The Essential Th ing: Mission Command and its ... - Australian Army

Current Operations Lieutenant Colonel Roger Nobleof our troops. At the most basic level, the language was different and our organicexpertise in Arabic was limited. Cultural norms and conduct, such as the role ofwomen, differ noticeably to that encountered in the West. In the constant crossculturalexchange, a simple mistake could become an obscenity without the ‘guilty’party even being aware of the error. Religion is a powerful influence, and religiousleadership is closely entwined with political leadership. Located far from Baghdad,Al Muthanna is intensely parochial and regional incharacter. Local geography is important and the citiesand towns of the Province have unique interests,organisations and identities. Tribal influence is crucial… a simple mistakeand pervades all aspects of daily life and action. 10 Thecould become anProvince is politically fluid, active and prone toobscenity …overheating at short-notice.At the time, over 13 political parties were activein the Province, as well as a number of illegal organisations,such as armed militias and criminal organisations. A full range of newand evolving government, judicial, security and bureaucratic institutions wereactive and evolving within an incomplete and uncertainty policy framework.This complex human system, embedded in a jigsaw of complex terrain, was theAMTG1 ‘battlefield’.Human complexity is not only a function of the domestic society. Externalstakeholders import their own significant contributions to complexity. First amongthese in the AMTG1 case study was the Multi-National Force (MNF). Like all largecoalitions, the MNF consisted of a vast array of national troop contributions withdifferent capabilities, characteristics and missions. 11 Inside the AMTG AO,Australian, British and Japanese troops were overlaid, using up to three languages,each seeking linked but not identical goals. Anextended range of government and civil agencies,such as various national diplomatic services andaid agencies, operated across the AMTG1 AO.Human complexity isWithin this mix there were also a limited numbernot only a function ofof independent non-government agencies.the domestic society.All these stakeholders were in constant,often completely independent, interactions withProvincial and Iraqi central government agencies.Amongst the milieu were private contractors, which range from large-scale logisticproviders through to a multitude of private security detachments. This extended,external, and complicated mix fed directly into the local human system.page 112 Volume III, Number 3 Australian Army Journal

Current Operations Lieutenant Colonel Roger Nobleoffer nothing material to the killing’. 18 AMTG1 faced a complicated patchwork ofheavily armed, largely local militia forces operating literally ‘amongst the people’. Itwas war by the few, but was dependent on the support of the many. 19 Interactionwith the threat took place in the context of the complex environment.Friendly Force CompositionComplexity is not only a by-product of the physical, social and informationalterrain and the threat profile. Modern security missions require the case-specificcreation of combined joint interagency task forces (JIATF) to achieve designatedmissions within a complex environment. These teams aim to ‘incorporate allelements of national power in an integrated framework, tailored and scaled tothe requirements of specific a mission’. 20 The intent is to build a force that is ableto ‘control the perceptions and behaviours of specific population groups’ andnot merely apply force. 21 JIATFs are, therefore, rarely standing organisations orgroupings. They are custom-made and case specific.AMTG1 is one example of a modern battle group–level JIATF. It was not astanding organisation and was non-traditional in structure. It incorporated a broadrange of capabilities drawn from joint, Defence and national resources. It consistedof 450 personnel from two Services, 56 Army units and 19 Corps. The considerablediversity is reflected through an example table shown below at Figure 1, whichshows the sources of AMTG1 Army personnel. The force also included a selectedrange of specialist civilian personnel. AMTG1 was a diverse, unique grouping ofcapabilities that were rapidly concentrated, formed and deployed. 22 The compositionand rapid deployment of a custom-made force was essential, but generatedunavoidable internal complexity and friction.The Complex Environment: The Implications ForCommandFor the soldier on the ground, the environment isquite simply a sea of complexity. Situations rapidlydevelop, constantly change and demand immediatecase-specific responses. The problems encounteredare never purely military or tactical; they are alsosocial, cultural, legal, moral and political. Drills andtemplates provide assistance and guidance, butsuccess requires thinking, decision-making andadaptation to the specific circumstance. A constant,recurring theme of modern operations is thatcomplexity means that ‘the possible permutationsThe problemsencountered are neverpurely military ortactical; they are alsosocial, cultural, legal,moral and political.page 114 Volume III, Number 3 Australian Army Journal

Current Operations Lieutenant Colonel Roger NobleThe AMTG1 mission (detailed above) provides an example of a mission thatgenerates a need for sophisticated and disciplined methods applied by a force armedwith a range of capabilities. AMTG mission success would ultimately depend oncollective local community opinion. 25 The focus was not the destruction of the threat,but rather the defeat of their intent to use illegal and violent action to achieve theirends. Success could be achieved as much by indirect means as through any clash ofarms. The AMTG1 was, therefore, unavoidably required to execute a broader rangeof tasks than those required of a purely conventional military security task. It alsorequired a sophisticated sensing of changes in theenvironment and quick adaptation to exploitopportunity. While the case study is unique, itThe nature of modernbears similar traits to missions and requirementsunderway from East Timor to Afghanistan.missions and complexThe nature of modern missions and complexenvironments demandsenvironments demands decentralised actiondecentralised actionand adaptability. For example, the AMTG1environment and mission demanded that noand adaptability.set patterns be developed in order to dislocatethe threat. The force was required to operate indispersed, small, but powerful groups that could survive and defeat an attack, yetnot alienate the locals through unnecessary disruption to, and interference in, theirlives. AMTG1 had to establish and sustain a continuous, open, face-to-face dialoguewith people at every level across our AO. The force, therefore, had to act effectivelyin a dispersed, decentralised, face-to-face manner.Decentralised and sophisticated methods, reliant on adapting to circumstance,require a binding ‘glue’ to ensure that action taken is coherent and directed towardsa common end. A centralised, hierarchical system relying on detailed direction fromabove has limited adaptability, responsiveness or situational awareness to support a forceoperating in a 24-hour, dispersed, mobile roles. The essential glue that enables coherentaction is not a piece of technology or a detailed web of predictive rules, but rather theestablishment of an adaptive human system of mission command. The difficult part isestablishing a mission command framework that enables effective, coherent action.Building a Mission Command FrameworkGiven the importance of adaptability and the pressing need for effectivedecentralised action, the key issue becomes how best to build a mission commandenvironment? This paper proposes that effective mission command relies on theestablishment and nurturing of a mission command framework. The framework mustconsist of a series of intellectual, moral and physical components that together providefreedom of action and support to subordinates within boundaries.page 116 Volume III, Number 3 Australian Army Journal

The Essential ThingIntellectual Components. An effective mission command framework relies on aclearly articulated and understood philosophy of mission command. This idea mustthen be clearly explained and articulated across the entire organisation. For example,AMTG1 had a short description of the philosophy of command that would applyon operations. The philosophy included the five specific individual characteristicsrequired of the soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers of thebattle group: 26• Mission Focused/Task Orientated• Imbued with a culture of mission command and a bias for action• Tactically and technically excellent• Highly Disciplined• AdaptableThe command philosophy provided the behavioural rules against which alldecisions, plans, training and actions would be developed and then assessed. InAMTG1, action was emphasised as a critical idea and was a mandated behaviouralrequirement:The AMTG must have a bias for action. Individuals mustindependently act to solve a problem and achieve the missionin a timely manner based on the available informationand resources. Decisive, determined action, based on thecommander’s intent and targeted against the enemy’s criticalvulnerabilities must be the hallmark of AMTG operations.Uncertainty is a constant, always act decisively.The AMTGmust have a biasfor action.A philosophy that describes mission command and explains what is importantis the first and critical element of any mission command framework.Mission Command relies on a clear understanding of the commander’s intentacross an organisation. The intent must be articulated, explained and updatedregularly. This is formally achieved through the promulgation of an operationsorder. Perhaps more importantly it was constantly reinforced through the ‘battlerhythm’ of an organisation. 27 Intent became the issue of discussion throughout theorganisation. In AMTG1, this was achieved through a variety of formal and informalmeans. Commanding Officer’s (CO) hours with the soldiers would begin with adiscussion of the mission, tactics and the threat. Visits, sub-unit training, meals,and tactical operations all provided occasions for commanders (at every level) andsoldiers to discuss and understand intent. One excellent example was the regular‘sand table’ tactics training held by Combat Team Eagle, where intent was an openforum topic for discussion and suggestion by all ranks. Intent must become a ‘living’idea that is a constant topic of discussion, and must be deeply understood.Australian Army Journal Volume III, Number 3 page 117

The Essential ThingThe discipline system must be supported by a command-driven welfare networkin which everyone supports each other. Key appointments, such as the doctor andpadre, are vital as they perform the role of both semi-independent morale (anddiscipline) ‘thermometers’ and advisers to all. High operational tempo and limitedopportunities to rest demand a careful, constant assessment by all deployedpersonnel. This is the core business of commanders. In AMTG1, the use of enforcedrest and short-term job swaps were two simple methods employed to manage disciplineand morale. The authority of formal militarydiscipline is the ultimate legal power that holds all tothe mission and the required standard of conduct. Itmust be both credible and strong.The discipline systemSystemic learning through constant assessmentmust be supported bylinked to training enables organisational adaptation.a command-drivenTraining is the mechanism to formally improve,welfare network …adapt and codify modified action. The retention ofcore skills and individual and collective proficiencyare critical to confidence and trust. Training, revisionand the testing of new and emerging ideas must also be part of the operational cycle.This requires not only familiar training (such as weapons handling and shooting),but a constant focus on tactical decision-making. The use of the tactical quickdecision exercise, whether formal or informal, forces a debate on intent and action.Over time, this style of training links approaches and thinking while simultaneouslygenerating critical analysis of current methods and tactics. For example, AMTG1used deployed tactical low-level simulation and deployed Coalition (and DSTO)operational analysis teams to support assessment, learning and adaptation. Partof a mission-command control framework must be a deliberate, planned trainingprogram linked with a culture of formal and informal discussion and learning.As mission success is the focus of mission command, an organisation needs tounderstand whether or not it is on the path to success. This requires the carefuldesign of measures of effectiveness and a rigorous performance tracking methodology.This element of a control framework was initially missing for AMTG1 ondeployment and answers were not readily found in doctrine. Over a period of time,a system of assessing progress was developed. This modified system allowed forthe measuring of progress and the adaptable allocation of a full range of resourcesand capabilities, (kinetic and non-kinetic) to influence outcomes. This process alsodemanded that AMTG1 gain an understanding of the complex environment inwhich it was operating. What action induced what responses? What were the leversof influence in society? How was local consent reinforced or undermined? Thistracking and auditing function is vital (for both positive learning and adaptation)in order to achieve the desired result.Australian Army Journal Volume III, Number 3 page 123

Current Operations Lieutenant Colonel Roger NobleCONCLUSIONIn the 21st century, action remains the essentialthing. Yet there are tremendous pressures to attemptto centrally control, direct and limit action. There isIn the 21st century,often a temptation to delay action, or indeed not act ataction remains theall, given both the intense scrutiny and the potentialessential thing.adverse and unpredictable outcomes. This is not thepath to success in complexity and against threats thatrecognise and exploit the operating environment andconstraints in and under which Western forces operate. Effective, focused actionat the lowest level remains the key to success. A network of intent that binds all tothe mission is the logical and optimal approach to the challenge of complexity andchaos. It also allows a force to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities and to targetthe vulnerabilities of hard, committed and intelligent adversaries.The key to effective, focused action is mission command. The philosophy ofmission command must be believed and nurtured. To be effective, it must be builton the intellectual components of clear intent, trust and accountability. The centralmoral component is trust. A physical control framework must also be establishedto support decision-makers at every level, especially those in the midst of chaos andin close contact with the adversary. While every circumstance is unique, this paperhas sought to identify some of the enduring components common to any physical,moral and intellectual framework of mission command. Mission command offersone way to enable effective action and to create a human network that ‘ensures readyco-operation in the spirit of the whole’.Endnotes1 General Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of a Soldier, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1930pp. 123–30.2 Lieutenant General J.P. Storr, ‘Command and Control within the Land Component’,Journal of Battlefield Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2000, p. 19.3 From 24 April 2005 until 10 November 2005, the Al Muthanna Task Group(AMTG1) conducted 24-hour combined arms security operations, including 2359discrete tactical tasks, for a total of 191 days in the high threat, complex operationalenvironment of southern Iraq. This paper will use the AMG1 experience as onespecific case study.page 124 Volume III, Number 3 Australian Army Journal

The Essential Thing4 Mission Command is a philosophy of command and a system for conductingoperations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior ofhis intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraintsare clearly enunciated; however, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decidehow to achieve the required result. Land Warfare Doctrine 0.0, Command,Leadership and Management, Department of Defence (Australian Army), Canberra,17 November 2003.5 Storr, ‘Command and Control within the Land Component’, p. 19.6 General Sir R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, AllenLane Penguin Books, London, 2005, p. 269.7 Australian Army, Future Land Operating Concept: Complex Warfighting,, p. 4.8 Ibid, p. 6.9 Patrols of the AMTG would encounter these physical environments, andcombinations of all three, within five kilometres of the forward operating base. Largeinfrastructure, such as highways and bridges, combined with significant man-madeand natural obstacles, created a complex physical environment where choke points,routes, and observation points combined to create a complicated tactical jigsaw forboth friendly and threat forces. It is difficult to imagine a physical environment moredifferent from Australian training areas or one that could provide a greater series ofrapid fire tactical challenges to any mobile security force.10 For example, any police response to an incident would begin with an assessment ofwhich tribes were involved in order to ensure the responding police could moderatethe situation rather than complicate it through their own tribal identity. After 6000years, an enduring, unwritten heritage of interaction between tribes, clans andfamilies played a role in all social interactions.11 AMTG1 flanking formations included troops from five nations who spoke fourdifferent languages. Liaison took place across three international and four Provincialborders. Two major Coalition routes ran through the AMTG AO, which resulted in aconstant transit of almost all the remaining troop contributing nation force elements.12 For example, most male locals owned at least one mobile phone and the networkwas modern, involved multiple service providers and offered extended local andinternational coverage. Cable television networks fed directly into the Province andcould be found as far afield as the most remote desert police station. Internet serviceswere also widely available.13 ‘An Army of One: Iraq’s Moqtada al-Sadr on his men, his mind-set and whenAmerica should go’, Interview by Scott Johnson, Newsweek, 8 May 2006, pp. 22–3.Australian Army Journal Volume III, Number 3 page 125

Current Operations Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble14 For example, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Coalition forces met fierce resistancefrom irregular forces and only experienced limited direct confrontation withconventional forces. Studies such as COBRA II reveal that this was unexpected andthat Coalition forces, especially at the operational level, were slow to adapt to thereality of the threat. M. Gordon and B. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of theInvasion and Occupation of Iraq, Atlantic Books, London, 2006.15 This was largely due to the efforts of those in the local community who weredetermined to prevent mass casualty attacks and extremist violence mounted byforeign fighters or Iraqis from other regions—all collectively viewed as ‘outsiders’ bythe local majority.16 Threat groups employed a range of highly lethal weapons, such as highly sophisticatedImprovised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and improvised indirect fire rocket attacks,in order to maximise their impact and minimise their chances of being decisivelyengaged. In all actions, threat groups exploited the environment, local support andknowledge in order to cover, assist or allow their actions to take place.17 During the six months of the AMTG1 tour, it is worth noting that, of the sevendeliberate threat attacks against Coalition forces in Al Muthanna, only two involveddirect fire ambushes. Of these only one was assessed to be a deliberate, plannedattack, while the other exploited a fleeting target of opportunity.18 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Wordsworth’s Classics of World Literature,Ware, Hertfordshire, 1997, p. 182.19 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Meridian, New York, 2nd revised ed., 1991, p. 367. In1954, Liddell Hart published the last version of his classic book on strategy with anadditional chapter devoted to Guerrilla War. In it he describes the classic guerrillaor subversive strategy. It demonstrates that this approach is not new and remainsrelevant to modern operations in Iraq. He assessed that this approach ‘tends to bemost effective if it blends an appeal to national resistance or desire for independencewith an appeal to a socially and economically discontent population’. AMTG1,therefore, confronted a ‘classic’, if fragmented, guerrilla or subversive threat strategy.20 Complex Warfighting, p. 14.21 Ibid.22 Deployment time from Government announcement in Australia to thecommencement of operations in Iraq was 10 weeks. The AMTG1 drew personnel andequipment from across Australia.23 Major J. P. Storr, ‘Alternative Concepts For Battlefield Command And ControlOrganisations’, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, paper presented to the 1999Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Command andControl Research Program, US Naval War College, Rhode Island, 1999, downloadedfrom: .page 126 Volume III, Number 3 Australian Army Journal