White Spaces Innovation in Sweden - Innovation policy for ... - Vinnova

White Spaces Innovation in Sweden - Innovation policy for ... - Vinnova White Spaces Innovation in Sweden - Innovation policy for ... - Vinnova

13.07.2015 Views

WHITE SPACES INNOVATION IN SWEDEN2.4 Why human complex systems are differentHuman systems are different from natural and biological because they are reflexivewhich means that we can learn. The major differentiator is that humans can communicateby the use of language which has been described as involving the coordination ofthe coordination of actions (Maturana and Varela (1980). Language can itself be seen ascomplex adaptive system but language and the communication and interaction it allowsaffect interplay between micro-macro levels in other systems. Humans are cognitiveagents set out to pursue purposeful action, i.e. action or intervention based on intentionsindividually and collectively. Here we should note Midgely´s (2000) suggestion that ifintervention is purposeful action by an agent to create change, then systemic interventionis purposeful action by an agent to create change in relation to reflection onboundaries. What he means is that there is a need for agents to reflect critically upon,and make choices between, boundaries. Boundaries define both what issues are to beincluded, excluded or marginalized in analyses, and who is to be consulted or involved(the two are obviously linked, as different agents will have different concerns). Becauseof the „who‟ question, issues of power and participation are unavoidable in systemicintervention.Language is important from an innovation point of view which has to do with characterof the “knowledge boundaries” that have to be crossed. These are referred to incommunications theory as syntactic, semantic and pragmatic boundaries and the higherthe novelty the more a need to be able communicate across the two latter categories ofboundaries (Star (1989), Carlile (2004) by making use of boundary objects. These inturn allows for complexity absorption (Boisot & Child, 1999). This is not the place toexpand further on these topics. They are mentioned because they may play an importantrole in coordination and sensemaking in the generative phases of ideas and concepts.The issue of intent and the consequences thereof make the issue of how boundariesare defined of interest. The more universally a system is defined the less influence ofindividual and perhaps even collective action.It is clear that in order to be recognisable as such, a system must be bounded in someway. But as Cilliers (2001) says, as soon as one tries to be specific about the boundariesof a system, a number of difficulties become apparent. For example, it seems uncontroversialto claim that one has to be able to recognise what belongs to a specific system,and what does not. But complex systems are open systems where the relationshipsamongst the components of the system are usually more important than the componentsthemselves. Since there are also relationships with the environment, specifying clearlywhere a boundary could be is not obvious. Cilliers suggest that we should think ofboundary as something that constitutes that which is bounded in order to see the boundaryas something enabling rather than as confining.As an illustration of this logic he presents the example of the eardrum. It forms theboundary between the inner and the outer ear, but at the same time, it exists in order to32

WHITE SPACES INNOVATION IN SWEDENlet the sound waves through. As a matter of fact, if it was not there, the sound waveswould not be able to get through at all! If the boundary is seen as an interface or membraneparticipating in constituting the system, we will be more concerned with the marginsof the system, and perhaps less with what appears to be central. A second boundaryissue concerns the “place” of the boundary. The propensity we have towards visualmetaphors inclines us to think in spatial terms. A system is therefore often visualised assomething contiguous in space. This tendency is reinforced by the prevalence of biologicalexamples of complex systems. We think of systems in an “organic” way. Socialsystems are obviously not limited in the same way. Parts of the system may exist intotally different spatial locations. This may be exemplified by clusters as geographicallydefined systems and at the same inhabited by actors belonging to different social worldsor systems where the overlaps between these different kind of boundaries constitutemuch of the governance issues related to horizontal innovation. And there is a discussionon boundaries there as well, especially if we include the cognitive and social aspectsin the governance discussion which was mentioned above.33

WHITE SPACES INNOVATION IN SWEDEN2.4 Why human complex systems are differentHuman systems are different from natural and biological because they are reflexivewhich means that we can learn. The major differentiator is that humans can communicateby the use of language which has been described as <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the coord<strong>in</strong>ation ofthe coord<strong>in</strong>ation of actions (Maturana and Varela (1980). Language can itself be seen ascomplex adaptive system but language and the communication and <strong>in</strong>teraction it allowsaffect <strong>in</strong>terplay between micro-macro levels <strong>in</strong> other systems. Humans are cognitiveagents set out to pursue purposeful action, i.e. action or <strong>in</strong>tervention based on <strong>in</strong>tentions<strong>in</strong>dividually and collectively. Here we should note Midgely´s (2000) suggestion that if<strong>in</strong>tervention is purposeful action by an agent to create change, then systemic <strong>in</strong>terventionis purposeful action by an agent to create change <strong>in</strong> relation to reflection onboundaries. What he means is that there is a need <strong>for</strong> agents to reflect critically upon,and make choices between, boundaries. Boundaries def<strong>in</strong>e both what issues are to be<strong>in</strong>cluded, excluded or marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>in</strong> analyses, and who is to be consulted or <strong>in</strong>volved(the two are obviously l<strong>in</strong>ked, as different agents will have different concerns). Becauseof the „who‟ question, issues of power and participation are unavoidable <strong>in</strong> systemic<strong>in</strong>tervention.Language is important from an <strong>in</strong>novation po<strong>in</strong>t of view which has to do with characterof the “knowledge boundaries” that have to be crossed. These are referred to <strong>in</strong>communications theory as syntactic, semantic and pragmatic boundaries and the higherthe novelty the more a need to be able communicate across the two latter categories ofboundaries (Star (1989), Carlile (2004) by mak<strong>in</strong>g use of boundary objects. These <strong>in</strong>turn allows <strong>for</strong> complexity absorption (Boisot & Child, 1999). This is not the place toexpand further on these topics. They are mentioned because they may play an importantrole <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>ation and sensemak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the generative phases of ideas and concepts.The issue of <strong>in</strong>tent and the consequences thereof make the issue of how boundariesare def<strong>in</strong>ed of <strong>in</strong>terest. The more universally a system is def<strong>in</strong>ed the less <strong>in</strong>fluence of<strong>in</strong>dividual and perhaps even collective action.It is clear that <strong>in</strong> order to be recognisable as such, a system must be bounded <strong>in</strong> someway. But as Cilliers (2001) says, as soon as one tries to be specific about the boundariesof a system, a number of difficulties become apparent. For example, it seems uncontroversialto claim that one has to be able to recognise what belongs to a specific system,and what does not. But complex systems are open systems where the relationshipsamongst the components of the system are usually more important than the componentsthemselves. S<strong>in</strong>ce there are also relationships with the environment, specify<strong>in</strong>g clearlywhere a boundary could be is not obvious. Cilliers suggest that we should th<strong>in</strong>k ofboundary as someth<strong>in</strong>g that constitutes that which is bounded <strong>in</strong> order to see the boundaryas someth<strong>in</strong>g enabl<strong>in</strong>g rather than as conf<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.As an illustration of this logic he presents the example of the eardrum. It <strong>for</strong>ms theboundary between the <strong>in</strong>ner and the outer ear, but at the same time, it exists <strong>in</strong> order to32

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