The Navy Vol_64_Part2 2002 - Navy League of Australia

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The Australian built An/ac class frigate HMAS WARRAMUNGA proceeding down Cockburn Sound in WA. While many only see the "sharp end' of anavy. HQ. shore support facilities, industry and hydrography services all act as vital enahlers and force multipliers of maritime power. (RAN)In part 6 of our presentation of the RAN's new Maritime Doctrine we detail Chapter 9 on The Knablers of MaritimeForces. The document was written by the Seapower Centre and is reproduced in THE NAVY, with the Centre'sapproval. Riven its importance to readers of THE NAVY. Australiaas and to the Navy league in general.Chapter 9THE ENABLERS OFMARITIME FORCESThe enablers of maritime forces are the structures, systemsand elements which support the armed forces within themaritime environment.ORGANISATIONThe effective organisation of the Navy is fundamental toits efficiency and its capacity to accomplish its missions. Theobjective of the RAN's current structure is to align the entireService and its supporting agencies into a system which isfocused on the delivery of combat capability.The Chief of Navy commands and is responsible forraising, training and sustaining the RAN. Under him are Avemajor elements: Navy Headquarters (NHQ). the ForceElement Groups (FEGs). Navy Systems Command(NAVSYSCOM). Support Command (Navy) (SCA(N)) (untillate 2000) and Maritime Command (MHQAUST). TheMaritime Commander Australia has operationalresponsibilities to the Commander Australian Theatre and theChief of Defence Force.The core of this structure are the Force Element Groups(FEGs) as the centre of capability output and managementwith responsibilities direct to the Chief of Navy for capabilitymanagement and direct to the Maritime Commander foroperational output delivery. The FEGs arc divided intoAviation. Submarines. Surface Combatants. Patrol Forces.Amphibious and Afloat Support. Hydrography, and MineWarfare and Clearance Diving.Navy Systems Command and Support Command (Navy)Provide services commonly required to some extent by allseven FEGs. The FEGs are functionally located withinMaritime Command. The FEGs draw together FEG specificoperations and preparedness, doctrine, research, developmentand capability proposals, integrated logistics andconfiguration management, repair and maintenance, trainingand personnel requirements, and resource management.The FEGs define and articulate their requirements,priorities and expectations from other agencies and serviceproviders. They monitor the delivery of goods and services toachieve goals defined by the Chief of Navy and the MaritimeCommander.Navy Headquarters supports the Chief of Navy in directingNavy capability management and the delivery of the DefenceOutput for which the Chief of Navy is responsible, togetherwith Navy contributions to other Defence Outputs.Navy Systems Command integrates centres of knowledgeand expertise in key technology areas with logisticsrequirements, personnel (including training) and safety. It isthe provider of Navy services required by other elements. Itis responsible for command, control, communications,computers and intelligence (C4I): the delivery of personneland training: systems support: safety, certification and audit:and command of fleet bases and establishments.NUSHIP STUART at the Tenix dockyard in Melbourne. BALI.ARAT canbe seen in the background just prior to her launch. Navies are particularlydemanding in terms of technology and manufacturing and the RAN is noexception. An effective relationship with national industry is vital for thedevelopment, manufacture and support of sophisticated combatforces. (Tenix)Support Command (Navy) is the Navy Component ofSupport Command Australia. The fundamental charter of theSupport Command is to provide Joint Logistics and systemsto take advantage of national economics of scale. Within itsLogistics Operations branch and its Commodore LogisticsNavy branch. Support Command (Navy) provides a widerange of logistics, material support and minor projectmanagement services for the Navy as a whole, as well as toother ADF agencies. Support Command will soon be foldedinto the new Defence Material Organisation which will takeresponsibility for provision of these services. Acquisition ofmajor projects will also fall within these new arrangements.Maritime Commander Australia has responsibility to theChief of Navy for the full command of assigned assets and toCommander Australian Theatre for the planning and conductof operations as directed. While thr Chief of Navy setsstrategic Navy requirements and priorities, the MaritimeCommander is responsible for implementing these at theoperational level. The Maritime Commander thus has dualresponsibilities: to the Commander Australian Theatre as theNaval Component Commander (NCC) and to the Chief ofNavy as the commander and operator of the Fleet. Seatraining, assessment and cross-FEG operational integrationare major activities for Maritime Headquarters.NATIONAL INDUSTRYAn effective relationship with national industry is vital forthe development and support of sophisticated combat forces.Navies are particularly demanding in terms of technology andmanufacturing. Properly managed, however, the successfulmeeting of such demands on shipbuilding, systemdevelopment and integration, as well as in service supportbrings substantial benefits for industry and for the nationaleconomy.A careful balance needs to be maintained by countriessuch as Australia lo ensure that capability requirements areproperly met while such national benefits are gained over thelong term. The fact that many elements of maritime capabilityseek lo exploit the latest advantages in technology as theydevelop means that accepting technical risks is an inevitableaccompaniment of this process. Success in meeting thischallenge depends upon close co-operation between all levelsof Government. Defence and industry.MARITIME LOGISTICSLogistic support exists to ensure that combat forces canmeet readiness levels and be deployed, sustained andredeployed to meet the operational aims of the commander.Logistic support includes the provision of the stores and spareparts required by units, the supply and re-supply of fuel andlubricants, ammunition and food, and the provision ofmedical support, maintenance support, personnel support andhotel services. Maritime logistic support exists to providethese services to maritime combat units.In practice, logistic support will often be conducted on ajoint basis and logistic related issues lend themselves readilyto the economies of effort possible by integration of the needsof the various environments. There are. however, significantdifferences between the three Services' logistic systems. Thestrategic, operational and tactical levels of logistics consist ofmany support organisations manned by ADF. Defencecivilian personnel and contractors. Continuity of logisticsupport is paramount to combat success.The naval logistics system is structured very differently tothose of the other Services because of the differences in theenvironment in which the Navy operates. Generally speaking.Navy's fundamental unit of combat is a warship. Its logisticcapability is inherent in the design. Ships deploy from theirhome ports with spare parts typically of an endurance level of90 days, rations typically of 30 days and with large quantitiesof fuel onboard.HMAS WESTRALIA conducts an underway replenishment of HMASADELAIDE. Logistics support at sea is imperative if a Navy is to keepships on station. (RAN)Naval forces are therefore largely self-sustaining for longperiods if supported by an underway replenishment groupand the "pull" forward of mission critical stores. Thiscontrasts to the "push" system used for land forces where thefundamental unit of combat is the soldier who has limitedcapacity for self-support.Australia's strategic circumstances reinforce the truismthat the sea remains the principal medium for the movementVOL. 64 NO. 4THE NAVYTHE NAVY VOL 64 NO. 4 15
of large quantities of material. This means that much logisticeffort,whether directed towards maritime combat forces ornot, will be by sea. Shipping must thus be considered a jointlogistic asset. Its protection may well become a critical issuewithin a campaign that has few other apparent maritimedimensions.Shore support facilities such as the submarine training establishment in WAare vital to train new submariners and sharpen the skills of existingsubmariners. < RAN IThe logistic capacity of maritime forces can also act as aforce multiplier. Ships can provide a large range of logisticsupportto land and air units and arc especially useful inproviding these services in the interim while single services'support units are deploying. That maritime forces are largelyself-reliant and are not adversely affected logistically bydifferent operating areas to the same extent as land or airforces remains a strategic advantage. Furthermore, althoughthe concepts of lines of communications can be applied toboth land and maritime environments, they do noi mean thesame thing and pose very different problems of security andprotection.Shore SupportThe logistic support process is founded directly upon shoresupport, a concept which embraces not only service facilitiessuch as bases and supply depots, but private contractors, bothdomestic and international, as well as formal arrangementswith allied governments for access to material and technicalsupport. The sophistication of such support will depend uponthe point within the logistic chain that it operates, as well asthe urgency of the need.The operations of deployed maritime forces can begreatly assisted by the provision of local host nation support.Even at its simplest, in the form of sheltered anchorages,such support can considerably reduce the difficulties ofre-supply and provide the opportunities for stand-downsand deep maintenance which will considerably increase thelength of time which units can remain operationally efficientin area. However, it is also true that such host nationsupport is not an absolute necessity for maritime forces,provided that sufficient seaborne support exists to accomplishthe mission.Reach and SustainmentHowever capable the maritime combat forces, theirpotential is enormously increased by the presence of supportvessels. In fact, unless maritime units are acting purely incoastal defence roles at short distances from their shore bases,there are very fe* modern maritime operations which can beconducted effectively without such support. At its mostsophisticated, extending to repair ships as well as stores,ammunition, food and fuel supply units, such support canmake maritime combat forces indefinitely independent of theshore. This level of capability is currently possessed in fullmeasure only by the United States and to a degree by theUnited Kingdom. Smaller forces, such as those of Australia,nevertheless achieve a high degree of force multiplication bythe possession of replenishment ships which are primarilyconfigured to provide liquid fuels but can also supply limitedamounts of ammunition, stores and food. Within theAustralian context, a credible surface task group for extendedmaritime operations will always include a replenishmentship. The inicr-operability of most maritime forcesfor replenishment is itself a significant force multiplier thaiallows the rapid combination of coalition forces in anemergency.Larger combinations of maritime forces can achieveeconomies of scale in the critical areas of spares, storessupport and repair expertise. Mechanisms exist for the stockholdings of vital spare parts to be "screened", such that theycan be transferred from one unit to another which has a defect.This procedure is regularly conducted during internationalexercises and operations and extends to the loan of expertmaintainers to rectify difficult defects. The process is greatlyassisted by commonality in equipment between Navies.The former HMAS JERVIS BAY being overflown by a Sea King helict>picrin East Timor. The ability of the RAN to Take Ships Up Erom Trade', suchas JERVIS BAY. was an important enabler to the East Timor Operation.(RAN)Ships Taken Up From TradeSupport capabilities can be improved by taking merchantships up from trade and converting them to the extent requiredby the operation. These vessels cannot replicate thecapabilities of built for the purpose replenishment units, butthey can play a vital role in maximising the capacity of thelatter by acting as re-supply units between shore bases and the16 VOL. 64 NO. I THE NAVYoperational area. If vessels are to be taken up from trade, thenmechanisms need to exist for their identification within thenational register and charter or requisitioning. In thesecircumstances, the possession of a substantial national flagmerchant fleet can be an important strategic advantage.Merchant vessels can also be employed to provide sea lift forthe movement of land forces and their logistic support.Nations with smaller merchant fleets may be forced topurchase or charter ships for these purposes from overseassources, an expedient which can be difficult to achieve inemergencies.ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGEUnderstanding of the environment in which maritimeforces operate is critical to the success of operations. Crediblemaritime combat capability therefore depends fundamentallyupon the ability to access and analyse environmentalknowledge. If this does not exist, then deployment plans canbe flawed by the use of unsuitable platforms, surveillanceintentions can be thwarted by the inability of sensors to meetrequirements and weapons may prove ineffective against keytargets. There are three main areas of effort in this regard, allof which are important for commanders and planners at alllevels of warfare. They are hydrography, oceanography andmeteorology.iHydrographers in a small boat conduct a survey of the approaches to DiliHarbour during the East Timor Operation. Without accurate underwatercharts Navy's ability to operate in unfamiliar water is greatlyreduced. (RAN)HydrographyNaval hydrographic forces work in peacetime to surveyand chart littoral and ocean areas in accordance with strategicguidance.Much of this effort is focused towards therequirements of commercial shipping, generally aimed atshortening trade routes, reducing existing uncertainties oranomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. There arc obviousflow ons for combat forces from this activity, but surveyingwork in peacetime can also be used to improve theunderstanding of areas in which operations may take place.These can involve either the littoral, including beach surveyswhich extend to the hinterland of possible landing areas foramphibious forces, or deep water, particularly wheresubmarine operations are involved. These activities givecombat forces increased freedom of manoeuvre.Hydrographic units also have important roles duringconflict. They may be required to conduct precursor surveysTHE NAVYVOL. 64 NO. I 33Two of the RAN's inshore hydrographic vessels. Much of the RAN'shy drographic effort is focused towards the requirements of commercialshipping, generally aimed at shortening trade routes, reducing existinguncertainties or anomalies from older surveys and allowing deeper draughtships or fishing vessels to operate safely. (RAN)for amphibious operations or to act in conjunction with minecountermeasure forces in assessing shipping routes which willbe safe from mines.OceanographyOceanography plays a vital role in undersea warfare, notonly for submarines themselves, but also for anti-submarineand mine warfare forces. For efficient operations, these unitsrequire not only an extensive knowledge of the watermass inwhich they are operating, but the means to analyse prevailingconditions and predict sensor and weapon performance. Inpeacetime, much effort must go towards the development ofsophisticated databases of watermass characteristics, such astemperature, current and turbidity, and the refinement ofpredictive models. In addition to training and exercises, theseactivities contribute much to weapon and sensor developmentfor the long term. In time of conflict, such efforts may requireto be both continued and concentrated within specificoperation areas and the means provided to planners andoperational units to exploit such knowledge in the mosteffective ways. This requires the maintenance of a core ofpersonnel expert in the subject and skilled in providing theappropriate advice and guidance.MeteorologySimilar requirements apply to the effects of weather onnaval operations. Planners and commanders need to draw oncomprehensive databases, well developed prediction systemsand expert analysts. In time of peace, the gathering of datawithin expected areas of operation is a constant activity by al 1units, while the effects of weather need to be clearlyunderstood by those developing operational concepts and newweapons and sensors. In the operational environment,meteorologists arc vital contributors towards ensuring thatunits are deployed and operated to best effect within theprevailing conditions. J,
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Page 43 and 44: * * *• * ** ¥ *AJERRY BRUCKHEIME

The Navy Vol_64_Part2 2002 - Navy League of Australia

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