Complete Issue - Shippensburg University

34 PROTEUS: A Journal of Ideasof the available rents are captured by those with power,influence, and wealth, and rent-seekers think using theresource efficiently is much less important than gainingcontrol of the allocation mechanism. Institutional rulesthat require irrigators to cover the cost of operatingand maintaining their systems and to contribute to therecovery of the initial investment in the institution,could help contain rent-seeking behaviours. However,that process could also be extremely challenging asthe Farfenga group showed. The norms applied ininformal relationships and used in cultural traditionare forms of a shared knowledge and as such implicitlyfostered by an innermost circle. This process ofinternal-values establishment with positive outcomeshas not been achieved in the Farfenga case. The mainreason could reside in the features of the internalvalues of the community members. Data show a clearpreference by these farmers towards selfish behavioursand attitudes, carried out in a short-time view of theexploitation process. Not seeing a common and sharedbenefit in cooperation, members’ inability of dialogueand deficiency of reciprocity made the institutioncollapse. Where substantial temptation to engage inopportunistic behaviour does exist, no set of rules willbe self-organized (Ostrom V. 1980). In such regard, thepresent research found the existence of a common setof internal values is useful in increasing the institutionalperformance and in controlling opportunisticbehaviours. If participants do not view the specificrules crafted to organize a particular irrigation systemas being appropriate, a behaviour that violates acceptednorms may not be sanctioned.As in the Farfenga case, if a formal structure isviewed as illegitimate, behaviour that undercuts themaintenance of that structure will not be viewed withdisapprobation. Consequently, if opportunism becomesthe dominant mode of behaviour in irrigation systems,ultimately all users will be hurt. When institutionsare well crafted, opportunism can be substantiallyreduced, and even if the temptations can never betotally eliminated, they can be held in check. Moreover,the data brought evidence that the existence of a smallnumber of social actors with Kantian aspects in ruralirrigation groups has remarkable effects on overcomingcollective action problems.In the Gabbiana case, farmers did not stop eitherthe constant maintenance of the channels or developingwater allocation procedures. The reason seems to residein a shared awareness regarding responsibilities onthe part of the whole community with regard to theresource, as well as personal exposure of long-termplanning among them. In particular, the person calledto supervise stream maintenance has had a key role inthis consciousness of the whole group about the needfor constant attention to water infrastructures. He hasbeen able to recognize the channels were as importanta resource as the water itself. As a consequence, hehas directed his efforts on activities, given for free,whose objective was to ensure an optimal level ofstream preservation over time. This sort of innovatorhas helped the community to overcome short-termexploitation of the resource, bringing it toward a moregeneral level of consciousness about needs of sharingcommunitarian values among farmers. In his ownbehaviour, he clearly shows Kantian aspects, as well as astrong consistency with Boudon’s axiological rationality.As Gabbiana case shows, in order to decreaseopportunistic behaviours community members needto invest voluntarily in coordination activities suchas monitoring and sanctioning, along with constantirrigation channel maintenance. Coordination couldbe achieved by learning how to do joint tasks better, byassigning one person the responsibility to be in chargeof other users, and by establishing a rule specifyinghow particular activities are to be undertaken, alongwith establishing how that same rule is monitored andenforced by participants, external enforcements, orboth.This research stressed the existence of a commonset of values is extremely useful in increasingthe institutional performance and in controllingopportunistic behaviours. An important point torecognize is that genuine trustworthiness, i.e. theindividual preferences consistent with conditionalcooperation, is an independent and non-reduciblereason for explaining how communities achieveenvironmental preservation. Trust is the most powerfulinstrument of connection between institutionalarrangements and values. It is enhanced whenindividuals are trustworthy, networked with oneanother, and acting within institutions that rewardhonest behaviours (Marshall 2005).The present results also support Ostrom’s (1998,1999) idea of a core relationship existing among trust,reputation, and reciprocity. It has been determinate,indeed, that those factors are dependent on thecommunity’s past experiences and on the capacity oftheir members to recognize a major common interestin preserving the resources. Once in place, those factorsenhance the capacity of a community to govern itsenvironment and, in particular, to foster the process ofinstitutional adaptation that is necessary for a long termmanagement of water resources.