The Navy Vol_64_Part2 2002 - Navy League of Australia

and long term assistance in disaster relict, not only for coastallocations, hut sometimes well inland. While shiphornehelicopters can be particularly useful and ships may act aslogistic support bases, hospitals and command posts for longperiods, the specialist skills available in ships also mean thattheir personnel can be invaluable sources of trained manpowerfor rehabilitation and repair work. Naval forces are selfsupportingand do not create logistic burdens in situationswhere infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged.Disaster relief is one of die many activities to which navalforces can be expected to make an immediate and effectivecontribution with little or no warning.Defence Force Assistance to Allied and Friendly NationsDefence Force assistance can be provided to other countries ina wide variety of ways. In addition to those benign activitiesalready listed, maritime forces can exercise with and assistwith the training of other national forces to increase theireffectiveness. Examples include the provision of subsurface orair assets to practice the tactics of undersea and air warfare toa sophistication which is not possible in the absence of therelevant force elements, as well as the sharing of intelligenceand surveillance dala.Chapter STHE MOST IMPORTANTFACTOR• . - . ' „ .. v .THE HUMAN FACTOR[ It is not technology which gives the Navy capability bin theI way that technology is employed. The capabilities represented| by systems that can be effectively employed and sustainedtake many years to develop in maritime forces and they aremuch easier to lose than tlicy are to create. It is people whogenerate the real capabilities that (IK RAN's surface ships.! submarines, aircraft and support organisations represent.I People are thus the musl important factor lor the Navy'sj operations. The RAN has a history of achievement anilexcellence which provides a firm foundation for its currentactivities and for the future, but this Inundation is one thaican rapidly be eroded if wc do not give theNavy's people the priority theydeserve.. Life at SeaLife at sea is unlike any other. The maritime environment istiring, demanding and unforgiving. Maritime operations are-•fcfct unremitting atteotion to the task in hand and maritimewarfare isTharacterised by long periods of surveillance andpatrol" followed by short bursts of intense and .destructivecombat.Peacetime operations require nearly the same degree ofcommitment and effort and they, too. can be arduous andunremitting. Officers and sailors in seagoing units-as well asthe soldiers and airmen who go with them-must live and workfor long periods in very close proximity to each other. Eventhe biggest ships are cramped and confined and all are subjectto the effects of weather and seastale. All in their crews mustbe constantly alert to the possibility of emergencies and theunexpected. Even in harbour, ships require watchkccpingpersonnel to ensure their safe operation and physicalintegrity.DisciplineIt follows from the nature of life at sea that naval discipline isas much self-discipline as it is externally imposed. There areoccasions on which orders need to be obeyed instantly andw ithout question, but the key elements of naval discipline areco-operation and teamwork. Naval discipline at its best is theresult of a clear understanding of the code of hchaviouirequired 111 a war lighting and seagoing sen ice li pn»\ ides theframework b\ which personnel i .in o|«eiatc elle»n\el\ uudeithe strain, slun k and leai ol ui.iiiluue COIIIIK IMoraleMm oh IN defined .IN the state ol mind of a group of people asrcllcctcd by then behaviour under all conditions. Indeveloping morale, although it is a collective quality, it isnecessary to start with the individual as the way to stabilisethe group. The creation of high morale depends upon a way oflife. Naval training must focus on the development of thequalities needed to create a spirit which, sustainedprofessional mastery and leadership, will never acceptdefeat.BLeadershipLeadership in the maritime environment is as vital as that onland. Its nature and exercise nrc, however, different becausethe nature of what is done at sea and on land arc themselvesvery different. The focus at sea is on the effort of the entirecrew to place the combat instrument which is tlie ship into thecontrol of the directing mind of the commander. No bullet isfired, no nubile can be launched without specific commanddirection. With very few exceptions this applies even in themost intense of combat situations and it is never widelydelegated. By contrast, the infantry commander must lead hismen as individuals to make their singular contributions to thecombat effort in accordance with his intent. It is a fairgeneralisation to say that the aim of leadership at sea is theship's company and their ship as a fighting instrument and theaim on land is the individual as a fighting instrument.This means that leadership at sea depends vitally uponprofessional competence, but in no way does it diminish theimportance of die human element. One advantage that theleader at sea possesses is that risk is shared by allthose onboard the ships involved incombat. The need for teamwork,the enclosed and confinednature of the shipboardenvironment andthe long andarduous natureof maritimeoperation Nsuch capability set forachievement will dependupon the operationalrequirement but no unitwill be deployedfor peacetimeservice untilit has^ • • W V 'ivUK.Ill lll.ltreached the Minimum Level of Operational Capabilityli .ulei--IIIII IIIIINI IK.(MLOC). An assessment as to whether a ship has achieved this\ ii.il. |H-rsonal and consistent. The crowning example of naval state will be made by the staff of the Sea Trainingleadership remains that of Lord Nelson, whose ability logenerate enthusiasm and devotion amongst his subordinates atevery level was a basic element of his success in battle. Anoutstanding Australian naval leader was Captain 'Hec' WallerCroup. Certain threats or contingencies will require priority tobe given to particular warfare areas or techniques, while otherscan be held at designated peacetime standards. This focusingallows the most efficient allocation of resources, as well aswhose command of IIMAS Stuart (1) and the 'Scrap Ironensuring that forces are provided as quickly as possible.Flotilla' in 1039-41 set a standard recognisedDesignating the standards required for peacetimeby all who knew him.operations is a particularly important process. It must draw aTrainingThe processes by which men andbalance between achieving standards which will make thetransition to battle readiness as rapid as possible, as well aswomen are trained for improving professional performance generally, and not askingmaritime combat involve more of personnel than they are able to give, not just in a singlework up or commission, but for an entire seagoing career.ptfjfBattle Readiness and Combat Stress_ , Units must be in a battle ready state before theyentei the area of operations. This condition isnot something that is wholly susceptible toobjective measurement and its attainment must bea matter of judgement on the part of thoseresponsible for combat training and those who willcommand the operation. In reality, the preparations fordeployment will be working against time and the packageof preparative training will almost always be a compromisebetween operational imj .-ratives and training ideals. It isalmost certain that units will not achieve their highest degree•>;.->' both individual and collective of battle readiness until they have actually had someefltotis. The complexities of modem experience of combat and developed confidence in their own• nbatants tAd the systems that they carry mean fighting abilities and in those of the other units with whichthat uaval personnel of all ranks and specialisations require they operate. This will be particularly true in the case of,jointintelligence and a high level of education from the outset, or coalition operations, in which pre-existing 'sharedwhile the provision of quality basic and specialist training onentry Is essential, particularly in an eia of minimum manningconcepts. It is a reality, however, that the individual's trainingas a sailor will not be completed until after he or she has hadexperience is less likely.The maintenance of a battle ready state is one oC^thc -primary responsibilities ol commanders. They must be able to 4demand.the utmost from their people and systems withoutihe first hand experience of seagoing.Units newly commissioned or operational after extendedperiods of leave and maintenance, both of which usuallyinvolve considerable changeover of personnel, cannot beexhausting them beyond the point of no return. Thisof effort also applies to commanders themselves,must be able to maintain their personal efficiencyconserve their strength for the critical periods. Crew-expected to conduct operations with any degree of efficiency. and mutual trust and support are essential factors in sustaining- *Ships in these circumstances require to conduct harbour battle readiness.training nnd systemch&JS^heff>re they go to sea to shakedown to achieve minimum standards of safety and work up HMAS KANIMBLA (clocefl t«. earner*) and HMAS ADELAIDE in the^to achieve the operational capability requited. The level of Persian Gulf conductinc emhar?o/sanciiom enforcement operations, (RAN)THE NAVY