIIIIIIIIIii
Page 29 and 30: MIL-STD- 1629ATASK 102CRITICALITYAN
Page 31 and 32: IMII.-ST1)-162(]Ashown in Figure 10
Page 33 and 34: MIL-STD-1629Awhere:C* = Criticality
Page 35 and 36: MI I.-sTI)-I629AINCREASINGCRITICALI
Page 37 and 38: MIL-STD-1629A3*1 Failure predictabi
Page 39 and 40: .--— .-—--— , --—— ——
Page 41 and 42: MTL-STD- 1629A4\l Damage modes. All
Page 43 and 44: NI 1.-[; 1’1)- 1(); ?!)Au0.-.mr-r
Page 45 and 46: MI I,-ST1)-1629A3. Content. The FME
Page 47 and 48: —..-A 1MIL-STD-1629AAPPENDIXA10.
Page 49 and 50: MIL-STD-1629A50.1.3 Intended use. T
Page 51 and 52: MIL-STD-1629AWhere:C= “ Criticali
Page 53 and 54: INSIRUCII ONS: In ● continuing ef
Page 55 and 56: MIL3TD-1629ANotice 17 June 1983MILI
Page 57 and 58: MIL-STD-1629ACONTENTS (Continued)Fi
Page 59 and 60: MIL-STD-1629ASPECIFICATIONSMilitary
Page 61 and 62: MIL-STD-1629Ad. Functional Failure
Page 63 and 64: MIL-STD-1629A..2’Ilm.o.,id1-< xQ
Page 65 and 66: —MIL-STD-1629A50.5 DMEA (Task 104
Page 67 and 68:
MIL-STD-1629ACONTENTS (Continued)Pa
Page 69 and 70:
.-MIL-STD-1629AAPPENDIX AAPPLICATIO
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20-30Stop LCNMIL-STD-1629AEnter the
Page 73:
NOTICE OFCANCELLATIONNOT MEASUREMEN
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MIL-STD-1629-RevA - Barringer and Associates, Inc.

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