English - Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal ...
English - Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal ...
English - Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal ...
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The Remake of a Statequite a bit of confusion between DDR and SSR. Some treat DDR and SSRas two completely separate discipl<strong>in</strong>es while some take the completionof DDR as a precondition for <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g the SSR agenda. For countriesemerg<strong>in</strong>g from conflict, <strong>in</strong>tegration of ex-combatants <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> society andsecurity forces is a challeng<strong>in</strong>g task for the nation, political parties, civilsociety and ex-combatants themselves. Internationally, many countries<strong>in</strong>itiated DDR after peace agreements while only a few considered SSR.There have been a number of successful cases of <strong>in</strong>tegration betweenarmed groups and state security forces.Third is the disharmony between post-conflict state build<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st postconflictadm<strong>in</strong>istration and stabilisation. Knaus and Cox (2005) presentthe case of the Bosnia and Kosovo <strong>in</strong>terventions where a post-conflictsituation is dom<strong>in</strong>ated by undemocratic leaders, parties and movements,and by overrid<strong>in</strong>g ethnic or political divisions among them. A transitionaladm<strong>in</strong>istration must be strong enough <strong>to</strong> control, conta<strong>in</strong> and face downundemocratic elements, especially if they are armed and violent, andyet flexible enough <strong>to</strong> allow and <strong>in</strong>deed cultivate the emergence of local<strong>in</strong>itiative and control, the development of democratic self-governance.This may not be an impossible comb<strong>in</strong>ation, but <strong>in</strong> the fragile post-conflictsituations, it is a difficult one.Fourth is the tension between two compet<strong>in</strong>g visions of post-conflictstabilisation, one deeper, longer-termed and costlier, the other easier<strong>to</strong> secure but far more vulnerable <strong>to</strong> failure. There is a temptation <strong>in</strong> acountry that has been <strong>to</strong>rn by war <strong>to</strong> reach for a false sense of peacebecause it is quicker and easier <strong>to</strong> obta<strong>in</strong>—<strong>to</strong> defer <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itely the hardchallenge of SSR and management and <strong>in</strong>tegration of arms and armies.This happened with the first false start at peace <strong>in</strong> Sierra Leone, Angolaand Iraq, which led <strong>to</strong> the resumption of civil war and subsequent ris<strong>in</strong>glevels of violence.Fifth is the concern arisen from negotiations and political barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g amongthe UN and domestic political elites (Barma 2005). These <strong>in</strong>teractionsare constra<strong>in</strong>ed by the macro-structural context determ<strong>in</strong>ed by thehis<strong>to</strong>rical path of each country’s political and <strong>in</strong>stitutional development.The preced<strong>in</strong>g conflict is the most proximate event <strong>in</strong> such a path, s<strong>in</strong>ce itdeterm<strong>in</strong>es the distribution of power and other political resources (suchas money, militia control, and ethnic/<strong>in</strong>terest group support) amongdomestic elites. Other explana<strong>to</strong>ry variables take shape further back <strong>in</strong>the his<strong>to</strong>rical trajec<strong>to</strong>ries of the countries exam<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g pre-exist<strong>in</strong>gpolitical <strong>in</strong>stitutions and the his<strong>to</strong>rical antecedents <strong>to</strong> and nature of the291