THE Doctrine of Maya - HolyBooks.com

THE Doctrine of Maya - HolyBooks.com THE Doctrine of Maya - HolyBooks.com

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""""86 THE DOCTRINE OF MAYAknown as Aldta-cakra is a very common sight in thestreets, where littleboys play in the evening afterhaving finished their daily school-task.The firstpart, as already remarked, being basedon the Upanisad, Gaudapada could give an uncheckedflight to his thoughts only in the other three parts.These are therefore more important for our purpose.We here give a brief summary of the Advaitism ofthis great teacher, which ispermeated with the conception of Maya."Boldly and truly Gaudapada asserts the world doesnot exist in reality hence this; Maya cannot beliterally removed or destroyed even. All this ismere appearance, in sooth it is Advaita. In otherwords, the metaphysical truth is that the world doesnot exist, the multiplicity is false, hence being not areality it does not stand in need of removal (i. 17).Nobody ever MADE may a it is;not a reality,hence it ismeaningless to speak of it as to be removed." When the highest truth is realized theillusion itself isdestroyed (i. 18).In the second part Gaudapada explains the unreality (vaitathya) of all multiplicity by showingthat the world which people call real is no more realthan a dream-world. The two worlds are alike inthis respect, the only difference is that the wakingworldis external, while the dream-world is internal.But as witnessed by the same self they are the same,both being within the body in a subtle form (ii. i).Sankara explains this stanza logically thus

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 87Proposition (pratijna)Objects seen in the waking world are unreal,(jagraddrsyanam bhavanam vaitathyam.)Reason (hetu):Because they are capable of being seen,(d rsyamanatvat. )Illustration (drstanta):Like the objects seen in a dream,(svapnad rsy abhavavat . )Argument (hetupanayd) :As in a dream the objects seen are false, so too inwaking, their capability of being seen is the same.(Yatha tatra svapne drsyanam bhavanam vaitathyam tatha jagarite pi drsyatvam avisistam iti.)Conclusion (nigamana):Therefore in the waking condition too they (theobjects seen) are false (tasmaj jagarite pi vaitathyam smrtam iti).Though, on account of being internal and in asubtle condition, the phenomena of dream are different from those of waking, yet (the fact remains) thattheir being seen (drsyamdnatva) and their consequentfutility (or falsity, vaitathya) of presentation, arecommon to both. In ii.5 the same is finally enunciated.From an analysis of our experience we find thatwhat isnaught at the beginning and end is necessarily so at the middle too. For instance, themirage is nothing in the beginning, since it neverwas a mirage, so too it isnothing at the end, sinceit never existed ;hence it could not have anytertiary existence. The objects of our waking experience are finally of the same class as the mirage,

DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION 87Proposition (pratijna)Objects seen in the waking world are unreal,(jagraddrsyanam bhavanam vaitathyam.)Reason (hetu):Because they are capable <strong>of</strong> being seen,(d rsyamanatvat. )Illustration (drstanta):Like the objects seen in a dream,(svapnad rsy abhavavat . )Argument (hetupanayd) :As in a dream the objects seen are false, so too inwaking, their capability <strong>of</strong> being seen is the same.(Yatha tatra svapne drsyanam bhavanam vaitathyam tatha jagarite pi drsyatvam avisistam iti.)Conclusion (nigamana):Therefore in the waking condition too they (theobjects seen) are false (tasmaj jagarite pi vaitathyam smrtam iti).Though, on account <strong>of</strong> being internal and in asubtle condition, the phenomena <strong>of</strong> dream are different from those <strong>of</strong> waking, yet (the fact remains) thattheir being seen (drsyamdnatva) and their consequentfutility (or falsity, vaitathya) <strong>of</strong> presentation, are<strong>com</strong>mon to both. In ii.5 the same is finally enunciated.From an analysis <strong>of</strong> our experience we find thatwhat isnaught at the beginning and end is necessarily so at the middle too. For instance, themirage is nothing in the beginning, since it neverwas a mirage, so too it isnothing at the end, sinceit never existed ;hence it could not have anytertiary existence. The objects <strong>of</strong> our waking experience are finally <strong>of</strong> the same class as the mirage,

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