The Navy Vol_64_Part2 2002 - Navy League of Australia

of large quantities of material. This means that much logisticeffort,whether directed towards maritime combat forces ornot, will be by sea. Shipping must thus be considered a jointlogistic asset. Its protection may well become a critical issuewithin a campaign that has few other apparent maritimedimensions.Shore support facilities such as the submarine training establishment in WAare vital to train new submariners and sharpen the skills of existingsubmariners. < RAN IThe logistic capacity of maritime forces can also act as aforce multiplier. Ships can provide a large range of logisticsupportto land and air units and arc especially useful inproviding these services in the interim while single services'support units are deploying. That maritime forces are largelyself-reliant and are not adversely affected logistically bydifferent operating areas to the same extent as land or airforces remains a strategic advantage. Furthermore, althoughthe concepts of lines of communications can be applied toboth land and maritime environments, they do noi mean thesame thing and pose very different problems of security andprotection.Shore SupportThe logistic support process is founded directly upon shoresupport, a concept which embraces not only service facilitiessuch as bases and supply depots, but private contractors, bothdomestic and international, as well as formal arrangementswith allied governments for access to material and technicalsupport. The sophistication of such support will depend uponthe point within the logistic chain that it operates, as well asthe urgency of the need.The operations of deployed maritime forces can begreatly assisted by the provision of local host nation support.Even at its simplest, in the form of sheltered anchorages,such support can considerably reduce the difficulties ofre-supply and provide the opportunities for stand-downsand deep maintenance which will considerably increase thelength of time which units can remain operationally efficientin area. However, it is also true that such host nationsupport is not an absolute necessity for maritime forces,provided that sufficient seaborne support exists to accomplishthe mission.Reach and SustainmentHowever capable the maritime combat forces, theirpotential is enormously increased by the presence of supportvessels. In fact, unless maritime units are acting purely incoastal defence roles at short distances from their shore bases,there are very fe* modern maritime operations which can beconducted effectively without such support. At its mostsophisticated, extending to repair ships as well as stores,ammunition, food and fuel supply units, such support canmake maritime combat forces indefinitely independent of theshore. This level of capability is currently possessed in fullmeasure only by the United States and to a degree by theUnited Kingdom. Smaller forces, such as those of Australia,nevertheless achieve a high degree of force multiplication bythe possession of replenishment ships which are primarilyconfigured to provide liquid fuels but can also supply limitedamounts of ammunition, stores and food. Within theAustralian context, a credible surface task group for extendedmaritime operations will always include a replenishmentship. The inicr-operability of most maritime forcesfor replenishment is itself a significant force multiplier thaiallows the rapid combination of coalition forces in anemergency.Larger combinations of maritime forces can achieveeconomies of scale in the critical areas of spares, storessupport and repair expertise. Mechanisms exist for the stockholdings of vital spare parts to be "screened", such that theycan be transferred from one unit to another which has a defect.This procedure is regularly conducted during internationalexercises and operations and extends to the loan of expertmaintainers to rectify difficult defects. The process is greatlyassisted by commonality in equipment between Navies.The former HMAS JERVIS BAY being overflown by a Sea King helict>picrin East Timor. The ability of the RAN to Take Ships Up Erom Trade', suchas JERVIS BAY. was an important enabler to the East Timor Operation.(RAN)Ships Taken Up From TradeSupport capabilities can be improved by taking merchantships up from trade and converting them to the extent requiredby the operation. These vessels cannot replicate thecapabilities of built for the purpose replenishment units, butthey can play a vital role in maximising the capacity of thelatter by acting as re-supply units between shore bases and the16 VOL. 64 NO. I THE NAVYoperational area. If vessels are to be taken up from trade, thenmechanisms need to exist for their identification within thenational register and charter or requisitioning. In thesecircumstances, the possession of a substantial national flagmerchant fleet can be an important strategic advantage.Merchant vessels can also be employed to provide sea lift forthe movement of land forces and their logistic support.Nations with smaller merchant fleets may be forced topurchase or charter ships for these purposes from overseassources, an expedient which can be difficult to achieve inemergencies.ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGEUnderstanding of the environment in which maritimeforces operate is critical to the success of operations. Crediblemaritime combat capability therefore depends fundamentallyupon the ability to access and analyse environmentalknowledge. If this does not exist, then deployment plans canbe flawed by the use of unsuitable platforms, surveillanceintentions can be thwarted by the inability of sensors to meetrequirements and weapons may prove ineffective against keytargets. There are three main areas of effort in this regard, allof which are important for commanders and planners at alllevels of warfare. They are hydrography, oceanography andmeteorology.iHydrographers in a small boat conduct a survey of the approaches to DiliHarbour during the East Timor Operation. Without accurate underwatercharts Navy's ability to operate in unfamiliar water is greatlyreduced. (RAN)HydrographyNaval hydrographic forces work in peacetime to surveyand chart littoral and ocean areas in accordance with strategicguidance.Much of this effort is focused towards therequirements of commercial shipping, generally aimed atshortening trade routes, reducing existing uncertainties oranomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. There arc obviousflow ons for combat forces from this activity, but surveyingwork in peacetime can also be used to improve theunderstanding of areas in which operations may take place.These can involve either the littoral, including beach surveyswhich extend to the hinterland of possible landing areas foramphibious forces, or deep water, particularly wheresubmarine operations are involved. These activities givecombat forces increased freedom of manoeuvre.Hydrographic units also have important roles duringconflict. They may be required to conduct precursor surveysTHE NAVYVOL. 64 NO. I 33Two of the RAN's inshore hydrographic vessels. Much of the RAN'shy drographic effort is focused towards the requirements of commercialshipping, generally aimed at shortening trade routes, reducing existinguncertainties or anomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. (RAN)for amphibious operations or to act in conjunction with minecountermeasure forces in assessing shipping routes which willbe safe from mines.OceanographyOceanography plays a vital role in undersea warfare, notonly for submarines themselves, but also for anti-submarineand mine warfare forces. For efficient operations, these unitsrequire not only an extensive knowledge of the watermass inwhich they are operating, but the means to analyse prevailingconditions and predict sensor and weapon performance. Inpeacetime, much effort must go towards the development ofsophisticated databases of watermass characteristics, such astemperature, current and turbidity, and the refinement ofpredictive models. In addition to training and exercises, theseactivities contribute much to weapon and sensor developmentfor the long term. In time of conflict, such efforts may requireto be both continued and concentrated within specificoperation areas and the means provided to planners andoperational units to exploit such knowledge in the mosteffective ways. This requires the maintenance of a core ofpersonnel expert in the subject and skilled in providing theappropriate advice and guidance.MeteorologySimilar requirements apply to the effects of weather onnaval operations. Planners and commanders need to draw oncomprehensive databases, well developed prediction systemsand expert analysts. In time of peace, the gathering of datawithin expected areas of operation is a constant activity by al 1units, while the effects of weather need to be clearlyunderstood by those developing operational concepts and newweapons and sensors. In the operational environment,meteorologists arc vital contributors towards ensuring thatunits are deployed and operated to best effect within theprevailing conditions. J,