English - Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal ...

Forestland reformStewart 1989; Berkes 1989; Berkes and Farvar 1989; Berkes et al. 1989;Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992; Runge 1992; Ostrom1992; Shepherd 1992; Sarin 1993; Wollenberg and Hobley 1994; McKeanand Ostrom 1995; Scherr et al. 1995; Cleaver 1996; Hobley 1996; Ribotet al. 2006; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Meinzen-Dick 2006; Larson et al.2010) provide theoretical framework as well as empirical evidences toshow under what conditions ‘common property regimes’ perform betteror worse. According to them, user behaviour is based largely on howone person believes the other will act, and thus depends upon mutualassurance. Successful and sustained use of a common property dependson a pattern of interaction based on systems of reciprocity in which actorshelp each other either through action or restriction. Reciprocity in turndepends upon mutual expectations of positive performance, and thedecision making arrangements adopted by a group will aim to ensure thatthese expectations are fulfilled. Communities of users may develop systemswhich enable the enforcement of rules. They may also develop methods tomonitor each other as well as a means of accountability to ensure that theaccepted standards of reciprocity are met. When these mechanisms failand reciprocity breaks down, the management of the common property isthreatened with free-rider strategies and as a result ends with the ‘tragedyof the commons’ (see Hardin 1968) type outcomes. Most of the commonproperty literatures suggest that there are many places across the worldwhere common property regimes do function well. If communities aregranted autonomy and full tenure rights, common property regimes doesnot cause degradation of resources, instead many community groupsacross the world are capable of creating ‘robust’ common propertyregimes resulting in improved resource condition (see Hobley 1985; Wade1988; Berkes 1989; Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990;Bromley 1992; Shepherd 1992; McKean and Ostrom 1995; Agrawal andOstrom 2001; Meinzen-Dick 2006; Larson et al. 2010). They show thatcommon property also ensures equity which means whether individualsreceive a ‘fair’ return for their contribution to maintenance or not.When expectations of fairness or equity are substantially disappointed,a property regime is likely to breakdown. Oakerson (1986) suggests thatequity problems are exacerbated by asymmetries among users, whichcreate opportunities for some to benefit at others’ expense.From the results of a study of a wide range of successful and long-lastingcommon property resource institutions, Ostrom (1990) has highlighted114