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English - Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal ...

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The Remake of a Statedevoted <strong>to</strong> show that state agencies, supposed <strong>to</strong> be the cus<strong>to</strong>dian ofthe resources, are not compatible, for a number of reasons, <strong>to</strong> managecommon property resources such as forest effectively.4. Critical reflection on state agencies that govern statepropertyState property regimes are generally governed by the state agencies.Theoretically, these agencies are set up under the framework ofWeberian model of bureaucracy which are characterised by the rout<strong>in</strong>eformal procedures, formally specified roles and tasks; they are expected<strong>to</strong> perform with a predictable environment <strong>in</strong> close direction, and areevaluated us<strong>in</strong>g ‘objective’ criteria. They have an authoritative claim <strong>to</strong>rational and apolitical decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g, with a close analogy <strong>to</strong> a realmach<strong>in</strong>e as shown by the Weberian image of bureaucracy (Warwick1982; Moore 1992). The overrid<strong>in</strong>g notion of ‘standardisation’ and thereplicability of the mach<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>sulate bureaucrats from the society. In theWeberian model, the officials are merely an <strong>in</strong>strument for the rationalachievement of the normative goals set by the prevail<strong>in</strong>g political system.In the course of consider<strong>in</strong>g organisational goals, this model neglects thepersonal fac<strong>to</strong>rs that shape the <strong>in</strong>dividual action of any bureaucrat with<strong>in</strong>the organisation. Weber’s model lays emphasis more on maximum verticalcontrol from the hierarchical l<strong>in</strong>e-of-command with m<strong>in</strong>imum horizontal<strong>in</strong>tegration among other organisations and neglects the relationshipswith local communities. Although this is restricted <strong>in</strong> its applicability<strong>to</strong> the social and political times <strong>in</strong> which Weber lived (see for example,Jacob 1966; Stifel et al. 1977; Warwick 1982; Brett 1988; Moore 1992),it provides sufficient framework <strong>to</strong> analyse state agencies which governnatural resources such as forests, water and m<strong>in</strong>erals. There are numberof <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong>stitutional constra<strong>in</strong>ts with<strong>in</strong> bureaucracies that h<strong>in</strong>der stateagencies <strong>to</strong> govern the resources efficiently. Box 6.1 is an example of thestate forest agencies <strong>in</strong> many develop<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Nepal</strong>. Theorganisational behaviours of such state forest agencies are not compatible<strong>to</strong> govern the common property resources such as water and forests, onwhich the dependency of local and <strong>in</strong>digenous people for their livelihoodneeds is high.117

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