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14.452 Economic Growth: Neoclassical Model in Discrete Time ...

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Equilibrium Characterization: Household ProblemElim<strong>in</strong>ate c (t) from Problem (3) to get:∞max β t u ((1 + r (t)) a (t) + w (t) − a (t + 1) ) (4){a(t)} ∞ t=0 t=0t−11s.t. lim a (t)1 + r (s) ≥ 0.t→∞s=0This fits <strong>in</strong>to the structure of the sequence problem <strong>in</strong> Chapter 6. Can write it <strong>in</strong>recursive form and <strong>in</strong>voke dynamic programm<strong>in</strong>g results. For our purposes, there is asimpler approach:Theorem 6.10 (Suffi ciency Theorem for discrete time): Under standard assumptions(most importantly convexity of choice set and concavity of the objective function)an <strong>in</strong>terior allocation that satisfies the Euler equation and the transversalitycondition is optimal.Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc rete Recitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the 20, OLG2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 4 Rebelo / 22


Household ProblemEquilibrium CharacterizationPlug <strong>in</strong> the last equation <strong>in</strong>to TC and get rid of the constant u (c (0)) to gett−11lim a (t) = 0. (6)t→∞ 1 + r (s)s=0This is the No-Ponzi condition satisfied with equality. Intuition? The optimal sequence {a (t)} ∞t=0is characterized by the Euler equationu (1 + r (t)) a (t) + w (t)−a (t + 1)= β (1 + r (t + 1)) u (1 + r (t + 1)) a (t + 1) + w (t)for each t,−a (t + 2)along with the <strong>in</strong>itial condition a (0) and the transversality condition (6).(7)Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc rete Recitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the 20, OLG2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 6 Rebelo / 22


The Semi-Technical Explanation for Dynamic Ineffi ciencySource: pecuniary (price) externalities. Illustration: Suppose I am a bread producer.When I produce less bread, I have small (positive) effect on the price of bread. Thishas a negative effect on bread consumers and positive effect on other breadproducers (or people endowed with bread). But these effects are present <strong>in</strong> anyWalrasian economy. They typically do not cause <strong>in</strong>effi ciencies: with completemarkets and no non-pecuniary (technological or preference) externalities, the welfareeffect from the change <strong>in</strong> prices can be written as (see Greenwald-Stiglitz (1986))(Total production(good) - Total consumption(good)) × Marg<strong>in</strong>al price changegoodFrom market clear<strong>in</strong>g, we have production=consumption. So when there are f<strong>in</strong>itelymany goods with f<strong>in</strong>ite production, welfare effect is 0. This is the sense <strong>in</strong> whichpecuniary externalities typically "net out". This is the content of the first welfaretheorem, from a different perspective.But this reason<strong>in</strong>g is fragile when there are <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely many goods. In this case, thesepecuniary externalities don’t necessarily net out.Consider (loosely)∞∞∞∞∞∞(2 − 2) = 2 + 2 − 2 = 2 + 2 − 2 = 2 + (2 − 2)t=0 t=1 t=0 t=1 t=1 t=10 = 2what is wrong with this algebra?!Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 12 Rebelo / 22


The <strong>Economic</strong> ExplanationThe pecuniary externalities <strong>in</strong> the OLG economy: Sav<strong>in</strong>gs by current young <strong>in</strong>creaseswages and decreases rental rate of capital tomorrow (which is also the gross <strong>in</strong>terestrate received on sav<strong>in</strong>gs). Thus, sav<strong>in</strong>gs by the current young generation has anegative externality on the same generation and a positive externality on the nextperiod’s young generation.As expla<strong>in</strong>ed above, <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite economy, negative externalities may dom<strong>in</strong>ate thepositive externalities, and thus sav<strong>in</strong>g by the young people may make all generationsworse off... and it does, when the economy is dynamically <strong>in</strong>effi cient. There isoveraccumulation of capital.This reason<strong>in</strong>g also po<strong>in</strong>ts to potential solutions.Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 13 Rebelo / 22


How to Restore Effi ciency: Social SecurityFunded social security: government <strong>in</strong>vests sav<strong>in</strong>gs on behalf of you and gives youyour fair returns when you are old. This has no effect <strong>in</strong> our framework. You chooseyour personal sav<strong>in</strong>gs exactly to offset government and save the same amount <strong>in</strong>total.Unfunded social security: take from current young, give to current old. Tomorrow’sold receives receipts from tomorrow’s young etc. This scheme reduces total sav<strong>in</strong>gs.To see this, suppose current young receives wages w ∗ and faces <strong>in</strong>terest rate1 + r ∗ < 1 + n. Suppose the government <strong>in</strong>troduces social security scheme thatmakes every young generation contribute d (t) = d ∗ . Per-capita sav<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> thiseconomy change from s ∗ = w ∗ ∗− c 1 to s (0) = w ∗ − d ∗ − c 1 (0). So:1. There is a direct effect. Government takes from savers (young people), gives it toconsumers (old people), which reduces sav<strong>in</strong>gs. Unless young people cut back oncurrent consumption by a lot (i.e. c 1 (0) much lower than c ∗ 1 ), this will decrease andcapital accumulation.2. There is also an <strong>in</strong>direct wealth effect that works <strong>in</strong> the same direction. S<strong>in</strong>ceyoung receive return n > r ∗ from their contribution to social security, they have agreater overall budget, i.e. there is a wealth effect. S<strong>in</strong>ce utility is separable,consumption <strong>in</strong> both periods is a normal good hence (at the marg<strong>in</strong>, before <strong>in</strong>terestrate adjusts) consumption today must <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> response to a wealth effect. So thedirect effect <strong>in</strong> 1 is re<strong>in</strong>forced (rather than overturned).Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 14 Rebelo / 22


How to Restore Effi ciency: National DebtNational debt (Diamond, AER 1965): Suppose the government borrows fromcurrent young d (t) = d ∗ at market <strong>in</strong>terest rate and pays back next period byborrow<strong>in</strong>g also d (t) = d ∗ from the next generation. Whenever r (t + 1) < n ∗ , thisscheme will generate some extra revenues at time t + 1 which the governmentredistributes to the old generation at time t + 1 through lump sum transfers. Thiseconomy is similar to the economy with unfunded social security. Intuitively,government takes away from the wages of the current young (and does not <strong>in</strong>vest it)which directly reduces sav<strong>in</strong>gs.Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 15 Rebelo / 22


How to Restore Effi ciency: BubblesFiat money (Samuelson, JPE 1958) or bubbles <strong>in</strong> general. Normalize L (0) = 1 soL (t) = (1 + n) t . Consider an <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically worhtless asset, which we call bubbly, thathas a fixed (one unit) supply and consider the steady state equilibrium of the OLGeconomy with bubbly. We conjecture a steady state equilibrium on which the priceof bubbly evolves accord<strong>in</strong>g top (t) = p (0) (1 + n) tfor some p (0), and an <strong>in</strong>dividual of generation t holds 1/ (1 + n) t units of bubbly.Note that the market for bubbly clears (demand at each period=supply=1). Notethat the <strong>in</strong>dividuals save both <strong>in</strong> capital and bubbly, hence (at an <strong>in</strong>terior solution)must receive the same return from both. This implies that the steady statecapital-labor ratio is k gold = f −1 (1 + n). Note also that, the total sav<strong>in</strong>gs of<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> bubbly is p (t) × 1/ (1 + n) t = p (0), hence by adjust<strong>in</strong>g p (0) we canadjust the residual sav<strong>in</strong>gs of <strong>in</strong>dividuals that go to capital sector. There is a level ofp (0) that makes each <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>vest exactly k gold (1 + n) <strong>in</strong> capital, prov<strong>in</strong>g thatthere is an equilibrium for this level of p (0).Note that due to dynamic <strong>in</strong>effi ciency, bubbly returns more than capital at the oldsteady state (r ∗ < n) and thus will be <strong>in</strong> positive demand <strong>in</strong> the new steady state(i.e. p (0) > 0 and there is an <strong>in</strong>terior solution). A generation holds the asset to sell it to another generation. Yes, this is speculative trade but of the good k<strong>in</strong>d! Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 16 Rebelo / 22


Rebelo’s Two-Sector AK <strong>Model</strong>Based on: Sergio Rebelo, "Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run <strong>Growth</strong>", JPE1991. Also covered <strong>in</strong> Section 11.2 of "Introduction to Modern <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Growth</strong>".Goal: Build an AK model <strong>in</strong> which share of capital and labor rema<strong>in</strong>s constant aseconomy grows.Method: assume capital and consumption sectors have different productiontechnologies. What is essential for susta<strong>in</strong>ed growth is l<strong>in</strong>ear production <strong>in</strong> capitalproduc<strong>in</strong>g sector. Consumption good produc<strong>in</strong>g sector could use scarce factors (suchas labor or land), hence share of labor <strong>in</strong> output can rema<strong>in</strong> constant despite growthdriven by capital accumulation.Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 17 Rebelo / 22


EnvironmentCapital produc<strong>in</strong>g sectorI (t) = AK I (t) (13)K˙ (t) = I (t) − δK (t) . (14)Consumption sector (α = 1 is like basel<strong>in</strong>e AK model, here we allow for α < 1)Market clear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> capitalC (t) = BK C (t) α L (t) 1−α (15)K I (t) + K C (t) ≤ K (t)We need prices for <strong>in</strong>vestment and consumption goods p I (t) , p C (t). We will takep C (t) = 1 as normalization. Wage rate given by w (t). Loans (assets), aredenom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> consumption good, so we will denote rate of return on assets byr C (t).Let K C (t) = (1 − κ (t)) K (t) and K I (t) = κ (t) K (t), where κ (t) is share of capital used <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment sector. Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 18 Rebelo / 22


EquilibriumIs a path of {K (t) , κ (t) , C (t) , p I (t) , r C (t) , w (t)} ∞1 Household solves ∞1−θmax exp (−ρt) C (t ) − 1 dt1 − θ23{C (t),A(t)} t=0∞ 0such that t s.t. Ȧ (t) = r C (t) A (t) + w (t) − C (t) and lim exp −r (s) ds A (t) ≥ 0.t→∞0Competitive firms maximize, which by production technologies <strong>in</strong> (13) and (15) gives:Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 19 Rebelo / 22t=0r C (t) = A − δ + ṗ I (t)p I (t)[Consumption can be converted to <strong>in</strong>vestment good, which can then be converted toA − δ units of next period capital by the l<strong>in</strong>ear technology (a portion of capitaldepreciates), which can then be converted to next period consumption. Dur<strong>in</strong>g theconversion from consumption to <strong>in</strong>vestment good and then back to consumption goodnext period, the asset loses value if <strong>in</strong>vestment good is gett<strong>in</strong>g cheaper.]L1−αp I (t) A = αB (17)(1 − κ (t)) K (t)Asset and good markets clear.K I (t) + K C (t) = K (t)(by equat<strong>in</strong>g marg<strong>in</strong>al product of capital <strong>in</strong> two sectors)K (t) p I (t) = A (t) (note that assets are denom<strong>in</strong>ated by the consumption good)(16)


Equilibrium CharacterizationWe conjecture a steady-state allocation and prove that the allocation is <strong>in</strong>deed anequilibrium.Conjecture: κ (t) = κ ∗ is constant. In any such equilibrium, growth of K (t) is alsoconstant by capital accumulation equation. Denote this by g K .Differentiat<strong>in</strong>g Eq. (17) givesIntuition?Plug this <strong>in</strong> Eq. (16) which givesṗ I= − (1 − α) g K .p I∗r C (t) = r C ≡ A − δ − (1 − α) g K .By Euler equationĊ 1= (A − δ − (1 − α) g K − ρ) . (18)C θAlp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 20 Rebelo / 22


Equilibrium Characterization, Con’tNext, differentiate the production of the consumption good Eq. (15), to get:ĊC = α ˙K C= αg K . (19)K CIntuition?Comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Eqs. (18) and (19), we uniquely solve for g K as:g K = A − δ − ρ and g C = αg K . (20)1 − α + αθFrom Eq. (14), we can solve for κ ∗ uniquely asκ ∗ = g K + δ .A∗We also need g K < r I to satisfy the transversality condition. In terms of parametersA − δ − ρ < A − δ,1 − α + αθ(Note that this also ensures κ ∗ ∈ [0, 1]).Then, the path <strong>in</strong> which κ (t) = κ ∗ for all t (and the rest of the variablesdeterm<strong>in</strong>ed uniquely as above) is an equilibrium under the above parametricrestriction. (Check that this path satisfies all of the equilibrium conditions).Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 21 Rebelo / 22


Equilibrium Characterization, Con’tConstant growth at all times. No transitional dynamics.We can also def<strong>in</strong>e the total "output" as the value of the consumption and <strong>in</strong>vestment production" Y (t) = C (t) + p I (t) I (t) .Check that output grows at the same rate as consumption, i.e., g Y = g C (which isequal to αg K ).<strong>Growth</strong> rate <strong>in</strong> (20) responds to policy as <strong>in</strong> the standard AK model.What happens to wages: Note w (t) = β (K C (t) /L) α , henceẇ (t) = αgK = g C .w (t)Thus, wages grow at the same rate as consumption (and output). Share of labor isconstant, which is different than the standard AK model.There is, however, capital deepen<strong>in</strong>g. K (t) grows faster than output (Y (t) = C (t)). Not consistent with Kaldor facts strictly read. But is this a problem? Alp Simsek (MIT) <strong>14.452</strong> Recitation Notes: 1. <strong>Neoclassical</strong> <strong>Model</strong> <strong>in</strong> Disc reteRecitation <strong>Time</strong> 2. Ineffi 4 on ciency November <strong>in</strong> the20, OLG 2009 <strong>Model</strong> 3. 22 Rebelo / 22


MIT OpenCourseWarehttp://ocw.mit.edu<strong>14.452</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Growth</strong> Fall 2009For <strong>in</strong>formation about cit<strong>in</strong>g these materials or our Terms of Use,visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.

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